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To my wife, my children, and my grandson, especially to Roxanna 
and Alexander, so that they can understand someday the value that our 
democratic institutions bestow to the search for historical truth! 
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PREFACE 
This study concerns the historical and political factors that pre-
vented the expansion of the Spanish American movement for independence 
to the Caribbean during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. 
It also entails an examination of the evolutionary aspects of the Cuban 
and Puerto Rican independence movements, a discussion of the influence 
exercised by the United States and the European powers in the Hest In-
dies, and an evaluation of Spain 1 s imperial policies in the Caribbean. 
An examination of the historical records of the period reveals 
that the influence of the United States, Great Britain, and France 
significantly affected the political processes of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. During that 
time, the United States and the European pmvers struggled for commer-
cial and political supremacy in the Caribbean as a result of the uncer-
tainties created by the Congress of Vienna, the apparent threat to their 
trading interests, ru1d the fear of imperial restoration in Spain's for-
mer colonies. This conflict prevented the independence of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico when local conditions, created by the instability of the 
peninsular government and the chaos which resulted during the \vars for 
independence in Spanish America, were most favorable for accomplishing 
that goal. The struggle beuveen the United States and the Luropean pow-
ers for the control of the Caribbean also shaped the relations of the 
United States with Spanish America and the attitude of Mexico and Colom-
bia toward American foreign policy. 
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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL R~CKGROUND 
During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the 
United States, Great Britain, and France struggled for commercial and 
political supremacy in the Caribbean as a result of the uncertainties 
created by the Congress of Vienna, the apparent threat to their trading 
interests, and the fear of imperial restoration in Spain's former col-
onies. This conflict prevented the independence of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico when local conditions, created by the instability of tl1e penin-
sular government and the chaos which resulted during the wars for in-
dependence in Spanish America, were most favorable for accomplishing 
that goal. The struggle between the United States and the European pow-
ers for control of the Caribbean also shaped the relations of the Unit-
ed States with Spanish America and the attitude of Mexico and Colombia 
toward American foreign policy. 
Host of the present political, social, and economic problems of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico can be traced directly to the results of Spanish 
colonialism. In the sixteenth century these islands became part of the 
Spanish colonial empire as result of their discovery in 1492 and 1493. 
Since the colonies had limited resources and smilll productive pop;tla.-
tions, Spain did not value them highly except as military outposts pro-
tecting the main entrances to the Caribbean. While the colonial govern-
ment introduced on a limited scale the social and economic institutions 
1. 
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which characterized its administration in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba 
and Puerto Rico never developed beyond the level of poor colonies. 
During the entire colonial regime ,the available agricultural land 
remained divided into large plantations and landownership became limit-
ed to a few individuals. This system, supported by the importation of 
African slaves, dominated the colonial economy, except for a brief pe-
riod during the nineteenth century when foreign immigration and some 
foreign trade intensified economic growth. Repressive monopolies, high 
taxes, and a centralized and autocratic military government restricted 
the growth of political and economic institutions during most of the 
colonial period. The strategic positions of the islands, however, 
. guaranteed a continuance of political interest by Spain as well as by 
other countries. Despite the repressiveness of the government and the 
bacl~vater conditions of the colonies, the people remained loyal to the 
Crown during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 1 
In the nineteenth century, however, the political turmoil that be-
sieged Spain and her colonies as a result of the Napoleonic invasion 
caused great anxiety and concern among the Cubans and Puerto Ricans. 
The islands undenvent a period of uncertainty when a constitutional 
monarchy and the basic principles of the French revolution became part 
of the aspirations of the Spanish people. The French invasion of Spain 
and the indecisive actions of the Spanish government also affected the 
political expectations and loyalty of the colonies. A rising national 
conciousness began to manifest itself among the Cuban and Puerto Ricans, 
influenced both by the political events on the peninsula and by their 
belief in the inevitability of a prolonged struggle for independence 
in Spanish America. 
--- ------- --------
The failure of the liberal reforms in Spain and the return of 
absolutism in 1814 resulted in increasing attempts for political and 
economic emancipation in the islands. The movement for independence 
in Venezuela and Santo Domingo strengthened the nationalistic spirit 
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of Cuban and Puerto Rican separatists. The progressive views of the 
Cortes (Spanish parliament} encouraged those who preferred permanent 
economic and political changes to complete independence. The repres-
sive measures tru{en by the Spanish colonial officials, the exile of 
several important radical leaders, and the factional disputes between 
conservatives, liberals, and separatists considerably affected the 
struggle for self-government. The isolation of the islands from the 
mainstream of revolutionary activity and the impact of thousands of 
Spanish refugees who arrived from other parts of Spanish America also 
had some effect. But the most important reason why Cuba and Puerto 
Rico remained colonies of Spain during the first part of the nineteenth 
century \'las the intervention of the United States and the European pow-
ers in the political affairs of the Caribbean. 
The United States intervened in the Caribbean to protect its grow-
ing interests in the West Indies. The concern for the nation's secur-
ity, the need to protect her trade and commerce, and the fear that the 
Spanish American conflict i'lould eventually spread to her own borders 
were compelling reasons for the intervention of the United States. The 
threat to the institution of slavery and the desire of some Southern 
political leaders for territorial expansion in the Caribbean were also 
factors of considerable importance. 
National interests made necessary the prevention of non-Spanish 
foreign control of the Caribbean. Neither was it in the best interests 
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of the United States either to allow Cuba and Puerto Rico gain self-
government because of the possibility that Great Britain or France 
\vould seize them after independence. This circumstance, it was believed, 
would seriously compromise United States national security and damage 
h 'al and ad . . tl 2 er commerc~ tr e ~nterests ~ 1e area. 
Great Britain and France also opposed the possession or control 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico by any other po\ver besides Spain. Great Brit-
ain had friendly relations with Spain and was a colonial pmver lfith 
possessions of her own in the West Indies. She did not desire to dis-
turb the Antillean settlement reached in the Congress of Vienna by which 
she had acquired the British Guiana, Tobago, and St. Lucia, major sources 
of world sugar. In Vienna, Great Britain could have demanded the trans-
fer of all the remaining French colonies in the Caribbean, but her mod-
erate demands had resulted in a satisfactory balance of European interests 
in the area. Great Britain also believed that the possession of Cuba 
or Puerto Rico by the United States would jeopardize her West Indian 
trade and ruin the nation 1 s growing commercial interests in the \vest-
ern Hemisphere. On November 15, 1822, British Foreign Secretary George 
Canning wrote that "it may be questioned \vhether any blow that could 
be struck by any foreign power in any part of the world would have a 
more sensible effect on the interests of this country or in the repu-
tation of its Government.n3 
France, like Great Britain, also had important commercial inter-
ests in the Caribbean region. l•lith the loss of Haiti, Tobago, and St. 
Lucia, her only footl1olds in the area \vere the islands of Guadeloupe 
and Martinique. Since France desired to establish commercial control 
in the West Indies, she looked with great interest upon the fate of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. Th.e acquisition of these islands \vould have 
given France a strong position in the Caribbean and perhaps control of 
the grO\ving trade between Europe and the emerging Spanish American re-
~blics. 
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The United States, Great Britain, and France, therefore, \'/ere sus-
picious of each other's intentions in the Caribbean. It was clear, how~· 
ever, that none of the principal contending powers could take Cuba or· 
Puerto Rico without inflicting serious damage upon the other's interests. 
Possession of the Spanish colonies in the West Indies would have given 
a definite advantage to the controlling power. The condition of these 
islands was of such importance to the United States, Great Britain, and 
France that their foreign agents in Cuba received instructions to report 
all political activities regardless of their significance. 4 
In the summer of 1819, it was rumored in Europe that Great Britain 
might seize Cuba to balance United States hegemony in the Gulf of Hexico, 
which had been one of the results of that nation's acquisition of Florida. 
During this time the British press, which had condemned the Florida p.tr-
chase, demanded that Great· Britain seize Cuba to ·counterbalance United 
States' influence in the Caribbean and protect British commerce in the 
area. 5 
Great Britain had provided substantial military assistance to Spain 
during ti1e peninsular campaign against Napoleon, and that country owed 
about L 15,000,000 for supplies and maintenance of the British Army. 
Spain also owed large sums of money to British merchants who had suffer-
ed commercial injuries during the Napoleonic Wars. As Spain was unable 
to satisfy her financial obligations, it was believed that she would 
transfer Cuba or Puerto Rico, her last remaining loyal colonies in the 
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Western Hemisphere, to Great Britain as payment for these debts. There 
also was some speculation that Spain might cede one of these islands 
to France, which also had provided military assistance to the Spanish 
monarch to help hlia regain his throne. 6 
Between 1822 and 1825, the three contending powers increased their 
naval forces in the Caribbean. Spain also sent forces to protect the 
islands against possible invasions by the European powers or the United 
States. The risk of an actual confrontation became more pronounced at 
the end of 1822. In December of that year, British sailors temporarily 
occupied a small section of eastern Cuba. This action considerably dis-
turbed the United States government. Its concern did not ease until 
Canning informed several governments, including the United States, that 
the landing had been made to suppress piracy and that Great Britain had 
no aggressive intentions to,vard Cuba. Canning suggested during that 
· time, hmvever, that if the United States meant to annex Cuba, Great 
Britain might "have to annex Puerto Rico to preserve the balance of 
power in the Caribbean. "7 
On April 29, 1823, as a result of the increasing international ten-
sion in the Caribbean and the rumors circulating in the United States 
concerning the transfer of Cuba to Great Britain, Secreta~/ of State 
John Quincy Adams instructed his agents on that island to observe the 
course of events and to inform him of 11any apparent popular agitation(' 
especially that which might indicate ''the transfer of the island from 
Spain to any other po·ver. 118 Joel Roberts Poinsett, an agent of the 
United States, had visited Puerto Rico six months earlier, apparently 
with the same purpose.9 In addition, all United States naval commru1ders 
in the Caribbean received instructions to be on the alert for any hostile 
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activities of the British or French naval squadrons in the area. "These 
islands, 11 wrote Adams, "are natural appendages to the North American 
continent and one of them, Cuba • • • has become an object of transcen-
dent importance to the political and commercial interests of our Union. 1110 
Two months earlier, Congressman Henry Clay, expressing a similar concern, 
had indicated to Stratford Canning, the British Foreign Minister to the 
United States, that the nation was ready to fight if Great Britain in-
vaded the island. 11 
Commencing in August, 1823, the British Foreign Secretary ~pproach­
ed the United States concerning the balance of power in the Caribbean, 
the future disposition of the independent Spanish American colonies, 
and the threat of France in the \vestern HemisJilere. 12 Since a major 
concern during this time was that other European nations, besides France, 
:also might intervene to restore Spanish imperial rule, Great Britain 
discussed with the United States the feasibility of a joint declaration 
opposing that purpose. The principal result of the conversations was 
the unilateral declaration of President james Honroe on December 2, 1823, 
stating that the United States would regard as an unfriendly act any 
attempt by a foreign nation to interfere in the Western Hemisphere or 
increase its possessions there. The Honroe Doctrine reflected a fear 
of Great Britain and France and their attempts to expand commercial con-
trols to the Caribbean. It also was the result of a struggle for supre-
macy in the \vest Indies and the competition between British and American 
traders to gain a large share of the Spanish American markets. l3 
The Honroe Doctrine, hO\iever, did not resolve the international 
problem in the Caribbean. During the summer of 1825, a large French 
naval squadron visited the \vest Indies, prompting much speculation about 
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the French government's intentions. The French action drew strong 
diplomatic protests from the British Foreign Secretary. TheFrench 
government replied that the governor of Martinique had been responsible 
for ordering, without authorization, the warships into the Caribbean. 
Great Britain insisted on an explanation because she felt that the 
French activities in the West Indies threatened her interests in the 
·area and ,.,ere a violation of the Polignac Hemorandum by \vhich France 
pledged to refrain from intervening in the affairs of the Spanish Amer-
. 1 . 14 1can co ome s. 
As a result of these activities, in August, 1825, Canning again 
approached the United States with a proposal to ease the tensions bet-
ween the maritime powers. As the United States and Great Britain pre-
viously had reached a mutual understanding concerning the balance of 
pm1er in the Caribbean and since both nations had disclaimed any aggres-
sive designs against the Spanish colonies, he suggested a tripartite 
agreement between the U::Uted States, France, and Great Britain with 
respect to Cuba. The United States did not accept the suggested arrange-
ment because it would have. reduced ti1e chances of incorporating that 
colony into the American union; France declined the offer because of 
her commitment·to support the objectives of the Holy Alliance. 15 
By 1825 an impasse had developed among the three,nations concer-
ning their interests in the Caribbean. The United States could not 
take Cuba without going to war 'vith the European powers; Great Britain 
and France \vere similarly restricted because it would have led to a 
conflict with the United States or a war between themselves. To pre-
serve the existing balance of po"rer in the Caribbean and neutralize the 
sudden danger of intervention by Hexico and Colombia in the \'lest Indies, 
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the U~ted States took the initiative in persuading Great Britain and 
France to strengthen the status quo 'vhich existed in the area. - . 
Cuban and Puerto Rican revol?tionaries had asked the Spanish Amer-
ican republics to intervene in the islands to secure their independence, 
since all previous local attempts to emancipate the people had failed. 
To the separatists, it was clear that the only way to accomplish the. 
goal was through an invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico by the combined 
forces of Mexico and Colombia assisted by t1e revolutionary forces on 
the islands. Clearly, a military operation of this magnitude would 
have terminated Spanish rule in the Caribbean. The United States and 
the European powers, however, could not tolerate the Spanish American 
intervention because it threatened the already unstable balance of pow-
er in the area. 
As Mexico and Colombia turned their attention to the liberation of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States sought direct intervention by 
the European powers. Secretary of State Henry Clay asked the ministers 
of Great Britain, France, and Russia to exercise their influence to con-
vince the Spanish gover11ment to terminate the Spanish American conflict 
by recognizing the independence of the mainland colonies. By securing 
peace in the Western Hemisphere, the United States could prevent Hexico 
and Colombia from attacking the West Indies. 
The United States also attempted to convince Spain that, unless 
she ended the Spanish American conflict and recognized the independence 
of tl1e new republics, she was in danger of losing her possessions in 
the Caribbean. This move also was designed to influence Mexico and Co-
lombia, who desired to end the hostilities in the mai1lland. At the same 
time, the United States reemphasized to Great Britain and France the 
... 
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need of maintaining the status quo. Clay believed that if Mexico or 
Colombia intervened militarily in the Caribbean, Great Britain or France 
would feel compelled to join the conflict to protect their own interests. 
According to Samuel F. Bemis 1 this \vould have meant "that in the main-
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine it would have been necessary to defend 
Spain's possessions and therefore to incur the enmity of the Latin 
American republics and possibly France or Great Britain. 1116 
On April 27, 1825, Alexander Everett, the United States Minister to 
Spain, received instructions to discuss with the Spanish government the 
security of the Caribbean and the termination of the hostilities in_the 
Western Hemisphere. "The United States," wrote Secretary of State Henry 
Clay to Everett, "are satisfied with the present condition of those 
islands in the hands of Spain, •••• This government desires no polit-
ical ch~nge of that condition. n17 Since "political change 11 must have 
included self-government, as Clay's subsequent declarations seem to in-
dicate, it may be said that opposition to the independence of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico was part of the policy of the United States. 
Great Britain supported the actions of the Uirited States because 
she wanted to prevent possible American intervention in the Caribbean 
\vhich would disrupt the status quo. She also feared that the Spanish 
American republics, by extending their operations too close to her own 
colonies, might incite slave revolts such as the one that had occurred 
in Demerara in 1823. 18 Canning, supporting the American position, order-
ed Viscount Levenson-Gower Granville, the British Minister to France, 
to inform the French government that Great Britain had "no desire of 
interfering in the affairs of Cuba and Puerto Rico" or supporting their 
independence "by receiving any overture which might be made to it from 
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any party in those colonies desirous of throwing off the dominion of 
Spain. 11 Canning also indicated that Great Britain preferred the Span-
ish colonies to "remain attached to the Hother Country, not only for 
the sake of Spain herself, but for that of the general peace of the 
world. 1119 The British Foreign Secretary, however, did not wish to 
oppose openly the Spanish American plans in the Caribbean and thereby 
offend the new republics. Instead, he recomended the abandonment of 
their project "on the ground that the United States had already announced 
that they would interfere, and that their action would be bound to bring 
Britain also. ir20 Great Britain, _therefore; made the United States res-
ponsible for thwarting the invasion plans of Hexico and Colombia. 
France, accepting the views of the United States and Great Britain 
concerning the status quo in the Caribbean, did not approve the plans 
of Mexico and Colombia. To forestall potential uprisings, the French 
government had even authorized two years earlier the use of force to 
aid the Spanish authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 21 On January 10, 
1826, james Brown, the United States Minister to France, informed the 
Secretary of State that the French government 11ap"peared to concur entire-
ly in the viell which I took of the subject. 1122 The Russian government 
also accepted the recommendations of the United States. Russia's con-
cern, ho,.,rever, was not the danger involved in an attack from Mexico and 
Colombia but rather the use of force by the United States to impose a 
military solution to a political problem. 23 
As the plans of the Spanish American republics for the liberation 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico took a rnore definite form, the United States re-
quested that Mexico and Colombia suspend such actions 11in the interest 
of peace. 1124 The United States had stated previously that it would 
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regard \iith apprehension any effort of the Spanish American republics 
to seize or invade the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. 25 Clay 
also had emphasized that any attempted conquest of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
by the Spanish American republics \iould have changed the character of 
the \iar against Spain, \vhile Daniel \vebster, in a speech before the 
House of Representatives on April 14, 1826, warned that "such event 
might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and on that ground, 
call for decided and innnediate interference by us."26 
~lhile the United States diplomatic notes were conciliatory in na-
ture, they were explicit. The Secretary of State stated very clear that 
"essential interests 11 would entertain certain considerations and duties 
which the United States, among other nations, would "be forced to ful-
fill in the event of the contemplated invasion of those islands." Clay also 
added that the suspension of the projected expedition would prevent the 
interposition of other nations in the affairs of the Caribbean and the 
danger of a conflict of interests between the Spanish American countries 
and the United States. 27 
Both Mexico and Colombia coldly received the United States request 
for a suspension of their planned activities. When the Mexican Congress 
approved in january, 1826, a resolution condemning United States inter-
ference in the Caribbean, Clay dropped the diplomatic language and ~­
~ . the Mexican government that the United States would intervene to 
prevent Spain's expulsion from Cuba. These warnings and the fact that 
the European powers also supported the United States' position concern-
ning the status quo resulted in a delay of the proposed expedition. Co-
lombia and Mexico decided, in view of American opposition, to bring the 
subject of the colonial status of Cuba and Puerto Rico before the Congress 
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of Panama during the summer of 1826. When the representatives of the 
Spanish American republics met in june, renewed attempts by the United 
States and the European powers to maintain the status quo in the Carib-
bean further dissuaded the leaders of Hexico and Colombia from intervening 
in the islands. 11 The Plenipotentiaries," wrote Poinsett, "were probably 
deterred from acting upon this important subject, both by the language 
which has been held by the President with regard to these islands, and 
by the inability of the Governments of Hexico and Colombia, at this 
time, to undertake any expensive expedition.u29 
The United States and the European powers also undertook other 
actions to prevent Colombia and Mexico from building adequate naval 
forces to carry out their plans. Although Colombia had borrowed heavily 
from private financial sources to create a strong Bavy capable of destroy-
ing. the Spanish forces that defended the Caribbean, she could not pur-
chase the necessary vessels nor recruit trained sailors for them. \ihen 
Sweden agreed to sell warships to Colombia, the European powers pres-
sured that country to _revoke its decision. As a result, the few ves-
sels Colombia received and the limited number of sailors from foreign 
countries \vho accepted serving on them were insufficient to challenge 
either Spain or the major powers in the Caribbean. 30 
The leaders of the Cuban and Puerto Rican movements for indepen-
dence clearly understood that to continue the struggle for political 
emancipation would be futile \dthout direct assistance from the Spanish 
American republics. Rebellion in Cuba and Puerto Rico during this time 
had less chance of success than on the mainland because of the islands 
geographical isolation and the repressive measures of the Spanish govern-
ment. Many creoles, who feared that they would not be able to control 
the black slaves after independence, opposed a general insurrection. 
Theirreticencegreatly inhibited revolutionary activities in Cuba. 
The actions of the United States created distrust of American in-
tentions in Spanish America and strained hemispheric relationse The 
National Congress of Cuban Historians which met in 1947 in Havana de-
clared, for example, that the opposition of the United States was the 
principal reason \vhich prevented the Spanish American republics from 
agreeing on the Caribbean problem in 1826. This belief still predom-
inate in many parts of Spanish America. 3l 
The status quo supported by the United States and the European 
powers in the Caribbean prevented the liberation and independence of 
the last Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere during the first 
part of the nineteenth century. As a result of this political restraint 
which assured Spain control of her dependencies in the West Indies, 
Cuba and Puerto Rico were unable to gain their independence when local 
conditions were most favorable for accompliShing that goal. The con-
tinuing colonial condition of these countries retarded their economic, 
political, and social development. The technological change and econ-
omic development, aided by capital, technicians, and labor from abroad, 
which considerably improved the cond.i tions of Latin America during the 
second half of the nineteenth century barely . touched Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. 
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CHAPTER II 
SPAIN'S lliPERIAL INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
The Caribbean Sea has always played a significant role in the his-
tory of _the Western Hemisphere. A partially enclosed suboceanic basin, 
it was for many years tile scene of naval confrontations and considerable 
commercial rivalries. Its geographical position between North and South 
America made its control highly desirable to Great Dritain, Spain, France, 
Holland, and later the United States. For·over two hundred years, the 
Caribbean Sea was the principal trading route for the Spanish galleons 
which brought European goods to the New lvorld and took back to Spain the 
gold, silver, and raw materials of the Empire. It also was the gateway 
to Spain's colonial settlements and the first line of defense against 
the European powers which sought to destroy Spanish trade, commerce, and 
political hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, Santo Domingo, and 
Puerto Rico, the principal Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, became 
bulwarks against foreign enemies and served as strategic military out-
posts of the Spanish continental defense system. 
Christopher Columbus discovered the Caribbean Sea during his second 
voyage to the New lvorld. The Spanish found on the Lesser Antilles a 
fierce warring Indian tribe, which the natives of the other islands called 
Caribs, and named the unexplored sea ~ Caribe, or the Caribbean, to 
characterize it as the region of these indigenous inhabitants. Soon 
after their discovery and exploration, Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto 
Rico became colonies of Spain and that country established there her 
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medieval social, political, cultural, and economic institutions. 
As a result of the early exhaustion of their mineral resources and 
the migration of many of their colonists to the mainland, where wealth 
could be more easily acquired, the settlements failed to develop into 
important commercial centers and instead became poor agricultural de-
pendencies. Landownership became the · prerogative of few individuals 
who divided the land into large plantations and commercial ranches. 
This system of land distribution, supported by the importation of many 
African slaves, dominated the colonial economy during the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. 
During that time the Caribbean Sea remained precariously under Span-
iSh control. Attracted by the rich cargoes of gold and silver which the 
Spaniards Plundered or mined in Central and South America, English, 
French, and Dutch pirates and freebooters periodically attacked the 
Spanish settlements and fortifications in the West Indies and captured 
or sank many treasure-laden ships. During Spain's colonial \'Iars with 
Great Britain, France, and Holland, foreign privateers also raided Cuba, 
Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico, destroying many small towns or holding 
them for ransom. 
In 1538 French corsairs raided Havana, which afterwards became the 
capital of Cuba, and burned most of the nearby settlements. In 1554 the 
French privateer Francois Le Clerc attacked and seized Santiago de Cuba 
and held the town for ransom, The following year jacques de Sores, one 
of LeClerc's lieutenants, looted and burned Havana. 1 In 1586 a large 
English armada under the command of Sir Francis Drake cruised for sev-
eral days fiear Havana but did not attack the port. The Viceroy of 
Mexico had reinforced the island 1 s defenses \iith 352 soldiers and several 
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warships from a squadron which had recently arrived from Spain; the 
protective measures deterred the English attack. 2 In 1603, however, a 
pirate named Gilberto Gir6n sacked Santiago de Cuba, but failed to 
seize Bayamo because of the island's strong defenses. In 1629 the Dutch 
admiral Pieter Pieterszoon Heyn, sponsored by the Dutch West India Com-
pany, outmaneuvered a Spanish treasure fleet near Matanzas and captured 
most of the vessels. 3 
Several long-lasting blockades of Havana and frequent raids by 
pirates and buccaneers to other Cuban ports kept this Spanish possession 
in a constant state of fear during most of the second part of the seven-
teenth century. After 1655 the threat to Cuba increased substantially 
with the British seizure of Jamaica. Slave traders and robbers from 
that island systematically raided Cuban towns and coastal settlements 
in search of African slaves and loot. In 1662 they attacked and burned 
Santiago de Cuba,. With French allies, they returned in 1665, sacked 
Remedios, and attempted to take Sancti Spiritus. 
Operating from bases in Jamaica, other privateers, notably Henry 
Morgan, periodically attacked the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. 
Cuba's misfortunes culminated in May, 1762, \'ihen the English caprured 
and looted Havana during the Seven Years' War. Using 187 \warships and 
transports and over 14,000 men, the Duke of Albermarle, who was then the 
governor of Jamaica, seized Havana after a bitter siege. Since the Brit-
ish victory isolated Florida and threatened Spain's control of the Carib-
bean, the Spanish government quickly sought to negotiate the return of 
Havana. Great Britain demanded the Floridas and Puerto Rico as the price 
for restoring Havana. In the end, the city returned to Spanish control 
in exchanges for the Floridas. To compensate for the Spanish losses 
21 
during the war, on November 3, 17621 France transferred the Louisiana 
territory to Spain.4 
For over two hundred years, Cuba served as the principal American 
port in Spain's commercial system. According to a well-regulated plan 
which began about 1549and, which with some interruptions, continued in 
effect until the second half of the eighteenth century, each year t\'lo · 
fleets, ranging in size from eight to sixty merchantmen and several war-
ships, sailed to the New \vorld to exchange European goods for American 
gold, silver, and raw materials.5 One of the fleets, known collective-
ly as the Fleta (Fleet), sailed in the spring for Ne,., Spain; it included 
vessels bond for Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico. Entering the 
Caribbean through the Dominica Passage in the Lesser Antilles, the fleet 
sailed toward the north\'lest near the southern coast of Santo Domingo 
and Puerto Rico. After a short delay at the Bay of Ocoa, the fleet con-
tinued its voyage toward the jamaican strait and the Cuban southern 
coastline. Crossing the Yucat~n Channel, the fleet sailed for the port 
of Veracruz. 6 
The second fleet kno'm as the Galeones (Galleons) departed Spain 
during August for the Isthmus of Panama; it convoyed vessels bound for 
Cartagena and other ports of the mainland. Entering the Caribbean through 
the Hartinique Passage, the Galeones sailed 150 nautical miles tmvard 
the Southwest before turning for the coast of South America. After reach-
ing Cartagena and detaching a few ships for that port, the fleet sail-
ed for Porto Bello in Panama, where the Spanish traders would remain for 
more tl1an a month. During that time, an annual fair transformed the 
normally quiet village into a commercial center of considerable import-
ance. Here, merchants exchanged manufactured goods for enormous quantities 
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of gold and. silver bullion mined in P·eru. and Potosi in Northern Bolivia. 
The following March, the ~·o fleets met at Havana and began the home-
ward journey utilizing the Gulf Stream for a fast voyage to Spain.7 
The loss of Jamaica and the Lesser Antilles forced Spain to change 
her commercial routes in the Caribbean. Instead of sailing through the 
Lesser Antilles, the fleets entered the area through the strait which 
separates Trinidad from Grenada at the lower end of the Caribbean. From 
that point, the vessels sailed toward their destinations protected by 
Spanish warships and the armadillas (cruiser squadrons) which protected 
the trade routes all the year around. To protect further her commercial 
interests and defend the colonies from foreign aggression, in 1645 Spain 
stationed the Flota de Barlovento (the Windward Defense Fleet) in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico. 8 
Havana served for many years as the principal port of ti1e Flota 
system and as .the location for repair, resupply, and control of outgoing 
vessels. The harbor fortifications protected the fleet,and crews and 
passengers comfortably remain in the city while the ships undenvent ne-
cessary repairs. An agricultural economy developed to provide the ships 
with necessary food supplies. This system of limited agriculture con-
tinued for many years, but with the decline of the provisioning system 
during the latter part of the seventeenth century, cattle ranges and 
tobacco plantations emerged on the island and soon thereafter became im-
portant economic activities for the Spanish settlers. 
Because of their strategic location and role in protecting the com-
mercial fleets, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico also became important im-
perial concerns. Santo Domingo began as the principal Spanish settlement 
in the New World; during the colonization phase, it became the base from 
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which expeditions explored the other West Indian islands and the adjacent 
mainland. In 1511 the Croh"ll created the Audiencia de Santo Domingo (an 
administrative and judicial court) to administer the colonies. After 
1527 the institution lost many of its jurisdictional powers to other 
audiencias created in New Spain, Peru, and Guatemala. The Audiencia de 
Santo Domingo, however, continued to exercise judicial authority in the 
Caribbean until its transfer to Puerto Principe in Cuba at the end of 
the eighteenth century. 
Spain also created the Archbim1opric of Santo Domingo to direct the 
ecclesiastical affairs of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. In 
1538 the Crown established the University of Santo Tom~s,but there is 
no evidence that it operated beyond the level of a theological seminary. 
Despite the prestige of the colony as the first major Spanish settlement 
in the New World, Santo Domingo did not prosper during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Although plantations of sugar, tobacco, cotton, 
and cacao occupied scattered parts of the island, Santo Domingo enjoyed 
little economic prosperity because the colony never had a large popula-
tion. 
During the middle of the sixteenth century, Santo Domingo became an 
economic and a strategic liability for Spain. The Spanish governors 
could not maintain adequate control over the colony's innumerable har-
bors nor could they improve agriculture or trade because there were not 
enough people on the island. By 1605 the Spanish abandoned all efforts 
to colonize the western side of the colony and ordered the few inhabitants 
there to move to the eastern half of Santo Domingo. As a result of that 
decision, the area became a haven for pirates, buccaneers, and other 
outlaws who preyed on the Spanish commerce, raided settlements, and 
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engaged in contraband trade with the color~es. Attempts by the govern-
ment to suppress these outlaws failed, and piratical depredations con-
tinued throughout the Caribbean for many years. 
In 1586 Sir Francis Drake attacked Santo Domingo and seized the 
capital. The English burned one-third of the town and ransomed the 
rest for 25,000 ducats or about $30,000. In April, 1655, an English 
expedition under the command of Admiral 'villi am Penn and General Robert 
Venable returned to the same area and attacked Santo Domingo with an 
army of 9,000 men. Penn's forces, however, failed to capture the Span-
ish strongholds and retreated after encountering strong resistance from 
the defenders.9 
During the second half ofthe seventeenth century, the colony suffer-
ed many attacks from pirates and buccaneers. By. that time, Santo Domin-
go \ias so poor that the activities of the freebooters had a negligible 
effect on the well-being of the island. When Spain changed the route 
of her commercial fleets in the eigthteenth century, the colony lost 
its strategic importance. To improve its economic conditions, the govern-
ment sent thousands of migrants to the island, expanded agriculttrre, 
and fostered commerce by opening the colony ports to foreign trade. 
Other economic reforms improved manufacturing and ameliorated the misery 
which had prevailed on the island for more than t\vo hundred years. 10 
In 1751, ho\vever, an earthquake destroyed large sections of the 
capital and devastated the countryside. In 1755 the Ozarna River, S\'lel-
led by the tidal wave of the earthquruce which destroyed Lisbon, flooded 
the southern region of the country, destroying many agricultural areas, 
and damaging the walls \vhich protected the capital city. 11 These nat-
trral disasters iru1ibited the growth of the island's economy and the 
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progress of its inhabitants. In spite of subsequentgovernment efforts 
to revitalize the economy and the island's increased population, the 
colony did not prosper during the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Although the Spanish Crmm claimed the entire island during the 
seventeenth century, the Spaniards were unable to prevent French occu-
pa.tion of the western end. In 1664 the French Company of the lvest In-
dies began colonization of that part of the colony. The boundary claims 
caused friction, and in 1697 Spain formally ceded the area to France in 
the treaty of Ryswick. French St. Domingue (Haiti) soon developed into 
a sugar-producing area of such importance that it was considered to be 
the richest of all the European colonies in the New World. On the other 
hand, the ap~ling conditions of the eastern side and the continuing 
border disputes ultimately compelled the Spanish government to relinquish 
its control of that area. By the Treaty of Basel of 1795, Spain ceded 
eastern Santo Domingo to France, but the European conflicts \vhich fol-
lowed the French Revolution prevented the immediate execution of the 
agreement. Between 1792 and 1801,about 40,000 white Spanish colonists also 
left Santo Domingo. 12 
In 1791 the white French settlers demanded greater autonomy in Haiti. 
Inspired by the French Revolution, they sought to rule the colony them-
selves and to assume control of the sugar economy. The white suprema-
cists known as the grand blancs, who dominated the political and economic 
affairs of the colony, did not consider any reforms for the black slaves 
and free mulattoes who constituted the majority of the population. Spur-
red by the propaganda of a French group known as the Amis des Noirs ---
(Friends of the Blacks), the slaves and mulattoes rose against their 
white masters in the first full scale insurrection of this nature in the 
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Western Hemisphere. In two years, blood-letting slaves massacred thou-
sands of white settlers, government officials, women, and children. In 
retaliation, the white population committed atrocities of their own. 
Yellow fever, malaria, and dysentery also killed many of the French, 
Spanish, and British soldiers who. \vere sent to the island to suppress 
the black rebellion. 13 
In 1801, Toussaint l 10uverture, the black revolutionary leader who 
had seized power in Haiti, invaded the eastern half of the island, but 
failed to get hold of it. Bet\~een 1808 and 1809 a Spanish creole Juan 
S4nchez Ramirez, with the aid of a British naval squadron and Spanish 
forces from Puerto Rico, reestablished Spanish control on eastern Santo 
Domingo. In 1821, however, the Spanish creoles revolted and attempted 
to unite the colony to Colombia. Soon thereafter, a Haitian army in-
vaded the country for a second time and expelled the rebel government 
of J os6 Nufiez de Cc1ceres! The Haitian chieftains ruled Santo Domingo 
until the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Puerto Rico, however, continued to be of considerable importance 
to Spain because of the island's strategic position on the eastern Carib-
bean. Since Puerto Rico served as a military stronghold against the 
enemies of Spain which controlled the Lesser Antilles, in 1569 the Span-
ish government authorized the Viceroy of New Spain to subsidize the mil-
itary defenses of the island. This annual subsidy became known as the 
Situado and for many years provided an artificial stimulus to the econ-
omy of l1lerto Rico. The subsidy primarily benefited the peninsulares 
who lived in San Juan, but it did not help the small farmers and peasants. 
The rural settlers prospered in a modest way, hmvever, by clandestinely 
selling hides, sugar, tobacco, and cattle to Spain's enemies. They 
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ignored the royal edicts which prohibited such trade and developed a 
profitable smuggling operation with the non-Spanish European and Amer-
ican tra.ders. 14 
To protect the colony against enemy attack, Spain undertook the 
construction of several important fortifications at the entrance of San 
juan harbor. The capital city, in effect~ became a military outpost. 
A stone wall measuring twenty~five feet high and eighteen feet 'V'ide ren-
dered the city virtually impregnable. A large contingent of soldiers 
later arrived in Puerto Rico, and armed vessels Jleriodically cruised 
near the principal settlements to protect them against piratical de-
predations. In spite of these defensive measures,, French, English, and 
Dutch freebooters continued to plunder the coastal settlements and towns~ 
carrying off food and slaves and destroying valua'ble property. 
In spite of the Situado~ Puerto Rico continued to be a poor colony 
during most of the Spanish colonial period. Puerto Rico had no adequate 
schools prior to 1770~ and education lvas limited to the wealthy creoles 
and peninsulares. The island contained no factories or large, income-
producing Plantations. Trade and commerce was restricted to a few ports, 
and tobacco production, \vhich had begun in 1636, failed to provide an 
adequate source of income. Roads were non-existent in the rural areas, 
and medical services r:ere limited to the inhabitants of the capital. As 
Robert W. Anderson has accurately indicated: 
As a small, underpopulated, resource-poor isl.and \vhose value to 
its imperial oversear was purely military, Puerto Rico display-
ed none of the great institutions that are noraally associated 
with Spain's American empire. Instead of the great ecclesiastic-
al and civil hierarchies of the viceroyalties of Hiddle and South 
America, there was rule by generally pedestrian militaiJ" gover~ 
nors. The religious orders barely touched Pu.erto Rico, and the 
Church itself played no significant role on the island •••• 
Neither the city, as a focus of intellectual or aristocratic 
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activity nor the ~comienda,as the principal form of land O\•mer-
ship and exploitation, \vas important in Puerto Hico. 15 
As was the case in Cuba, Puerto Rico served at times as a point of de-
parture for expeditions to the mainland during the exploration phase of 
Spain's activities in the Nevr lvorld. Juan Ponce de Le6n departed from 
Afiasco Bay on the western side of the island in 1513 to explore the 
coast of Florida and to discover Hexico and the Gulf Stream. Francisco 
Pizarro received Inen, supplies, and horses from the island during the 
16 conquest of Peru. 
Early in its history, Puerto Rico became an objective of the Euro-
pean sea pmvers disputing the Spanish hegemony in the \>lest Indies. Dur-
ing the first half of the sixteenth century, French raiders burned and 
sacked San German, the second largest community on the isl~~. In 1595 
Sir Francis Drake attacked San Juan but failed to penetrate its defert-
ses in spite of the fact that the English had twenty-five ships and 
over 4,000 armed troops in the invading force. 17 Three years later 
George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, secured a victory against the Span-
ish forces defending the island. He captured San Juan and some of its 
fortifications ru1d for eighty-three days attempted to convert the Span-
ish colony into an English settlement. His plans failed, and he had to 
retreat after an outbreru( of dysentery caused many casualties among his 
18 forces. 
In 1625 the Dutch, as part of their campaign to harass Spanish col-
onial trade in the Caribbean, attacked and burned San Juan. The Dutch, 
however, could not overcome the Spanish defensive positions and retreat-
ed without achieving their objective. During the seventeenth and eigh~ 
teenth centuries the colony suffered frequent attacks from pirates and 
buccaneers, but, as in Santo Domingo, their activities had no important 
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consequences. The last English attack occurred in 1797. In that 
year, as a result of the conflict between Spain and Great Britain which 
follO\ved the French Revolution, General Ral};h Abercromby unsuccessful-
ly tried to seize San juan. 19 
The Spaniards,preoccupied with the larger islands to the west and 
discouraged by Carib hostility and lack of mineral resources, had made 
no attempts to settle the Lesser Antilles. As a result of this indif-
ference, France, Holland, and Great Britain competed for their posses-
sion during the first half of the seventeenth century. Barbados, St. 
Christopher, Guadeloupe, Hartinique, and the Virgin Islands became the 
objects of international concern, especially among the enemies of Spain 
who challenged that country's hegemony in the Caribbean. ·Thereafter, 
the islands developed as centers of illegal trade and as focal points 
of French, Dutch, and English activities in the 'vest Indies. 
The British seizure of jamaica in 1655 extended the illicit smug-
gling operations to Cuba. English traders sold provisions, manufactures, 
and slaves in Cuba and purchased sugar, molasses, and other tropical 
products. The trade enriched Great Britain and provided the North Amer-
ican colonies with most of their gold and silver. By the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the Lesser Antilles also had achieved considerable 
importance as sugar producers and as centers for the African slave traf-
fic. As a result, British colonies in the Caribbean became more valuable 
to Great Britain than those of temperate North America. 20 
The illegal trade between the Spanish colonists in the Caribbean 
and the European interlopers increased during the eighteenth century. 
The islanders exchanged local products for finished manufactured goods, 
sometimes with the connivance of colonial officials. In Cuba, the town 
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of Bayamo became a center for smuggling operations; in other localities, 
Cubans enjoyed years of uninterrupted trading with the pirates and en-
emies of Spain. Puerto Rico~ proximity to the Lesser Antilles encour-
aged clandestine activities which benefited the rural inhabitants, the 
plantation owners, rutd the local authorities. 21 
During the first part of the eighteenth century, Spain ordered the-
. Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico to raid the neighboring islands and 
dislodge the pirates, buccaneers, and privateers who used them to attack 
the Spanish possessions or conduct illegal trade. The success of these 
preventive measures encouraged further action by other Spanish officials, 
and as a result a system known as the guardacostas (coast guard) emerged 
to challenge not only the pirates but the European powers as '"ell. The 
guardacostas, manned by ruffians, privateers, and often pirates, carried 
commissions from the local Spanish governors and '"ere allowed to resupply 
in Spanish ports. They sailed along the regular trading routes to pro-
teet Spanish commerce; they also stopped foreign vessels in search of 
"contraband. 11 The guardacostas brought captured merchant ships to Span-
ish ports where the cargoe~ were sold. They shared the profits from the 
sales with the colonial officials. 1he guardacostas went so far as to 
seize ships that were anchored in the harbors of colonial ports, and 
many peaceful traders suffered unjust seizure and condemnation. 22 
Spanish retaliatory action brought many complaints from British 
merchants and government officials. In 1730 the British government 
threatened to take reprisals if the Puerto Rican authorities did not sus-
pend the activities of the guardacostas. 23 In spite of the threat, the 
armed enterprises of Spain continued to increase, especially during the 
"War of Jenkins' Ear, 11 the first major European conflict fought expreshl.y 
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for \vest Indian colonial supremacy. 24 During that time, San juan ser-
ved as a base of operations against the British settlements in the Les-
ser Antilles. Puerto Rico's geogra~1ical position near the center of 
international conflict also served to contain the aggressive intentions 
of the European powers during the Seven Years' War. 25 
The British colonial governors in the Lesser Antilles often con-
sidered the feasibility of an armed attack against Puerto Rico. During 
the War of the Spanish Succession, the Governor of the Lem.,rard Islands 
suggested an invasion of Puerto Rico. The British Secretary of State 
rejected the suggestion, hO\vever, because the military action \vould had 
led to a depopulation of the strategically important Leeward Isl~~ds. 26 
· In 1729 john Hart, a colonial official, proposed to the British govern-
ment the seizure of Puerto Rico since the island could be used for in-
tercepting the Spanish trade. During that time, England was negotiating 
an alliance with Spain and was ready to sign the Treaty of Sevilla (1729). 
As a result, the government did not consider the suggestion. 27 
The constant threat of foreign intervention in the Spanish colonies 
and the activities of the pirates and buccaneers in the Caribbean hard-
ened Spain 1 s determination to secure Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Crown 
appointed captains-general ldth civil and military powers to rule the 
colonies and direct the Spanish defenses in the Caribbean. These offi-
cials became very powerful and had virtually the same powers as the 
viceroys who governed other parts of the empire. 28 
l·lith fe\v exceptions, these captains-general ruled under strict codes 
of ntilitary law which they enforced by the promulgation of decrees. They 
exercised their authority with the assistance of peninsular officers. 
Until the introduction of the Inct:endency system at the end of the 
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eighteenth century, they also controlled the fiscal affairs of the col-
onies and even influenced the social and religious activities of the in-
habitants. Spain enacted these authoritarian measures because she con-
sidercd the Caribbean to be a region \vhere foreign enemies presented 
unusual problems of defense. 
Colonial administration in the Hest Indies was based on the Novi- · 
sima recopilaci6n de leye s 2!:. Indias (Compendium of the Laws of the In-
dies), \vhich contained approximately 6,400 different laws and decrees, 
some dating from the early part of the sixteenth century. Promulgated 
in 1681, these laws prohibited all non-Spani:ili trade in the colonies 
and decreed that the island's commerce had to be carried on Spanish 
ships. Hercantilistic policies controlled all areas of trade bet\veen 
Spain and her colonies. Since the colonies existed, in theory, for the 
benefit of the Hother Country, they could not produce any goods which 
competed \vith those already being manufactured in Spain. 29 
During the eighteenth century, French Bourbon princes ascended to the 
throne of Spain replacing the decadent Ha sburg monarchy. This change 
brought many reforms in the colonial government. · In 1748 Spain abolish-
ed the fleet system and allowed individual commercial vessels to sail 
directly to the New World, a decision that improved trade between the 
colonies and the peninsula. The Crmm also improved colonial adminis-
tration by appointing governors \vho ruled \vith competence, integrity, 
efficiency, and zeal. 
Beginning in 1764, Cuba made notable economic progress. lfundreds 
of families migrated to the island from Santo Domingo after France took 
possession of that colony. Hany other settlers established themselves 
in Oriente Province. By 1774 there \vere 96,440 white settlers, 44,333 
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slaves, and 30,847 free blacks and mulattoes nn the island. This total 
represented a substantial increase over the seventeenth century po:rula-
tion. During the same period, coffee, sugar, and tobacco production 
increased S.s,aresul t of better farming methods introduced from Santo 
Domingo. In 1778 Spain opened the Cuban ports to American trade, con-
siderably stimulating the local economy. Havana traded regularly lvith . 
the rebellious North American colonies during their war for independence 
and carried on an extensive commerce with the French possessions in the 
Caribbean. 30 
The Spanish goverrunent also made several important changes in the 
colonial administration of Puerto Rico. In 1756 Spain created the ~ 
pafiia Barcelonesa (Barcelona Trading Company) to provide capital for 
inter-colonial commerce and the ~ Factoria Mercantil (Royal Hercan-
tile Agency) for fostering foreign trade. The Crown also made Changes 
in the distribution of farmland and coffee production and sponsored 
the foundation of many ne\v towns rum villages. 31 
The results of these economic improvements were immediately felt in 
the colonies. Trade, commerce, and agriculturalproduction increased, 
smuggling activities ceased to be a major problem, and the inhabitants 
improved their living conditions. But all hopes for permanent politic-
al and economic improvements were soon dispelled. At the end of the 
American Revolution, Spain reverted to her previous colonial policies 
by terminating the legal trade beuveen Cuba and the United States. The 
government reestablished its commercial monopolies and imposed new res-
trictions on foreign migration. Crolvn representatives, except for some 
enlightened officials who identified themselves with progress, liberalism, 
and better government, brought back the strict codes of military law and 
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the authoritarian rule of their predecessors. The reimposition of im-
perial controls resulted in much dissatisfaction among the creoles, who 
had benefited during the liberal interlude. 
Spain's commercial monopoly also was a major source of agitation 
in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Earlier in the eighteenth century, the govern-
ment established a tobacco monopoly to regulate prices and prevent sale~ 
to private merchants. The royal edict which created the monopoly caused 
serious opposition from many tobacco growers, who resented government 
interference in their private business activities. They rebelled against 
the local authorities and threatened the government agents who enforced 
the law. In Cuba, the insurrection extended to many rural areas and 
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forced the resignation of the captain-general. General Gregorio Guazo, 
the new governor, suppressed the rebellion by raiding the planters strong-
ho~ds and capturing many of the dissidents. This action crushed the 
v:eguero movement, as the tobacco grmvers called it, but the governor 
made some changes in the monopoly to prevent further problems. In spite 
of these concessions, the Estanco de Tabaco (tobacco purchasing agency) 
continued to be a source of irritation to the planters. Three decades 
later, they revolted again but suffered the same consequences. 33 
The Spanish commercial monopolies extended to other parts of the 
Cuban economy as well. In 1740 the goverment created the ~ Compan!a 
de Comercio (Royal Company of Commerce) to regulate business. This 
company also monopolized the import and export trade, manufacturing1 and 
agricultural production. Its operating capital came mostly from business-
men of CMiz and from the King's O\·m assets. For twenty years the Real 
Compafiia de Comercio directed the economic affairs of Cuba under strict 
la\vS that forced the farmers and merchants to sell their products at 
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lmv prices and p.1rchase Spanish manufactured goods at high import rates. 34 
In Puerto Rico, one of the principal source of discontent was the 
abasto forzoso (fo-rced supply). Under this system, the municipalities 
of the interior were regularly forced to supply all the beef that San 
juan consumed. Every farmer had to give one head of cattle for every 
six that he owned. He also had to ensure the safe arrival of the animal 
to the capital, regardless of the problems encountered during their trans-
portation~ Any animal that was lost or died during the journey had to 
be replaced at the expense of the farmer. The law provided for no ex-
ceptions, as its purpose.· ,,.as to ensure an ample supply of beef to the 
peninsulares of San juan at below fair market prices. This injustice last-
ed for many years, and the Spanish authorities strictly enforced it. 35 
Social, economic, and political discrimination also· r.esulted in 
creole dissatisfaction. Spanish Crown officials and the peninsular aris-
tocracy in the islands distrusted and feared the creoles, considered 
them inferior,. and believed that they lack the proper cultural and so-
cial graces. Cuban and Puerto Ricans, except on few occasions, did not 
attain positions of responsibility or authority in the local government 
because the peninsulares normally monopolized the lucrative bureaucratic 
posts. The Spaniards also controlled the business and commercial mono-
polies and the military forces that defended the islands. Furthermore, 
the creoles did not have representation in the political affairs of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico and could not change any law promulgated by Spain. The 
peninsulares believed the creoles were incapable of self-government and 
unable to direct the political affairs of the colonies. 
With the reimposition of imperial controls after the American Rev-
olution, an incipient national consciousness began to manifest itself 
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among the Cubans and Puerto Ricans. Influenced by the political events 
in the peninsula during the ferment of the 1790s and the desire for a 
continuation of the liberal concessions that had been made earlier, the 
creoles began to demand a greater participation in the insular economy. 
Fearing ti1e possible loss of control over ti1e colonies, Spain again mo-
dified. the trading regulations and allmved them to trade \vith N:orth Amer-
ica. 
Commerce with the United States increased slowly during the 1790s. 
Restrictions initially prevented the importation of large quantities of 
foreign goods into the colonies. As a restut, in 1790 trade between the 
United States and the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean amounted to 
only $147,807. 36 ·The interruption of Spanish imports, however, resulted 
in a shortage of foodstuffs in Cuba. . and Puerto Rico. The resultant 
scarcity of supplies increased trade 'vith the United States. Despite 
objections from the peninsular merchants, on November 18, 1797, Spain 
issued a decree permitting knerican commercial ships to enter, with only 
limited restrictions, the colonial ports of the Caribbean. This change 
brought a considerable increase in trade by the end of the eighteenth 
century. In 1798 the Spanish colonies imported $5,080,54337 in American 
goods and exported over 41,000,000 pounds of sugar, 1,109,558 pounds of 
coffee, and 1,910,150 gallons of molasses to the United States. 38 
Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar production became increasingly import-
ant after the black population revolted and destroyed the plantations 
in Haiti. The war in Europe also contributed to a sharp increase in 
the price of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and other tropical products~ Trade 
\vith the United States and ·the large numbers of refugees \vho arrived in 
Cuba from Haiti, Louisiana, and Santo Domingo also added to the prosperity 
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of that island. On a lesser scAle, Puerto Rico also experienced some 
econontic improvement in spite of the fact that the Situado had been 
reduced by the government. 39 
An event which served to promote creole leadership in Cuba \vas 
the extablishment in 1792 of the Sociedad Econ6T~ca Amigos ~ ~ 
(Economic Society of Friends of the Country). This organization be-
came a focus of economic liberalism for the creole professionals, bus-
inessmen, and planters in Cuba. Its members advanced programs of so-
cial and economic reforms in spite of peninsular oposition. Their 
efforts resulted in the Consulado ~ Agricultura l Comercio (Agricul-
turill and Commercial Agency) to promote economic \vell-being in the col-
ony. A creole, Francisco Arango y Parrefio, served as its representative 
in Spain and for a long time successfully defended Cuban interests in 
Madrid .. 40 
During this time, political instability and government inefficiency 
marked the reign of the Spanish Bourbon rulers. In 1795 Spain ceded her 
portion of Santo Domingo to France, and in 1800 transferred the valuable 
Louisiana territory to Napoleon~ These losses of territory, the poli-
tical activities of Hanuel de Godoy in favor of Napoleon, and the ques-
tionable behavior of the Queen Mar!a de Parma, King Charles IV, the Du-
chess of Alba, and other important members of the court affected the 
national government and weakened Spanish imperial position overseas.41 
In 1796 Charles IV (1788-1808) joined France in a war against Great 
Britain, and in 1801 Napoleon forced Spain to attack Portugal. In spite 
of the disastrous conditions of the country, heavy taxation, political 
dissatisfaction, and lack of funds, Spain \vas compelled to aid the French 
war effort by declaring still another war against Great Britain in 1804. 
In October, 1805, when the British navy destroyed the Franco-Spanish 
fleet at Cape Trafalgar, Spain lost most of her naval power and the 
ability to protect her overseas possessions in the Caribbean. 
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In 1808 Napoleon invaded Spain and placed his brother joseph Bona-
parte on the Spanish throne. The Spanish people refused to accept 
French control and revolted on the glorious ~ £! Ma;ro tHay 2, 1808) 
against the new government under the leadership of several juntas. As 
a direct result of this action, the Cuban and Puerto Rican creoles 
unified behind the banner of Ferdinand VII to assist in the war againt 
France. The colonies contributed substantial amounts of money to the 
peninsular effort; the contributions of Puerto Rico alone amounted to. 
more than 112,000 pesos. 
Despite the initial military defeats of Spain and the uncertain po-
litical conditions which prevailed in the peninsula, Cuba and Puerto 
Rico remained loyal to the Crown. The strong peninsular influence pre-
sent in the islands and the restraint imposed by the military garrisons 
were important factors in relitforcing that loyalty. The enlightened 
rule of some colonial officials, such as Luis de las Casas in Cuba, and 
the recent improvements made in the economy also contributed to the po-
litical stability of the islands. 
The liberal outlook of these colonial rulers, the improvement of 
the economy, and the efforts made to resolve the existing inequalities 
that existed bet\1een creoles and peninsulares, hO\vever, could not stifle 
the strong sense of nationality and pride in creole leadership which had 
arisen among the Cubans and Puerto Ricans. Spain 1 s erratic colonial 
administration, which under the influence of the peninsular merchants 
closed tme Caribbean ports to foreign commerce in 1801 only to have them 
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reopened again in 1803, further increased creole nationalism. The 
insular planters and merchants, having profited greatly by the freedom 
of trade of the preceding decades, realized that aaditional reforms 
\V'ere necessary if they ,.,rere to maintain a viable connnercial system. 
Since the desired concessions appeared to be unattainable without sub-
stantial changes in the political system, Cuban creoles began to favor-
·local autonomy, annexation by the United States, or outright indepen-
dence. In Puerto Rico, many creoles demanded complete assimilation 
into the political system or separation from Spain as the only 
solution for resolving the colonial problem. 
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tica de la Isla de s. Tuan Bautista de Puerto Rico dala t1 luz D. Antonio 
'Va!Ta.dares de Sotomaxcr' (Hadrid, 178::;), p. 168; Lidic>"Cru'Z ITOr'icTOva, 
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The United States exports to the Caribbean were thirty-one percent 
of all the American foreign trade for the year 1790. · U. S. Congress, 
American ~ Paper8.J Documents.} .~e~islativ~_ and Executive of the 
United ~tatesJ ~ommerce and Navigation, Vol. 1---nlashington, D. C.; 
I8~2J, p. ~J. 
37Ibid., p. 417. This amount represents t\venty-six percent of 
the Caribbean trade, a gain of t\venty-four percent in eight years. 
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the years 1772-1783. In 1784 it \vas reduced to 100,000 pesos annual-
ly, however, the amount of money received did not equal ti1e authori-
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4°For the organization of the Consulado see '!Real C~du1a de 
6recci6n del Consulado de la Habana espedida en Aranjuez a 4 de abril 
de 1794, 11 in Spain, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de la Isla de 
Cuba, Secci6n 11 (new designation), Legajo 7,.404. For Arango y Parreno 
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l Parrefio.J impreso pgr acuerdo del E:x:celentfsimo Ayuntam;tento de la 
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465. 
41one factor that is seldom considered in explaining Spanish 
decline at the end of the eighteenth century is the growth of the 



















An analysis of these figures will indicate the rise of a middle 
cll.ass to more than one-half million in the short span of twenty-nine 
years and the related decline of the aristocratic ruling elite by forty-
five percent during the same period& The factor for the botrrgeoise in 
the census of 1797 represents five percent of the total population for 
t..lJ.at year 'vhile the one for the nobles is 3.8 percent. 'fhe emergence 
of a powerful middle class accelerated the decline of the empire. Since 
this group promoted commercial and trade interests, tl1ey insisted in 
strong colonial controls to protect their investments. This resulted 
in creole dissatisfaction since most of them abhorred bourgeois values. 
The success of the Spanish American revolutions triggered by the actions 
of a conservative middle class government dismembered the Spanish empire 
and resulted in Spain becoming the "specter of Europe. 11 The demographic 
structure is discussed in Antonio Ubi.eto, et. al., Introducci6n a la 
historia de Espm1a (Barcelona, 1974), pp. 411-452. See also Jos6-Tcrrero, 
Historia ~Espana (Barcelona, 1971), pp. 350-351. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ERA OF COLONIAL REFORMS 
The rapid period of free trade and economic concessions which Spain 
bestowed during the preceding century diminished the creoles narrow col-
onial provincialism and brought to their attention the ~portance of 
world events. As a result of that a\vareness, the Napoleonic invasion 
of Spain, and the imprisonment of Ferdinand VII, Cuban and Puerto Rican 
creoles experienced great anxiety at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. The indecisive actions of the provisional government and the 
unstable political conditions of the peninsula also contributed to the 
colonial concern. The creoles underwent a further period of intensive 
uncertainty when constitutional monarchy, the ideas of the Enlightenment, 
and the basic principles of the French revolution became part of the 
aspirations of the Spanish people. 
In spite of the instability of the government, the creoles remain-
ed loyal to the Crown during the Napoleonic Wars. The Bourbon reforms 
of Charles III and the efforts of the colonial governors to improve the 
relations between peninsulares and creoles influenced their decision. 
The vigorous and conciliatory rule of the Crown's representatives and 
the control exercised by the armed forces played an important role in 
securing that loyalty. The fear of a possible slave insurrection in 
Cuba and the vital economic interests of the upper classes also contri-




In Cuba, Salvador del Huro, MarqU\1s de S-omeruelos, maintained 
creole allegiance by partially agreeing to their demands for open trade, 
economic reform, and increased African migration, even when Spain order-
ed othe:nvise. 1 Since the Cuban merchants desired to maintain the favor-
able commercial advantages gained as a result of the European conflict, 
he also provided for the security of their trade. 2 Many Puerto Rican 
creoles, influenced by the recent improvements in trade relations with 
Spain, also remained loyal to the Crown in spite of the fact that the 
peninsulares despised them.3 
In 1808 Cuba and Puerto Rico rejected the rule of joseph Bonaparte 
and proclaimed their allegiance to Ferdinand VII and to the Junta Su:ere-
~ (Supreme Council) that had assumed the direction of the government 
after the Napoleonic invasion. During that time, the majority of the 
creoles showed remarkable patience and adapted themselves to the chaotic 
conditions of the provisional government. 4 liith the increasing politic-
al instability in Spain, however, they too began to act and think in-
dependenly since they no longer wanted to remain just agents of the Cen-
tral Government or passive subjects of the Cro\m. 5 
A rising national consciousness influenced by the political events 
in the peninsula and by a belief in the inevitability of a prolonged 
European struggle emerged among the liberal-minded creoles. A strong 
sense of individualism, personality, and identity became evident in 
their demands for increased social equality and decreased political 
control. During that time, the creoles identified themselves with col-
onial goals rather than with national objectives. Since they desired 
to extend the commercial advantages that Spain had alredy granted, the 
creoles continued to demand further economic concessions. But unlike 
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the Spanish Americans of the mainland, who had a long-established tra-
di tion of independent determination, the Caribbean colonials \vere fear-
ful of challenging the government directly and did not stress their 
desires. 
After 1808 a liberal group, consisting mostly of influential upper-
class creoles with investments in sugar, coffee, and tobacco pr·oduct-
ion, favored complete assimilation into the peninsular political system. 
These creoles rejected colonial government and sought political and 
economic reforms beneficial to their particular interests. They opposed 
independence because they felt that political emancipation would bring 
instability, economic chaos and, in the case of Cuba, a racial strife 
between the \vhites and blacks. 6 In Cuba, the principal leader of this 
faction was Francisco Arango y Parrefio, ~mo represented the plantation 
O\illers' interests in Spain. The liberal creoles articulated their 
demands by means of local activities in the Sociedad Ec6nomica, the 
Consulado de Agricultura and the A~ntamiento ~ ~ Habana (the capital's 
municipal government). 
Since the prosperity of the Cuban liberals depended on slavery and 
the plantation system, they demanded the continuation of the slave trade, 
unrestricted white migration, and labor control. They also advocated 
free trade with all foreign countries and popular education.. In Arango 1 s 
view, the Cuban liberals \vanted political and economic concessions and 
the defense of their rights within the framework of a Spanish union. 7 
Puerto Rican liberals had similar objectives, except that they did 
not fear a slave insurrection. A census taken in Puerto Rico in 1827 
indicated that there were o~ly 28,418 slaves out of a total population 
of 287,673. 8 In Puerto Rico, slavery was a unique institution,and 
so 
free labor predominated during the Spanish regime. The lvhites always 
outnumbered the blacks.and slaves constituted an infinitesimal part of 
the total populatlon.9 The principal concernsof the Puerto Rican lib-
erals, therefore, were the reduction of trade barriers, the elimination 
of commercial restrictions, the promotion of agriculture, reduction of 
taxes~ and equality of opportunity for private economic interests. 
They, too, desired assbnilation into the peninsular political system 
and opposea outright independence from Spain. 10 
On the other hand, Cuban and Puerto Rican separatists wanted com-
Plete independence for the islands and deemed the abolition of slavery 
as an important part of their struggle.for political emancipation. 
This faction consisted of radical creoles, some well-to-do foreign 
plantation owners who opposed the Spanish regime, members of the lo\ror 
clergy, some members of the armed forces, freeholders, and rural in-
habitants. Many of them traded periodically with smugglers and priva-
teers and did not depend so much upon Spanish conunerce for their pros-
perity. Since a substantial number of them lived in the interior and on 
the coastal plains, for many years they had developed profitable trade 
relations lrith non-Spanish Europeans and other enemies of Spain. Foreign 
contacts had exposed them to the revolutionary doctrines of the l•'rench 
philosophers, freemasonry ethic, and the ideology of the Spanish Amer.:. 
ican movement for independence. They believed that Cuba amd Puerto Rico, 
after a formative period of three centuries, \>Tere finally ready to be-
come sovereign states with their own geographical, social, economic, 
and cultural boundaries. 11 
A conservative faction, consisting of Spaniards, wealthy creoles, 
members of the government, and immigrants from Louisiana, Florida, Santo 
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Domingo,and war-torn South and Central America, opposed the activities 
of both the liberals and the separatists. The conservatives wanted no 
political changes which could affect their strong influence in the 
government or the economy. They defended colonial status and opposed 
modifications in the structure of government or its economic institu-
tions because they viewed reforms as dangerous to their own political 
and commercial interests. The peninsular aristocracy also distrusted 
and feared the creoles, considered thetn inferiors, and despised their 
social behavior. Since many young women married Spaniards instead of 
creoles to improve their social and economic prestige, at times person-
al relations between the two groups were extremely unpleasant. 12 
A fourth group, consisting mostly of merchants, traders, and small 
businessmen, sought the incorporation of Cuba as a territory or a state 
of the United States. Some wealthy planters who admired the social and 
aristocratic values of the American South preferred annexation to losing 
their property and life style through changes in the colonial system. l3 
Members of this group even proposed the annexation of Cuba to either 
Mexico or Colombia if the -American government did not accept their over-
tures. 14 
By the end of 1808, the war between Spain and France had reached a 
dangerous level. Initially, the Spanish people, with the help of the 
British army and money from the Empire, had some initial victories against 
the French. Napoleon's drive could not be stopped, however, and by the 
end of that year the enemy had overrun most of the peninsula. The Junta 
Suprema followed the retreating forces from Aranjuez to Sevilla, where 
it planned to reorganize the war effort and consider means for a more 
active participation of the overseas colonies. To accomplish this last 
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purpose, the Junta extended political recognition to the ultramarine 
colonies, including Cuba and Puerto Hico, by raising their political 
status to that of equals with Spanish provinces and by permitting them 
to have a legal representative in the Spanish government. These pol-
itical concessions ,.;ere direct results of Spain's concern for con-
trol of her overseas possessions during the critical period of the 
. N 1 . . . 16 apo eom.c mvas~on. 
On january 22, 1809, a royal decree signed by Francisco Saavedra, 
the president of the junta Suprema, proclaimed the "vast and valuable 
dominions that Spain has in the Indies 11 \vere not colonies but 11an es-
sential and integral part of the monarchy.n17 The decree ordered the 
Spanish American colonies and the Pr~lippines to send representatives 
to the junta Suprema. While the decision was \vell received in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico, it did not satisfy the other Spanish American colonies be-
cause it failed to provide for equal political representation. 18 
The defeat of the Spanish army at Ocana, the occupation of Andalu-
cia, and the loss of prestige and confidence. of the Spanish people ulti-
mately caused the disintegration of the Junta Suprema. ~ Consejo de ~­
gencia (Regency Council) consisting of five members, including one Amer-
ican, assumed control. Fearful of liberalism, this conservative body 
suspended the plans for colonial representation and the reconvening of 
the SpaniSh parliament. These measures, as well as the ascension of 
joseph Bonaparte to the Spanish throne, resulted in several revolts in 
the Spanish American colonies. Venezuela set the example by deposing 
the captain-general and proclaiming her autonomy on April 19, 1810. The 
rebellious colonies soon established. self-governing juntas to rule in 
the name of Ferdinand VII. These initial revolts would later 9-evelop 
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into full revolutionary movements for independence. 
On September 24, 1810, the Regency authorized the opening of the 
Spanish Cortes as a result of the Spanish American rebellions and the 
demands of influential citizens, such as Jos~ Har!a Queipo del Llano, 
Conde de Toreno! Before the French invasion, this parliament had been 
composed of three separate estates representing the nobility, the Church, 
and the bourgeoise. The ne\v Cortes was t.o~ be organized into two assem-
blies or chambers, one comprised of popularly elected deputies, the other 
of members of the Church and the nobility. Gaspar Melchor de Jovella-
nos, who had directed the affairs of the Junta Suprema, became the prin-
cipal spokesman for ti1e new system. Jovellanos distrusted both the ab-
solute po\ver of the king and the political bahavior of the masses. He 
believed that the new system \vas properly balanced; one assembly lvould 
restrain the king while the other ,.,.ould regulate the "popular license. 11 
In the end, this idea \vas rejected, and the Cortes assembled in one cham-
19 ber. 
While the newly created parliament was less conservative than the 
Regency, its members, drawn mostly from the middle class, the clergy, 
and the aristocracy, still represented the conservative and commercial 
interests of the merchants of C~diz, Sevilla, and Catalufia. In nearly 
all matters, the Cortes accepted the leadership of the middle class. 
While the liberals rejected the despotic form of government that tradi-
tionally had ruled Spain, their progressive views concerned the penin-
sula, not the imperial possessions in Spanish America. Commercial and 
trade interests took precedence during their discussions concerning the 
Empire. 20 
As the new government was basically conservative, no substantial 
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changes could be expected in the relations between Spain and her col-
onies~ The advocates of colonial reform and assimilation into the ex-
isting system did not realize that their hopes and expectations for 
a systematic improvement in the political relations between Spain and 
her colonies were unfeasible. The Spanish authoritarian system and 
royal institutions were too well established to permit adequate reforms, 
especially since the changes desired by the creoles affected the autho-
rity of the captain-general and the commercial monopolies of the penin-
sulares.. The Cortes spurred national aims designed to preserve in-
tact the Spanish colonial empire. As a result, they would not permit 
colonial demands for political reform that threatened Spain's control 
f h d . . 21 o er overseas o~ons. 
The liberal faction that could have provided permanent political 
and economic refonns to the colonies divided itself into moderados and 
exaltados (moderates and radicals) after the opening of the Cortes. The 
politica~ confrontations and disputes betlveen the tlvo groups considerably 
damaged the effectiveness of constitutional government and discredited 
the work of the parliament. Their differences made possible the increase 
of conservative. and royalist adherents who undermined the reform pro-
gram of the parliament. Cuban and Puerto Rican reformers, however, placed 
their hopes and aspirations for a better colonial government on this 
ineffective and divided liberal faction. 22 
lVhile the Cuban and Puerto Rican creole s accepted partial economic 
reforms from the parliament, the rest of the Spanish American colonials 
refused to compromise their political demands, especially equality of 
representation. On February 14, 1810, the Regency authorized the col-
onies one deputy from each American province to represent colonial interests 
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in the Cortes. At the same time it authorized the residents of Spain 
to send a deputy for each 50,000 inhabitants in addition to deputies 
from the cities \'lhich had been represented in the Cortes of 1789. As 
a result, there were seventy-five.peninsular deputies present during 
the opening of the Cortes, with many other scheduled to arrive later, 
but only thirty representatives of the Spanish American colonies. These 
colonial delegates, with the exception of the representative from Puerto 
Rico, had been chosen fro~ among the many native clergymen, academicians, 
and members of the armed forces \vho resided in Cruiiz since many colonies 
did not hold elections to select official deputies. 23 As the official 
decree did not specify how many deputies should be elected from each 
overseas province, many of those chosen declined to go to Spa:in. 24"The 
unequal representation that resulted, 11 writes French Ensor Chadwick, 
11clearly indicates ho\v great was the departure from a theory of equal-
ity \vhich had been thrice enunciated in a fe\1 months. tt25 
In spite of changes made in the colonial trade monopolies, tl1e 
merchants of Cddiz still maintained a strong control over Spanish Amer-
ican commerce. Since they \vere providing roost of the financial support 
needed to fight the French, their views prevailed in most government 
decisions. Decrees which benefited the colonies but did not suit the 
Cadiz merchants were revoked, regardless of colonial objections. This 
influence further alienated the Spanish Americans, who found the pre,.. 
rogatives of the peninsular traders offensive to their economic and pol-
.. al . t 26 1t1c Lnteres s. 
The Spanish American colonists realized that their expectations for 
a better syste1n of government could not be realized since the over\Yhel-
ming majority of the peninsular deputies would legislate to their own 
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advantages. The Venezuelan revolutionaries considered this problem, 
and on May 3, 1810, refused to recognize the authority of the Consejo 
de Regencia or the decisions of the Spanish parliament. 27 By declaring 
their independence on july 5, 1811, they further demonstrated this ob-
jection to the Spaniards efforts to dictate how Spanish Americans should 
conduct their internal affairs. In Buenos Aires, the neN·spapers Hartir-
· o Li.bre and g Gri to ~ ~ discussed during that time the inequality 
of colonial representation, Spanish discrimination, and colonial loyal-
ty. Their arguments in favor of local autonomy further spurred the cause 
of Spanish American independence. 28 
Neither the Cubans nor the Puerto Hicans refused to accept the lim-
ited concessions granted by the Spanish government. In Cuba, Bernardo 
de 0 1Gavan and Andr~s de J~uregui were elected by the advocates of re-
form to represent their interests in the Cortes. Since one of the prin-
cipal objectives of the Cuban liberals was the preservation of slavery, 
their representatives received instructions to oppose the abolition of 
the slave trade. On March 26, 1811, the deputy for New Spain, Miguel 
Guridi Alcocer, proposed the suspension of the traffic of African labor-
ers, the emancipation of slave children, and the improvement of the liv-
ing conditions of those who were in bondage. This action lvas signifi-
cantbecause for the first time the Spanish parliament considered seriously 
the abolition of the slave trade. One \veek later, the well-kno\vn 
Spanish politician Agustin ArgUelles further recommended the elimination 
of the trade by supporting the proposal of the Hexican delegate. Since 
these measures threatened the Cuban interests, Jdliregui opposed them and 
even tried to persuade the Cortes to suspend public hearing on the sub-
. 29 Ject. 
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In Cuba, the Ayuntamiento de la Habana, the Consulado, the Sociedad 
Econ6mica, and the captain-general supported jaUregui's action. The 
Marqu~s de Someruelos suggested to the Cortes that the issue of slavery 
should be treated 11with great moderation in order not to lose this im-
portant island, 11 and the creole organizations argued that since the for-
tunes of Spanish Cuba inevitably depended on the plantation economy, 
slavery must be allowed to continue unchanged. 30 Arango y Parrefio pro-
tested that the Cortes had no jurisdiction to deal with the problem 
and that the colonials needed time to consider the situation and to 
adjust to the ne\v conditions before suspending the trade. He appealed 
for gradual emancipation and suggested the promotion of white immigra-
tion to compensate for labor losses. His brj~liant defense of Cuban 
slave interests resulted in a moratorium on the abolition of the slave 
traffic. 31 
The Puerto Rican delegate to the Cortes, Ram6n Po\rer y Girald, did 
not oppose the abolition of the slave trade. Puerto Rican creole in-
terests lay in the reduction of trade barriers, elimination of commer-
cial restrictions, the promotion of agriculture, and the equality of 
opportunity for private economic interests. As a result, Power's con-
cern was primarily the defense of the economic interests of the emer-
. Ri b . 32 g1ng Puerto can ourgeo1se. 
Since the other Spanish-American colonies were initiaJ.ly represent-
ed by substitute delegates who resided in Spain, Power became the only 
elected deputy present when the Cortes convened in C~iz. As the Span-
ish government desired to strees colonial participation and equality of 
representation, they elected Power to the vice presidency of the Cortes, 
an action which greatly satisfied the Puerto Rican liberals. Not 
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realizing the real motive of Power's election, they viewed the event 
as a true indication of the Spanish interest in resolving the existing 
colonial injustices and as a golden opportunity for the creoles to bring 
their grievances before the parliament. l'O\ver was successful in advan-
cing the interests of liberal creoles. Among the concessions that he 
successfully advanced were the elimination of the abasto forzoso, the 
repeal of comn1ercial monopolies, the reduction of export duties, and 
the opening of new ports to foreign trade.33 
Perhaps the most important reform granted to Puerto Rico as re-
sult of Power's demands was the separation of the .ntendant from the 
captaincy-general. The post of Intendant had been created in 1784 to 
deal \vith treasury, fiscal, and economic matters, but its duties had 
been assumed by the governor. The liberals always wanted the s~paration 
of these two functions because in this way they could prevent the govern-
or from interfer~ng in economic matters. Power's action resulted in 
the appointment of Alejandro Ramirez as Intendent on February 12, 1813, 
to deal lvith the insular economy. A brilliant economist, Ramirez re-
alized that the only \vay that the Puerto Rican economy could be made 
self-sufficient was by effective utilization of native resources rather 
than depending upon financial assistance from Spain or Hexico. 34 
To the delight of the liberals and the displeasure of the governor, 
Ramirez initiated a series of economic reforms \~lich promised subst~tial 
improvements in foreign trade and agriculture. In order to encourage 
foreign connnerce, he eliminated import taxes on farm machinery and 
agricultural tools and rehabilitated the ports of Aguadilla, Hayaguez, 
Cabo Rojo, Ponce, and Fajardo. The Intendant distributed better seeds 
to improve agriculture, organized a lottery to add income to the treasury, 
founded the first non-governmental ne\vspaper, and facilitated the im-
migration of white settlers to Puerto llico. Finally, he reorganized 
the monetary system by introducing the moneda macuquina (a valuable 
silver coin) from Venezuela to ~eplace the paper currency which nobody 
\vanted. 35 
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PO\ver sought to reduce the captain. -general 1 s discretionary powers, 
which he used to suppress political activities in the island. 36 The Puerto 
Rican representative, ho,vever, could not remove the governor from his 
position of authority in spite of the fact that he ruled despotically. 
In a secret session of the Cortes, Po;y-er requested the appointment of 
a commission to investigate the goven1or 1 s political conduct.37 The 
commission referred the investigation to the Consejo de Regencia, '¥hich, 
follo\ving the traditional conservative view to\vard the colonies, resolved 
that the case did not have sufficient merit to \varrant the governor's 
. 38 
suspens~on. 
The Cuban and Puerto Rican delegates received substantial encourage-
~ent in 1812 \vhen the Cortes proclaimed a constitution Hhich tempera-
rily ended absolutism in Spain. Under this document, the Spanish govern-
ment became a constitutional monarchy by \vhich, according to historian 
Loida Figueroa, "the king had fewer po\.,rers than his English counterpart, 
the English being the most advanced nation in parliamentary procedures.n39 
The Constitution of 1812 provided for popular franchise but it did not 
provide for equality, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, or the 
right of association. It permitted colonial representation in the Cor-
tes, but excluded persons of African origin - those even distantly 
related -- from receiving Spanish citizenship. The Constitution of 1812, 
therefore, deprived a great p:coportion of Cubans and Puerto Ricans of that 
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right. 
In other v;ays the Constitution of 1812 represented a considerable 
improvement over the authoritarian rule that had existed in the Carib-
bean for more than three hundred years. In addition to providing in-
sular representation in the Cortes, the document gave Cubans and Puerto 
.. 
Ricans the same rights granted to the peninsulares, including freedom 
of speech, thought, petition. work, and suffrage as well as important 
trade and commercial advantages. It recognized in part the political 
liberties of the creoles, but like over previous reforms, it further 
centralized the administrative mechanisms of the empire, the authority 
of the royal governors, and the collection of taxes.4° 
In 1814 Ferdinand VII, the imprisoned Spanish monarch, returned to 
Spain. He refused to accept the constitutional monarchy that had been 
devised by the Spanish .Cortes during his absence. Reverting to abso-
lutism, as it was understood by the most absolute of his predecessors, 
he brought back the monastic orders such as the jesuits, reinstated the 
inquisitorial authority of the Church, restored all the lost privileges 
to the nobility, and imprisoned many politicians, including deputies of 
the parlirunent. The members of the Cortes had to escape to either 
Great Britain or France because Ferdinand VII decreed the death penal-
ty for any one \vho dared even to speak in favor of the Constitution. 
Sixty-nine deputies \vere forced to sign the Hanifiesto de los Persas 
(Persian Manifesto), a document which promised complete allegiance to 
the Spanish monarchy.41 
Ferdinand VII then launched a campaign of terror to intimidate the 
Spanish American revolutionaries. He abolished aJ.l decrees and acts which 
had been promulgated by the Cortes and appointed a board of officers to 
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investigate the armeduprisi.ngs in America. The board reconunended that 
the King despatch a military force under the command of Pablo Horillo 
to suppress revolutionary activities. To pay the expenses of the pacific-
ation campaign, the government established a semi-annual tax of one hun-
dred reales on retail sales establishments.42 
The effects of the change of government and the return of absolutism 
were felt less in Cuba and Puerto Rico than expected. vlhile the governors 
reinstated authoritarianism, abolished the liberal reforms that had been 
granted by the Cortes, and curtailed political activities, the creoles 
continued to enjoy some measure of economic freedom. Spain made some 
additional concessions to Cuba and Puerto Rico to prevent the insular 
creoles from joining in the struggle for Spanish American independence. 43 
The government also intended to utilize the Caribbean possessions as 
military bases for the defense of its territories. Cuba 'vas to be used 
in the defense of New Spain and Florida in the event of a conflict with 
the United States or a dangerous uprising in Mexico. Puerto Rico \vas 
projected as the military bastion for operations against New Granada. 
Cuba and Puerto Rico also were to serve as refugee areas for the penin-
sulares escaping from \var-torn Spanish America, as well as centers for 
the Spanish agents who operated in the United States and South America. 44 
Since these military plans required satisfactory relations with 
the creoles, especially in Cuba,where the government intended to use local 
funds to pay for the naval activities in the Caribbean, Spain permitted 
the plantation owners and merchants to retain many of the trade conces-
sions which had been previously granted by the Cortes. In 1816 Cuban 
interests received further support with the selection of Arango y Parreno 
as qonsejero de Indias lCounselor of the Indies) to the Spanish Crown. 
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The follo\dng year, the government abolished the Royal monopoly on 
tobacco, \vhich had been the source of considerable dissatisfaction, and 
fostered \vhite iimnigration to the island. In 1818 Spain granted Cubans 
permission to trade \vith foreign countries and authorized the private 
O\mership of the tierras merccdadas (land grants) which still remained 
under government control.45 
At the insistance of the British government, the Cro\vn abolished 
the slave trade, but the measure did not seriously affect the slaveo\vners 
since they continued to import African workers illegally ldth the acqui-
esce of the local authorities. Prior to the suspension of the trade, 
the plantation O\vners rushed to p.1rchase slaves. Bet\veen 1817 and 
1820, 67,059 Africans entered the port of Havana. After the deadline 
of October 30, 1820, slave ships continued to arrive \vithout great dif-
ficulty. From October 31, 1820 to September, 1821, t\venty-six slave 
ships with 6,415 additional slaves entered Havana.46 
Puerto Rican creoles also received important concessions form Spain. 
On August 20, 1815, the Crmm promulgated the Cedula de Gracias (Decree 
of Concessions) to satisfy ·some of the local demands and foster the de-
velopment of population, commerce, and agriculture. The decree pro-
vided for a fifteen-year exemption from such taxes as the diezmos {tithes) 
and alcabal.as (sales taxes), expanded trade \vith Spanish ports and foreign 
countries, and allowed foreigners to settle in Puerto Rico. The c~dula 
greatly stimulated the gro\vth of population and the investment of Span-
ish capital. 47 
As a result of the concessions granted by Spain, many inmdgrants 
royalists fleeing from Santo Domingo, Louisiana, Florida, Venezuela, 
and Mexico -- settled on the islands. The flm;r of refugees and innnigrants 
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\'las so great that Spain had to provide them financial assistance. 
These exiles increased the number of peninsulares in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
and_ strengthened the reactionary control of the government, since they 
opposed the political activities of liberals and separatists. The sit-
uation \vas similar to the exodus of Loyalists from the thirteen British 
American colonies to parts of Canada after the Revolutionary War. In 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, as in Canada, the refugees exerted considerable 
political influence for many years.48 
Spanish concessions in the Caribbean during the second decade of 
the nineteenth century \vere mostly economic in nature and primarily be-
nefited the \veal thy creoles and the middle class merchants. The re- ' 
fol1Jls awakened many members of the creole bourgeoise to the realization of 
the advantages of \vorld trade. They did not, hm.;ever, improve the pol-
itical condition of the colonies or the economic status of the poor 
peasants, free blacks, and slaves who lived in poverty, had no education, 
and \vere una\vare of the fundamental needs of social change. 
Despite the many economic concessions granted to the islands to 
isolate them from the revolutionary ideology, the failure of the liberal 
reform movement in Spain and the return of absolutism in 1814 resulted 
. in increased creole dissatisfaction. The discretionary \vay by \vhich the 
governors and the local officials adopted or changed the reforms autho-
rized by the Cro\vn also contributed to colonial resentments49 As his-
torian Charles E. Chapman has summarized it, 11undue trade restrictions, 
arbitrary and unscientific methods of taxation, and the virtual exclu-
sion of Cubans ~and Puerto Ricans_! from government are the three most 
frequently mentioned causes of discontent in the nineteenth century. 1150 
The political apathy of the masses, intensified by years of oppression 
and military control, began to change after 1810 as result of the col-
onial demands for political and economic improvements. Under the leader-
ship of the separatists, many Cubans and Puerto Ricans began to recon-
sider the extent of their loyalty to the Crmm. The movement of pol-
itical emancipation in Venezuela and Santo Domingo also strengthened 
the nationalistic spirit of many Cubans and Puerto Ricans. The revolution-
ary leaders that emerged to direct the independence effort came mostly 
from the middle class; they were well-educated, influential, and patriotic. 
These separatists began to furnish the.directing force of the movement 
for Cuban and Puerto Rican independence in spite of the opposition of 
tl1e peninsulares and the passivity of the rural lo\rer classes. The 
era of colonial refonns, therefore, could not prevent the yearning for 
political emancipation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CUBAN AND PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENTS 
The Napoleoni.e invasion of Spain and the placement of joseph Bona-
parte on the Spanish throne r~sulted in the formation of revolutionary 
juntas in Spain to direct the Spanish resistance against the invader. 
The Spanish people, with the help of the British forces, had some ini-
tial successes against the French, but they could not stop Napoleon's 
drive across the peninsula. By March, 1810, the enemy forces \vere al-
ready in Cadiz, on the southern coast of Spain. The French victory and 
the coronation of Napoleon's brother resulted in several revolts in Span-
ish America; Venezuela set the example on April 19, 1810, by deposing . 
the captain-general and proclaiming self-government. 1 
Most of the South American colonies also revolted against the French-
dominated peninsular gover~~ent. They soon established local self-govern-
ing juntas, as Venezuela had done, to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII, 
whom they considered the legitimate Spanish ruler. As the rest of the 
Spanish American colonies began to slip from peninsular control, the 
strategic position of Cuba and Puerto Rico and their continued loyalty 
to the Crmm became increasingly important for Spain. That nation did 
not realize, ho\vever, that the initial revolts in the empire and the dis-
turbed political conditions in the Mother Country had. also, affected the 
Spanish Caribbean and the loyalty of its people. Cuban and Puerto Rican 
creoles had also begun to demand meaningful changes in the structure of 
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the colonial government and additional participation in the political 
process. \Vhen their political expectations did not materialize and 
Spain strengthened her military controls, the creoles decided to change 
the system. 
On July 26, 1808, Francisco de Arango y Parrefio, with the support 
of the Harqu~s de Someruelos and the approval of seventy-t\vo influential 
citizens from Havana, recommended to the Ayuntamiento the formation of 
a juntf;l. superi~ de gobierno (central ruling junta) to direct the pol-
itical affairs of the island. Since Spain did not have a legitimate 
government as a result of the Napoleonic invasion, many Cubans found it 
necessary to create a system of local government which could guarantee 
their special privileges and their interests. Such an assembly, however, 
could also have led to greater autonomy and perhaps to independence, as 
had happened in other parts of Spanish America. Therefore, the creoles 
\V'ho opposed self-government joined the reactionary peninsulares to de-
feat Arango 1 s proposaL Local authorities consequently took no action 
on the recommendation.They proclaimed their adherence to the principles 
of the Junta Suprema de Sevilla and declared war against France. 2 The 
government also placed all the military forces on alert status and order-
ed the organization of sixteen militia companies to defend the capital. 
While the motives of Arango y Parrefio may have been purely economic, 
h:is recommendation \vas, nevertheless, the first instance of overt Cuban 
dissatisfaction with -t;he prevailing political system. 3 
The first attempt for Cuban independence occurred in 1809, when 
Roman de la Luz Sanchez Silveira, a wealthy Freemason, together with 
Joaquin Infante, a lawer from Bayamo, and Luis F. Basabe, a military 
officer, organized a revolutionary conspiracy in Havana \vith the 
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assistance of many blacks and mulattoes. To win the support of the lib-
eral slaveowners, Infante proposed a republican constitution which \vould 
guarantee the continuation of slavery and the predominance of the creoles 
in the political affairs of the ne'v republic. The \ri.fe of Romctn de la 
Luz unintentionally informed a local·priest of the planned insurrection 
during confession and soon thereafter the authorities secretly arrested 
the leaders of the revolt.4 
Infante escaped to the United States, but Romm de la Luz and Luis 
F. Basabe \vere imprisoned in Ceuta and sentenced to permanent exile from 
Cuba. The leaders of the insurrection later received a royal pardon, 
but they 'vere prohibited from returning to their country. Rom~n de la 
Luz died in Spain several years later. 5 1villiam Shaler, an American spe-
cial agent in Cuba, wrote to the State Department that the majority of 
the revolutionaries vere "colored men, free Negroes, slaves and vaga-
bonds., and since trthe proceedings against them are secret, the public 
knows nothing more of it than what the government chooses to tell. 11 
Shaler concluded his report by indicating that there were strong fears 
of additional slave revolts throughout the island.. 6 
In 1811 a Cuban revolutionary and adventurer, jos~ Alvarez de Toledo 
fostered a revolution in his homeland with the assistance of the United 
States government. Toledo, labeled by the Spanish Hinister in the United 
States as the greatest enemy of Spain in that country, had been an officer 
in the Spanish navy and an alternate representative for the island of 
Santo Domingo to the Spanish parliament. \\'hile in Spain, he had join-
ed the radical element \vho opposed the return of Ferdinand VII to the 
throne. Accused of treason, he fled to the United States in September, 
1811, with the aid of Richard Heade, the American Consul at Cctdiz. 7 
In the United States, Toledo claimed to possess a document signed 
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by most of the Spanish American representatives in Spain which granted 
him the po1v-er to raise an army to revolutionize the ip.ternal provinces 
of Hexi.co. 8 While -in Philadelphia, he informed Secretary of State James 
Honroe that Great Britain, 1vith the approval of the Spanish Cortes, plan-
ned to take possession of the West Indies in order to monopolize trade 
in the Gulf of Hexi.co and the Caribbean. At that time, he sought Mon-
roe's help to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico and organize these territo-
ries as an independent confederation friendly to the United States.9 
Monroe became interested in Toledo's plans and employed Alexander 
J. Dallas, who was then the United States District Attorney for eastern 
Pennsylvania, as an intermediary with Toledo. On November 23, 1811, Hon-
roe authorized his representative to provide Toledo 'vith funds for a 
. h . . al d" h" pl. 10 tr~p tot e nat~on's cap~t to ~scuss ~s ans. T1v0 weeks later, 
Toledo sent J.v1onroe copies of a printed manifesto lvhich he had published 
to justify Cuban independence. At that time, Monroe authorized additional 
funds for Toledo~s. personal expenses and suggested that the revolution-
ary agent visit him in Washington. There is no official record of the 
subsequent conversations bet\veen Monroe and Toledo, but it is lmown that 
in December, 1811, he visited the Secretary of State. Cuban historian 
Carlos Trelles y Gob!n believes that he presented a plan for the indepen-
dence of Cuba; Issac J. Cox has \Vritten that Toledo gave Monroe infor-
mation concerning British designs in the Caribbean. Joseph B. Lockey 
maintains, hO\vever, that the independence of the Spanish West Indies was 
never the goal of Toledo and that his I,Urpose in seeking help from the 
United States \vas to revolutionize the northeastern borderlands of Mexico. 11 
In january, 1812, Toledo returned to Philadelphia and, with other 
individuals and the approval of the United States government, began to 
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organize a military expedition against Cuba. On January 14, he sent 
a letter to the Secretary of State concerning the preparations underway 
in accordance 11with the agreement of your Excellency.n Toledo also 
informed john Graham in the Department of State that he had received 
the funds promised for the expedition and \</as ready to proceed with the 
plans unless the government of the United States found them to be un-
satisfa.ctory. In that event, Toledo said in his letter, he was ready 
to change any· portion of them as required because he '"as determined to 
succeed 11for the welfare of my fatherland and of these United States. 1112 
. There are no documents in the Department of State concerning the 
cancellation of the planned expedition. Since the United States had 
serious difficulties with Great Britain during that time, it is possible 
that Monroe abandoned the plans for the liberation of Cuba in order to 
dedicate his attention to the European problem. Trelles y Gob!n maintains 
that Toledo abandoned the plans for Cuban independence after realizing 
that the colony was not ready for lt. 13 Historian Arturo Santana, ,,ilo 
has extensively analyzed Toledo's activities in the Caribbean, believes 
the Spanish islands in the ·\vest Indies 11figured prominetly in his plans· 
during the first months in the United States.n14 Toledo later went to 
Ne\v Orleans to join the Hexican insurgents who were trying to revolu-
tionize northern Hexico and apparently abandoned his plans for the inde-
pendence of Cuba. 15 
A more significant attempt for Cuban independence, involving free 
blacks and slaves, occurred in 1812 under the leadership of jo§e Antonio 
Aponte, a mulatto carpenter from Havana. While there is no consensus 
among Cuban historians concerning the origins of Aponte's revolutionary 
ideology, it is lmmm that he lvas a\vare of the struggle for independence 
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in Spanish America and probably ivas inspired by it. A black Haitian 
chieftain named Jean Francois promised Aponte to support the insurrect-
ion and some creole separatists joined the movement. The plans of Aponte 
involved a general uprising of slaves in the princip.al agricultural cen-
ters of the country, the destruction of tl1e sugar and coffee Plantations, 
and the transformation of the plantation system into an agrarian society 
which would not had to depend on slave labor for its economic prosperity. 16 
Aponte organized a junta revolutionaria ( a revolutionary junta) in 
Havana to direct the insurrection. The rebel leaders also organized in-
sur gent groups in many parts of the country, and the planned revolt 
acquired national scope. Hundreds of blacks and mulattoes, including 
members of the militia, joined the movement. They expected to succeed 
because most of the peninsular troops that defended the island had been 
transferred to South and Central America to fight the revolts on the 
continent. Aponte scheduled the uprising to begin on Harch 17, 1812, 
in Havana, where he had betiveen three and four hundred men ready for the 
insurrection. He also expected to receive about 5,000 men from Haiti 
to join the rebel forces. 17. 
Since the plans could not be kept secret and the insurrection app ar-
ed to have racial overtones, upper class creoles, the plantation mvners, 
and many \vhite citizens joined the peninsulares in their efforts to sup.-
press the rebellion. They provided funds and even organized militia 
units to fight the revolutionaries. One month prior to the scheduled 
date for the attack on the capital, government agents arrested Aponte 
and eight of the principal leaders, who \vere promptly executed; the autho-
rities carried the punislunent \vith extreme brutality. Part of the dis-
membered body of Aponte was displayed throughout the capital as a warning 
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to his follmvers. The other capt-ured leaders met a similar fate, since 
the Spanish \vanted to impress the black slaves who believed in ghosts 
and spiritualism. Despite the setback, violent uprisings took place in 
many localities, especially in those which had been organized by Aponte's 
follo\vers. The insurrection, however, was of a short duration since the 
rebels lacked adequate leadership to sustain a prolonged revolt. The 
government finally suppressed tl1e rebellion \vith extreme cruelty. 18 
In spite of the failure of the Aponte rebellion, slave insurrect-
ions contjnued throughout the second decade of the nineteenth centtury. 
During that time the black runaway slave and the mulatto rural worker 
became the vanguard of the Cuban revolutionary movement. Their rebel-
lious character was a constant threat to the Sparrlsh authorities and to 
the creole slaveowner. Hany of the runa\vay slaves, called cimarrones, 
escaped to the mountains of Oriente Province, \vhere they formed ,Ealenques 
( outlaw·s' dens) from which they raided the nearby to\vns and rural plan-
tations in search of food, weapons, horses, money, and supplies. By 
1814 the palenques of Toa, Hayari, Baracoa, and Frijol had become so 
dangerous to the residents of the area that the government sent punitive 
expeditions to suppress them. These attempts uniformlymet failure. Armed 
guerrilla bands from these palenques continued to harass ·the government 
forces for many years and later .served as the spearhead of the revolution-
ary movement. 19 
Beginning in 1814, Masonic lodges also played a significant role in 
the Cuban struggle for independence. The early defeats. of the Venezuelan 
and Hexican insurgents, the uncertain success of an armed uprising, the 
opposition of the liberal creoles, and the return of absolutism in 1814 
had discouraged the separatists. The arrival of new troops from the 
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peninsula and the continuing utilization of Cuba as a base of military 
operations against the mainland had further diminished the revolution-
ary fervor. As a result, the separatists took santuary in the Hasonic 
lodges and in the secret societies \vhich had begun to operate in Cuba. 
"The Freemasons t lodges, 11 '\il'ites Roque E. Garrig6, 11v;ere the schools 
of the secret revolutionaries during ti1at adverse period of Cuban his-
20 tory." These societies, under such names as Comuneros, Ca.rbonarios, 
Soles ~ Bolivar, Caballeros Racionales, Yorkinos, and Cade~ Tr.iangular, 
actively conspired for the independence of Cuba. Their political cons-
piracy increased throughout the years, and by 1820 the lodges had orga-
nized a strong revolutionary element in the country. Since many of their 
members were military officers, government functionaries, educators, 
and businessmen, their underground activities extended to many sectors 
of the community. The principal centers of political dissention were 
Havana, Hatanzas, Camaguey, and Villaclara. 21 
Since many separatists were foreigners, the Spanish government 
took measures to restrict their activities. Hany foreigners were either 
agents of the revolutionaries or emissaries from the insurgent, govern-
ments of Spanish America and had come to Cuba to stir political dissent-
ion or to help the separatists achieve their goals. Since their acti-
vities threatened the stability of the country, the government intensified 
its efforts locate them. On October 21, 1817, a royal decree divided 
all foreigners into three categories: transientswho \rere merely visitors 
in Cuba, domiciled foreigners, and naturalized citizens. Transients had 
to register \vith the local authorities, comply \vith existing regulations, 
and justify their reasons for being in Cuba. Domiciled foreigners had 
to declare their intentions of settling on the island, profess the Roman 
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Catholic religion, and swear allegiance to Spain. Naturalized citizens 
were required to serve in the militia, pay taxes, and practice Cathol-
icism, in addition· to being loyal subjects of the CroHn. Other inm1igrants 
-- mostly royalists fleeing from Venezuela, Santo Domingo, }texico, and 
Louisiana -- also settled in Cuba. These exiles received financial 
assistance and land grants from the government. They strengthened the 
pro-Spanish conservative forces and opposed the political activities 
of both liberals and"separatists. 22 
As the struggle for independence progressed in the Spanish American 
colonies, a large number of privateers took advantage of the existing 
political turbulence. Host of the privateers \rere American, British, 
and French, but many others \vere Venezuelans and Colombians who served 
under Pedro Luis Bri6n, a Dutch sailor and merchant \-rho had become Sim6n 
Bolivar 1 s naval corrnnander. The main object of these privateers, as part 
of Bolivar's strategy to isolate the Spanish forces, \vas to raid Spain 1 s 
comn1ercial vessels in the Caribbean, destroy coastal settlements under 
enemy control, and provide ''~eapons and supplies for the revolution. 
Argentinian and Uruguayan privateers also joined the struggle, and 
their activities contributed to the general instability of the area. 
They equipped their vessels and gathered followers in the United States, 
the Caribbean, and the British \vest Indian colonies. There is no doubt 
that these privateers did considerable damage to Spanish corrnnerce in 
the Caribbean and helped the independenc~ movement in South America durirtg 
the years when Bolivar was striving to organize an army capable of \rln-
ning decisive victories on the battlefield. According to Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, the clearing of Spanish ships from the Caribbean 11by scores of 
privateers fitted out in the United States had been an important factor 
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in keeping the- revolts alive." The Spanish navy could not subdue the 
insurgents because most of the maritime power had been annihilated at 
. 23 
the battle of Trafalgar. 
In 1816 Venezuelan and Colombian privateers blockaded the northern 
coast of South America and the S pa.nish possessions in the Caribbean. 
They prevented the arrival of reinforcements for the royalist forces and 
destroyed the Spanish merchant marine. As a result of the blockade, Span-
ish, English, and American commerce suffered considerably. While the 
privateers concerned themselves with raiding Spanish commerce, the 
United States government did not interfere with their activities. The 
s.ympathy of the American citizens with the revolutionary struggle also 
allowed the privateers to fit their vessels in North American ports and 
to gather American crews in the United States. But when they extended 
their operations to neutral shipping, their pop.1larity declined and the 
American government restrained their actions. 24 
On September 1, 1815, the United States issued a proclamation pro-
hibiting American citizens from helping the privateers. The directive in-
cluded rendering, assistance to the Mexican insurgents that operated in 
the Gulf of Mexico. It prohibited the sale of weapons and military suP-
plies to the revolutionaries, departure of armed expeditions from Amer-
ican ports, and the fitting of privateers in the United States. Two 
years later, as negotiations for the acquisition of Florida progressed~ 
the United States prohibited still further American participation in the 
Spanish American revolutions. 
In spite of the restraints imposed by the United States, the priva-
teers continued to raid the Spanish commerce. They also became the prin-
cipal link between the revolutionaries of Cuba and Puerto Rico and those 
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of the mainland. Their activities became increasingly important to 
the separatists by the end of the decade. Between 1817 and 1819 insur-
gent privateers held Cuba and Puerto Rico in a state of semi-blockade, 
much to the satisfaction of the separatists who believed that the measure 
would weaken Spanish domination in the Caribbean. During that time, 
the SpaniSh authorities constantly feared an insurgent attack on Cuba 
and Puerto Rico, and expeditions real or imaginary occupied the attention 
of the authorities. 25 
In 1820 two Spanish military officers, Rafael de Riego and Antonio 
Quiroga, led a successful liberal revolt in Spain to abolish absolutism 
and reestablish the Constitution of 1812. The rebellious army officers 
forced Ferdinand VII to reopen the parliament and grant representation 
to the Spanish colonies. For the second time in a decade, the Spanish 
government granted political equality to Cuba and Puerto Rico by allow-
ing insular delegates to represent the colonies in the Cortes. The new 
liberal measures revived hopes for a better colonial government~ 
In Cuba, however, the captain-general refused to accept the resto-
ration of the new liberal regime. As a result, the people of Havana 
threatened to revolt unless the government instituted the same liberal 
measures that had been adopted in Spain. The people also demanded the 
liberation of the political prisoners and the adoption of a progressi~e 
government in Cuba. During the election of the deputies to represent 
Cuba, additional disturbances between creoles and peninsulares occured 
in Havana and Puerto Principe. On that occasion, cries of "long live 
a free Cuba" and "death to the peninsulares 11 were heard among the people, 
especially in the province of Hatanzas. 26 
The newly gained victory lasted for a very short time. Ferdinand 
VII, who had been kept a virtual prisoner of the Spanish Cortes after 
the Riego revolt, appealed for help from the Holy Alliance and Alexan-
der I ef Russia to-regain his throne and reestabliSh absolutism. At 
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that time, Europe was under the political direction of the Russian 
monarch and Prince Metternich of Austria,who considered constitution-
alism too revolutionary. Therefore, when Ferdinand VII appealed for 
help, the leaders of the Quadruple Alliance authorized a French invasion 
of Spain. In 1823, Louis Antoine de Bourbon, due d'Angouleme, marched 
into Spain with 100,000 soldiers and successfully reestabliShed Ferdinand 
·VII as the legitimate ruler. Authoritarianism returned both to Spain 
and the SpaniSh Caribbean. 
The return of absolutism intensified military control in Cuba. 
Captain-General Dionisio Vives suppressed political activities, imposed 
additional taxation, and curtailed creole dissent. He prohibited cri-
ticism of the government and attempted to dissolve the masonic lodges 
and secret societies that conspirEd against the government. The liberal 
creoles and the plantation owners also became victims of the government 
reprisals,and the slaveowners discovered to their dismay that their in-
fluence in Spain was not what it had been before the liberals gained 
control in 1820. Dissatisfied with the return of absolutism and anger-
ed by the government retribution, many joined the secret societies. 27 
During the brief liberal interlude, the Cuban revolutionaries re-
organized the secret masonic organizations. In 1821 tpe Cadena El~ctrica, 
also knmm as the Cadena 'IJ'.iangular de Bolivar, became one of the most 
important rebel societies in Puerto Principe. Other masonic groups, 
among them the Escoceses and the Anilleros,also joined the independence 
movement. The Cuban patriot Nicolis Manuel de Escobedo unified their 
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activities and inspired new revolutionary fervor in those Cubans who 
h d 1 . . ind nd 28 a ost ~terest ~n epe ence. 
In 1821 jos~ Francisco Lemus, a military officer in the Colombian 
army and Cuban patriot, organized the Soles l Rayos ~ Bolivar (the Suns 
and Rays of Bolivar), the most active of the rebel societies. This 
organization established cells· throughout the country to work for Cuban· 
independence. Lenrus convinced many individuals from military units, 
city governments, schools, and the business connnunity to join his orga-
nization. In the rural areas, slaveowners, farmers, free mulattoes, and 
slaves also became members of the rebel movement. 29 
The Soles y Rayos de Bolivar became a true revolutionary organiza-
tion with thousands of followers from all sectors of society. Lemus 
convinced wealthy landowners and black slaves that independence was the 
only course open to Cuba and urged them to unify behind the revolution-
ary cause. An effective propaganda campaign also convinced many Cubans 
of the value of Lemus' P:rllosophy; his emissaries carried the revolution-
ary ideology to all the interior provinces. Lenrus believed that the 
vast distance between the Metropolis and the colony prevented effective 
government and provided opportunities for mismanagement and corruption. 
He also told the people that slavery was inefficient while free labor 
was more productive. 1'In this respect," writes Philip s. Foner, 11Lemus 1 
program was in advance of nearly all of the independence movements in 
the former Spanish colonies. n30 
To accomplish his objectives, Lemus instructed chosen members of 
the organization to join the militia units and procure weapons for the 
revolution. Arms also were to be obtained from Mexico and Colombia. As 
the date that had been selected for the armed insurrection approached, 
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the leaders intensified their activities by distributing weapons and 
p.1blishing throughout the country proclamations bearing the slogan 
11Independencia o Muerte (Independence or Death!). u3l The province of 
Matanzas became one of the principal areas of revolutionary activity. 
jos~ Mar!a Heredia, considered as one of the first romantic poets of 
Spanish America and a member of the society Caballeros ~cionales, led 
the revolt in Matanzas. Together with jos~ Teurbe Tol6n, Antonio 
Maria Betancourt, Melit6n Lamar, Manuel de Portillo, and Juan Guillermo 
de Aranguren, the Cuban poet planned a local uprising to coincide with 
the insurrection of the Soles y Rayos de Bolivar. His activities in 
favor of Cuban independence and subsequent permanent exile inspired 
Cuban revolutionaries throughout the nineteenth century.32 
In August, 1823, two members of the organization, Jos~ &im~s Valdez 
and Alejandro Campos, denounced the conspiracy to the authorities. The 
captain-general ordered tl1e arrest of Lemus and tile principal rebel 
leaders. Within a week, authorities seized 602 individuals, including 
174 from Hatanzas. To prosecute the revolutionaries, the government 
organi:z.ed a ~ ~ ~ Crimen (Criminal Court of Law), which dealt 
severe penalties to those arrested. This high court exiled Lemus to 
Spain after he served a prison term. Many of the rebels, including Jos~ 
Mar!a Heredia, escaped to the United States and Mexico. 33 
To prevent further disturbances, on March 4, 1825, the Crown authO-
rized the captain-general to organize th~ Comisidn H:Llitar Ejecutiva 
Permanente (Permanent Executive and Hilitary Commission) to prosecute 
crimes which were beyond the jurisdiction of the civilian court system. 
This organization subsequently assumed extensive judicial administrative 
powers and forced the Cuban people xo live virtually under martial law 
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for more than fifty years. 34 '1\vo months later, on Hay 28, 1825, the 
government reinstated the Facultades o~xrrmodas which gave the Captain-
General absolute pmier over life and death and authorized him to establish 
a military dictatorship to enforce the colonial laws. 
Spain further authorized the captain-general "full and unlimited 
authority" to exile any individual \vhom he considered a threat to national 
security. The government also gave him ti1e pr~rogatives normally given 
to a commander of a besieged Spanish province and jurisdiction to declare 
martial law, confiscate goods, or establish censorship. To strengthen 
the island 1 s defenses, Spain transferred to Cuba a considerable munber 
of troops and ,.,arships. By 1826 the Cuban garrison had 11,526 infantry-
men, a lru1cer regiment of 300 men, seven artillery companies, <~ a 
naval force of ~velve Ships.35 
The rapacity of the Captain-General, the suppression of individual 
liberties, and tlle establishment of absolutism, however, did not dis-
courage independence. The military garrison and the governn1ent protec~ 
tive measures, ho\vever, made an internal revolt virtually impossible. Thus, 
after years of continuous defeats, improper preparation, and poor coordi-
nation, ti1e separatists decided to take a different approach to accom-
plish their objectives. In 1824 they resolved to place their hopes for 
a successful rebellion in Sim6n Bolivar, Hexico, and tlle victorious ar-
mies of the Spanish American republics. 
While Cuba and the rest of the Spanish American colonies were con-
templating a long struggle for independence, the majority of the people 
in Puerto Rico remained loyal to tlle Crown. Since slavery did not have 
the importance that it attained in Cuba and slaveowners supported gradual 
emancipation of the slaves, few uprisings occurred on the island. The 
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rural Puerto Ricans were mostly peasants, free blacks, and slaves of 
exceedingly docile character. Uneducated, living in_poverty, and res-
tricted in their actions by an absolute government, they had shown 
little interest in politics or in revolutionary activities prior to 
1812. But the failure of the liberal reform movement in Spain and the 
return of absolutism in 1814 changed the political apathy of many 
Puerto Ricans. The movement for political emancipation in Venezuela and 
Santo Domingo also strengthened their nationalistic.views and their 
desires for change in the colonial system. 
Most Spaniards who resided in Puerto Rico opposed independence. 
They were employed in government service or were engaged in commercial 
and financial pursuits and did not desire a change in the political sys-
tem. Many creoles did not accept the separatists plans for an indepen-
dent republic either. As members of the upper class, they preferred 
assimilation into the political. structure rather than self-government. 
In 1810 the Puerto Rican separatists began their struggle for in-
dependence. Between 1810 and 1811, seditious proclamations inviting the 
Puerto Ricans to rise up in open rebellion and join the cause of lib-
erty appeared periodically in St. Thomas. 36 Luis de On!s, the Spanish 
Minister in the United States, frequently warned local authorities that 
Venezuelan agents were arriving in Puerto Rico to support the indepen-
dence movement. Many of these agents, in fact, reached the island; the 
Spanish authorities, however, captured others and imprisoned them in 
the Horro Castle. 
In 1810 the ayuntamientos of Caracas and Cartagena urged the mem-
bers of the Ayuntamiento de San Juan to revolt against the Spanish 
dominated government and join the rest of South America in the struggle 
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for independence. 38 On Hay 25, 1810, the creoles of San Juan rejected 
these invitations and reaffirmed their loyalty to Ferdinand VII because 
they could not condone the actions of the Spanish American revolution~ 
aries.39 On December 11, 1810, the creoles sent a similar rejection to 
Cartagena and criticized the activities of the insurgents.4° Praising 
the loyalty to Ferdinand VII, both the Consejo de Regencia and the Span..; 
ish Cortes sent their congratulations to the liberal creoles of San 
Juan for "their fidelity, love, and noble undertaking."4l 
The activities of the Puerto Rican patriots did not end with the 
opposition of the local ayuntamientos. With the help of Venezuelan 
revolutionary agents, they increased their political activism in the 
island. During that time, Miguel Jos~ Sanz, the Secretary of State and 
Foreign Relations of the revolutionary government of Venezuela, campaign-
ed actively for the independence of Puerto Rico because he had many 
friends in the colony, including Bishop Juan Alejo Arism~ndi and other 
members of the clergy. Sanz's activities caused his arrest and imprison-
ment while he was visiting Puerto Rico; he later escaped with the help 
of the separatists. Upon his return to Venezuela, he corresponded period-
ically with the separatists and sent them copies of seditious literature, 
including the Gaceta ~ Caracas, a revolutionary newspaper. Sanz 1 s let-
ters indicate that the independence of Puerto Rico had supporters among 
the lower clergy and the members of the armed forces. As the clergy was 
closer to the people and understood better than anyone else the hopeless 
conditions of Puerto Ricans, it is not unusual that they, like other 
priests in Spanish America, became partisans of independence. 42 
The increase of the insurgent activities resulted in many arrests 
and the exile of important leaders and sympathizers. The Governor of 
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Puerto Rico, Salvador Mel~ndez, believed that sedition existed in all 
sectors of the creole society. He sent a long indictment to Spain ac-
cusing the Puerto Rican Bishop juan Alejo Arizm~ndi and the represen-
tative to the C6rtes, Ra.m6n Power y Giralt, of subver.sive activities. 43 
This indictment may have been justified because many of the individuals 
accused of conspiracy were in fact separatists who had been planning 
an uprising in the tmvn of San Germ!n. 44 
Many historians have described Arizmendi as a liberal who accept-
ed impassively the existing colonial regime in Puerto Rico. Professor 
Lidio Cruz Honclova, one of Puerto Rico's leading historians, describes 
him as a supporter of the Spanish system and as au individual who be-
lieved in the need to maintain ties with Spain. 45 The Puerto Rican 
scholar Cayetano Coil y Toste viewed Bishop Arism~ndi as a "benevolent, 
charitable, religious man of liberal inclinations. rr46 Arism~ndi 1 s pol-
itical activitiesindicate, however, that while he did not conspire against 
the government, perhaps as result of his religious and moral responsi-
bilities, he did support changes in the political system. 
At the time when Franc-e invaded Spain, Arismendi proposed the crea-
tion of a junta to govern the island. The governor objected to the sug-
gestion because the island was not at war. 47 Puerto Rico, according to 
Loida Figueroa, therefore, 11lost the opportunity of being the first col-
ony to use this recourse.n48 Arism~ndi's recommendation was not an 
isolated case of his nPuerto Ricanism. 11 He often opposed government pol-
icy as well. On August 16, 1808, during a public ceremony in San juan 
to celebrate the election of Ram6n Power y Giralt as Puerto Rico's re-
presentative to the junta Suprema, the Puerto Rican bishop gave his epis-
copal ring to Power as a symbol of brotherhood and patriotic trust. 
89 
Arism~ndi's action was especially significant because during the cere-
mony he told Power that 11the ring will insure that you remember your 
comitment of protecting and defending the rights o( your compatriots" 
in the presence of the.Spanish governor and many peninsular civil and 
military functionaries. The Spanish authorities considered Arismendi 1s 
remarks subversive and highly irregular.49 
On JuLy 20, 1810, Arizm~ndi again disobeyed Governor Hel~ndez~ Six 
seminarians had arrived from Venezuela to be ordained. As Caracas was 
in a state of rebellion, the local authorities planned to arrest tlte 
clergymen when they arrived in Puerto Rico. The Bishop, however, gave 
them ecclesiastical protection, ordained them as priests, and secured 
their safe return ·to Venezuela in spite of the Governor's opposition. 
Arizm~ndi also maintained regular correspondence with the Venezuelan 
revolutionary Miguel Jose Sa.nz. Some of these letters could be inter-
preted as an indication of his separatist inclinations, but this suggest-
ion may require further documentary evidence before it c.a.n be accepted 
without discussion.so 
Ram6n Power y Giralt, the Puerto Rican representative to the Cor-
tes, was not a separatist. After his election to the Spanish Parliament 
Power refused to accept the instructions from the Ayuntamiento de San 
Germm, a center of revolutionary activity. Power probably re.j.ected them 
because they had been directed to the Junta Suprema and not to the Span-
ish Cortes, but his attitude seemed to indicate that his principal con-
cern was the economic interests of the emerging Puerto Rican bourgeoise, 
not the political changes recorranended by the Ayuntamiento de San Germ~. 
Jose Alvarez de Toledo claimed that Power had been one of the Spanish 
American delegates who had signed the document that authorized him to 
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organize an army for the liberation of northern Hexi.co, but there is no 
evidence to support that claim or to prove that Power supported the 
Spanish American revolutions.51 
Among the Puerto Ricanswhom Governor Hel~ndez accused of sedition 
were several members of the clergy. Archdeacon J os~ Guti~rrez del Arro-
yo and Father jos~ Cris6stomo Rodriguez were suspected of subversive 
activities. In August, 1810, these clergymen attended a dinner held in 
honor of the patron saint of Santo Domingo. Among those present at the 
social affair were Colonel Lorenzo Ortiz de Z<trate, a high-ranking mil-
itary officer, and Federico Sanjurt, the commander of the Third Battalion 
that protected San Juan. Other members of the government, the business 
community, and the armed forces were also present. During the celebra-
tion, Archdeacon Guti~rrez del Arroyo and Father Cris6stomo Rodriguez, 
perhaps influenced by the events in Venezuela or by their separatist 
beliefs, discussed the vie\<TS of the revolutionaries, the Spanish Amer-
ican conflict, and the authority of the Crown. The military officers ob-
served that it was illegal, in their opinion, to revolt against the autho-
ri ty of the king because such action was tantamount to rising against Godo 
F~changes and accusations between the participants contil1ued for several 
days after the banquet. The governor terminated the af'fair by exiling 
several of the clergymen and some- creoles accused of being revolution-
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ar~es. 
In October., 1810, the Consejo de Regencia sent to Puerto Rico Anto-
nio Ignacio de Cortabarr!a as a royal magistrate with full powers to 
resolve the Spanish American problem. So.on thereafter, Cortabarr!a began 
peace negotiations with the Venezuelan insurgents but failed to convince 
ti1em to remain loyal to Spain.53 Discouraged, he then decided to press 
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the· issue by sending a military force .from Puerto Rico, hoping to win 
on the battlefield what he had not been able to gain at the conference 
table. The Puerto Rican separatists, realizing the significance of this 
decision, gave Cortabarr!a a warning. They affixed to the door of his 
home a note l'lhich declared that "this country, so docile in obeying the 
official authorities, will never permit sending away one single Amer-
ican from this island to fight against its brothers the Car8;9,uefios." 
The government reacted by sending several Puerto Ricans prisoners to 
fight in the Spanish Amy in South America. 54 
To counteract the influence of the South American agents and cur-
tail the activities of the revolutionaries, on September 4, 1810, the 
Consejo de Regencia granted dictatorial powers to the insular governor. 
These po\'lers - the Facul tades omn.ifu.odas - authorized the Governor to 
assume emergency controls to suppress political activism on the island. 
The separatists, considering the royal decree a threat to their plans, 
moved their activities und:erground aDd continued them 11with tactics com-
mensurate \dth the dangers that they faced. 11 At times, however, they 
openly resumed their activities to let Governor Mel~ndez kno\f that their 
hostility toward the colonial system and their solidarity with the rest 
of Spanish American revolutionary cause had not been suppressed~ 55 
The first important attempt to gain Puerto Rican independence occur-
.ed the following year in San GermAn. Three of the principal creole 
families of that town - the Quillones, the Ram!rez de Arellano, and the 
Irizarry - conspired with some lesser known individuals to end Span-
ish domination in Puerto Rico. These separatists periodically met in 
the residence of Francisco Antonio Ramirez in the coastal town of Gutnica. 
Ramirez's home became the meeting Place for separatists and Venezuelan 
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agents who arrived in the southern part of Puerto Rico. These rebels 
also had the support of many separatists from the rural areas, the cap... 
ital, the armed forces, and the nearby towns. During that time, local 
dissatisfaction with the Spanish colonial regime had reached such a 
high point that many Puerto Ricans considered independence an accomplish-
ed fact. 
These revolutionaries contemplated retaliating against the govern-
ment by refusing t~ pay taxes and expelling the peninsulares from the 
country. Hany insurgents even considered 11cutting off the heads of 
the Catalans, n· seizing their pr-operty to pay for the expenses of the 
insurrection and removing those who survived from positions of respon-
sibility. 56 For decades, the creoles of San GermAn had been ignored 
by the government and scorned by the peninsulares. Although San Germ~n 
had a larger population than the capital, most of the inhabitants lived 
in porverty and did not have the political and economic advantages enjoy-
ed by the residents of San Juan. This unequal treatment, high taxes, 
and political dissatisfaction increased their desires for independence. 57 
When the news of the Venezuelan uprising reached San GermAn, the 
members of the Ayuntamiento, mostly relatives of the Quifiones family, 
decided to join the struggle for independence. The large number of ar-
med forces present in the region, hO\vever, prevented the developnent of 
an adequate plan. The revolutionary spirit continued while the creoles 
awaited a more convenient time to act. By 1811 their plans for a gen-
eral insurrection to coincide \vi.th the Christmas season were well devel-
oped. Command of the uprising was given to Domingo Postill6, a militia 
officer of separatist tendencies, and.to Bernardo Pab6n, a creole from 
San Germttn. 58 
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It was not possible to keep the proposed revolt a secret because 
many members of the movement openly expressed contemp~ for the Spaniards, 
dissatisfaction with the colonial regime, and support for independence. 
Their indiscretion led to the disclosure of the impending revolt. The 
alerted authorities arrested the leaders of the conspiracy and ordered 
their immediate prosecution. The arrival of Spanish troops in Aguadllla 
on December 23, 1811, and the fear of reprisals "imposed moderation and 
fear in tite creoles and, apart from this, they realized that it would 
have been impossible to take the authorities by surprise." As a result1 
the leaders of the insurrection who had survived the mass arrests .can-
celled the plans for the uprising. 59 
The activities of the Puerto Rican separatists caused continuous 
alarm among the peninsulares, government officials, wealthy creoles, 
and other conservatives. Since the def.ense of the island had been en-
trusted in part to the local militia, composed mostly of Puerto Ricans, 
Governor Hel~ndez became concerned with the revolutionary potential of 
that force. The militia, which had been armed and trained by the Span-
iards, had given valuable service to Spain in the defense of Puerto Rico 
against foreign invasions. Hany of its members sympathized with the se-
paratists and with the Spanish American struggle for tndependence. To 
prevent the utilization of the militia in a local uprising, the governor 
disarmed it and assigned its members housekeeping tasks instead of re- · 
gular defense. 'duties. Governor Mel~ndez even attempted to dissolve the 
force entirely, but the Consejo de Regencia opposed the captain-general's 
60 plans. 
The creoles protested to Spain the misuse of the militia forces, 
the disarmament of its members, and the activities of the governor. The 
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Consejo de Regencia, therefore, overruled the governor's decision and 
restored the militia's former responsibilities. To counteract this de-
cision, in 1813 Governor Hel~ndez organized an elite military unit com-
posed entirely of Spanish citizens. He named this armed force the 
Cuer,e~ de Voluntaries Distinguidos (Unit of Distinguished Volunteers} 
and issued its members the same armament and uniforms used by the re-
gular armed forces. This organization received instructions to be pre-
pared for an armed uprising and to protect the lives and property of 
the peninsulares. It became the personal guard of the Spanish citizens 
and an important 'addition to the local defenses. 61 
Governor Hell!ndez took additional precautions to prevent an armed 
uprising in the island. He reorganized the military forces, augmented 
the military patrols, and armed privateers to defend the coastal waters 
against incursions from Venezuela. He organized an important espionage 
cell to operate in Venezuela and Puerto Rico, to gather information and 
spy on the separatists. The cell consisted of Bartolom~ Hascarefias, 
Jo~e Lo¢z, Hateo Ocampo, and several other residents of Cumanct, Coro, 
and Curacao. Their efforts allowed the governor to intercept Sanz's 
letters and to arrest several messengers who had arrived from Venezuela. 
The governor also censored the mail and exiled many separatist leaders 
and sympathizers, including juan Cris6stomo Rodriguez Carrera. 62 
The precautionary measures taken by the authorities, the constant 
arrival of new troops en route to Venezuela and Hexico, and the early 
defeats of the Venezuelan rebels, diminished revolutionary activities 
in Puerto Hi.co. 1\vo other events served to lessen creole activism bet-. 
ween 1812 and 1813. On Holy Thursday, March 26, 1812, at 4:07 in the 
afternoon, one of the severest earthquakes ever recorded in South America 
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struck Caracas and surrounding areas. 63 In Caracas alone, more than 
20,000 people died. The religious implications of this disaster, both 
in Venezuela and Puerto Rico, were very profound.. The revolution also 
had begun in Venezuela during a Holy Week two years earlier. To many 
peoPle the coincidenc~ of these two events was terrifying; they believed 
that God was punishing them for the transgression of beginning a revo-
lution during Holy Week. 64 
The ecclesiastical au~~rities, who supported Spain and the Crown, 
quickly reinforced this belief by telling the people that the earth-
quake had been a chastisement of Heaven for abandoning the cause of 
Ferdinand VII,. The superstitious idea spread from Venezuela to Cuba 
and Puerto Rico,diminishing peasant support for local uprisings. In 
Venezuela, the psychological setback helped the Royalists win easy vic-
tories at Coro and Valencia, where they were joined by a considerable 
portion of the inhabitants of the interior. 65 
The other event·that decreased creole activism was the seizure of 
many revolutionaries on October 15, 1813. On that day, the governor 
ordered the mass arrest of kno\vn separatists and sympathizers of the re-
volution. During that time, a witness related that San Juan displayed 
the appearance of a fortress besieged by a large enemy force, its in-
habitants were terrorized, not knowing the intentions of ~~e local autho-
rities nor the purpose of the measures taken. While psychological war-
fare is a modern concept, it is interesting to note that the Spanish 
military forces used that approach quite effectively in suppressing local 
inSUlTections. The experience gained during the preceding three hundred 
years paid high dividends in the nineteenth century. 66 
By the end of 1815, the separatists, inspired by the beginning of a 
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new struggle in South America renewed their efforts for the independence 
of Puerto Rico. As in Cuba, patriotic groups, including Hasonic lodges 
such as the Losia Ya&Ue! in MayagUez, began to labor for self-govern-
ment. The activities of the separatists were well-known in Venezuela, 
as Bartolom~ Mascarenas, one of Governor Helendez' s spies indicated: 
In this place ~Venezuela_! it is common knowledge that there 
are juntas in Puerto Rico that conspire against the government 
and that the Isl&~d would not delay much in becoming indepen-
dent • • • • I can assure you that there are plenty of blazing 
groups in an outside the Island. 67 
In 1816 the visits of secret emissaries from Jeru1 Jacques Dessalines 
and other Haitian revolutionary leaders became frequent in Puerto Rico. 
The separatists, however, did not expect much help from Haiti because 
of that nation's great difficulties in achieving political stability 
after years of disorder and the frightful excesses that followed her 
separation from France. The Haitian emissaries also 'sought to foster 
Slave revolts in Puerto Rico, which even the separatists believed detri-
mental to their interests. 
Privateers, as already indicated, became an important part of the 
struggle for local independence. On January 25, 1817, Thomas Taylor, 
an American privateer who commanded ~ Patriota, raided the town of 
Fajardo, on the eastern coast of Puerto Rico. Taylor was operating under 
a license granted by the government of the United Provinces of the Rio 
de la Plata. A former merchant and sailor, in 1810 he had settle in 
Buenos Aires. Later entering the government naval service, he styled him-
self "Commodore Taylor of the Buenos Aires Navy. " Taylor had a large 
privateering squadron of thirteen to seventeen vessels. 
Taylor landed a large force near the town and proceed to capture a 
schooner that had taken refuge near the port. The local militia, under 
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the command of Antonio Planell y Bardaxi successfully resisted the 
attack and killed thirty of Taylor's men.. The privateers also lost 
a great quantity of arms and ammunition during the engagement. The pur-
pose of the attack, according to Governor Mel~ndez, was to plunder the 
town and obtain foodstuffs, arms, and gunpower. 68 Historians Lidio Cruz 
Monclova and Loida Figueroa, on the other hand, believe that the attack 
on Fajardo was part of a raid to support the separatists. According to 
Monclova, it failed when "the separatists of the. island, perhaps because 
of poor organization or the suddenness of the attack, could not provide 
adequate help .. "69 Since the official government report specifies that 
many weapons were captured -- probably arms for the insurgents -- the 
view that Taylor raided the town to obtain gunpower may not be correct. 
Monclova's assessment seems more accurate because Taylor did not stop 
his activities after his defeat at Fajardo.7° 
The threat of the privateers increased considerably between 1817 
and 1819. In the summer of 1817, the government received information 
that an expedition which had been organized in London was going to land 
in the island. The governor declared a national emergency and reinforced 
the coast with the Second Battalion of the elite Granada regiment.71 
In 1818 Governor Mel6ndez received information from juan Manuel Cajigal, 
the Captain-General of Cuba, that several ships had departed from a 
mainland port to invade the island. 7Z Rumors of an expedition from Bar-
bados to overthrow the Spanish regime also spread during that time. 73 uus 
de on!s, the Spanish Minister in the United States, also informed the 
Governor of Puerto Rico that an expedition under the command of Louis 
Aury had been organized in Charleston to invade the island. 74 Another 
expedition, organized in Haiti and under the command of the privateer 
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Gregor MacGregor, apparently had similar objectives.75 Later during 
the year, a group of privateers established themselves in the south at 
Key Caja ~ Huertos, off the coast of Ponce. From there, they conduct-
ed occasional raids against the Puerto Rican mainland.76 
On August 7, 1820, a new governor, Gonzalo de Ar6stegui, came to 
Puerto Rico to institute the constitutional reforms of the regime es-
tablished in Spain by the revolt of Rafael Riego. The new Spanish con-
cessions revived liberal activism on the island. The liberals founded 
a society which they called the Liberales mmantes de !,! ;eatria (Liberals 
for the Hotherland) to express their political views. The separatists, 
however, did not accept the changes proposed by the new governor and 
continued their insuiTectional activities. At the same time, abolition-
ist forces emerged and received support from jean Pierre Boyer, the 
president of Haiti. This faction planned a revolt of 1500 slaves on 
the plantations of Bayam6n, R!o Piedras, Gu~ynabo, Toa Alta, and Toa 
Baja. The rebellion failed to take place, however, because the govern-
ment discovered the plan.78 
After Sim6n Bolivar's victory at Carabobo on June 24, 1821, both 
the Venezuelan and Puerto Rican separatists made new plans to gain the 
independence of Puerto Rico. During that time, hmvever, the separatists 
had serious disadvantages in their struggle for Puerto Rican independence. 
They had to struggle against the opposition of the liberals and the con-
servatives, the apathy of the masses, anQ. the hostility and agrees.sive-
ness of the government. Also they had to contest the increasing in-
flmmce of the exiles, who, escaping from the war of emancipation in 
Venezuela, had sought refuge in Puerto Rico.79 
Realizing the difficulty of obtaining independence through an internal · 
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revolution, the separatists decided to seek help from outside sources. 
In the winter of 1821, agents of the Puerto lUcan rebels invited General 
H. L. V. Ducoudray Holstein to take command of an invading force, which 
was being readied for an attack on Puerto Rico in conjunction with an 
uprising scheduled to take place during the following year. Among 
the separatists involved vlith Ducoudray Holstein in the planned invasion 
and uprising were Carlos Rigotti; Andr~s Level de Goda, a refugee from 
Cuman~ who was living in Puerto Rico; an individual named Holoni; a 
Dominican by the name of Castro, whose residence was in St. Thomas; 
Pedro Dubois, a mulatto and one of the principal leaders of the revolt; 
and a Dutchman named Carlos Romano, a resident of the coastal tmm of 
Guayama. In his Memoirs, Ducoudray Holstein also stated that many rich 
foreigners who resided on the island and a numerous group of wealthy 
inhabitants supported the insurrection. 80 
After accepting ti1e command of tl~e invading force, Ducoudray Holstein 
went to the United States to organize an expedition. In the United Sates, 
he met Baptist Irvine, a leading journalist and a political agitator, 
and Charles Traugott Vogel,· who became the agent responsible for raising 
men and supplies for the expedition and for obtaining arms and ammuni-
tions. While in Philadelphia, Doucoudray Holstein received about $18,000 
from Puerto Rican separatists for the proposed invasion. 81 
In Philadelphia and Nevr" York, Doucoudray Holstein organized the 
basic elements of an expedition. He recruited forty men to serve as 
officers and chartered the brigantine ~ from Thomas Watson for $20,000, 
an amount which was to be paid 11within five days after arlf'ival in Puerto 
Rico, one half in produce of the Island" if the separatists could not 
provide "Spanish milled dollars. 11 It appear that the expedition had the 
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sanction of the Colombian government. Later, after the operation had 
been discovered, the editor of Niles' ~11eekly Register also implicated 
the Government of Haiti, but the accusation was unfounded because the 
members of the expedition had no immediate plans for the emancipation 
of the slaves. The men recruited in the United States to serve as of-
ficers of the liberating army included European adventurers and former 
soldiers, Bonapartist exiles, and thirteen Americans. Among the re-
cruits were a Lieutenant Grecourt, a Lieutenant Janet, a Lieutenant 
Colencourt, an ex-member of the French parliament and ex-governor of 
Guadeloupe_, H; c. Birchau, Pedro Bignet, Jose Alberti, Issac Reid, and 
Captains ilacron Burns and ivilliam Gould. 82 
On August 13, 1822, the expedition left the United States in the 
schooners Andrew Jackson, Selina, and Mary. A month later they arrived 
in the Swedish colony of St. Bartholomeu, \mere. Ducoudray Holstein ex-
pected to receive addit:ional funds from the separatists to purchase 
more weapons and recruit the necessary men for the invasion. In St. Bar-
tholomeu, Ducoudray Holstein purchased the brigru1tine Econdracht and 
recruited many people, among them several blacks. · He remained there 
for about eleven days awaiting the funds that the separatists were going 
to provide him. Failing to r·eceive adequate supplies, he proceeded to 
St. Thomas after the local authorities ordered him to leave the island. 
'Ihe expedition went from St. Thomas to Crabb Island on the eastern coast 
of Puerto Rico. According to Irvine, by that time there were doubts 
about its success since the separatists had failed to provide the neces-
sary money and supplies. The officers disputed constantly with the prin-
cipal leaders and several of them refused to continue, serving Ducoudray 
Holstein. After being at sea for several hours, Irvine and few other men 
101 
changed their minds and decided to change course. Irvine staged a 
short revolt among the officers, and, at the point of a gun, forced the 
expedition to change its destination. This action resulted in the can-
cellation of the plans for the invasion of Puerto Rico. 83 
The separatists could not help Ducoudray Holstein because their cons-
piracy had been discovered as a result of the indiscretion of Pedro Du-
bois, a leader of the uprising. In an effort to recruit additional mem-
bers, he had contacted M. De St. Maurice, a French planter from Fajardo. 
St. Maurice, \vho did not support Puerto Rican independence, encouraged 
Dubois to discuss with him the details of the conspiracy. The informa-
tion was sent to the authorities, who arrested the leaders of the revolt 
and shot severaJ. insurgents in the public square as an example of 11Span-
ish justice. 11 Soon thereafter the government exiled or imprisoned many 
foreigners and black residents of the island. Dubois was shot on Octo-
ber 12, 1822. Joel Roberts Poinsett, on his way to Mexico as a special 
agent of the United States, arrived in San Juanduring that time. On 
September 27, 1822, he wrote that "the authorities of the island have 
received information ti1at an expedition was about to sail from New York 
for the p1rpose of revolutionizing the island. They are prepared to de-
feat the project, whatever it may be.n84 
The failure of the separatists resulted in a campaign of propaganda 
"mounted to discourage the independence sentiment of the Puerto Ricans~ n85 
The defeat, however, did not discourage the separatists. They immediate-
ly began to organize another rebellion - this time centered in San Juan. 
Colonel Hanuel Suro-ez del Solar was selected to command the new uprising. 
He was aided by separatists from Venezuela and Puerto Rico, including 
Colonel }fat!as Escute, a Puerto Rican officer who was a member of the 
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Spanish garrison in San Juan and who had participated in the revolution-
ary campaigns in Venezuela. 86 The efficient espionage system of the govern-
ment, however, was able to discover and frustate the insurrection. 87 
Bolivar t s successful campaigns in South America gave new impetus 
and hope to the Puerto Ricans for a final victory. The Caracas newspaper 
§! Venezolano pAblished articles in favor of Puerto Rican u1dependence~ · 
and the se.paratists, in jest., even asked the Captain-General to declare 
the independence of Puerto Rico. 88 The government, however, intensified 
its terrorist activities by arresting separatist leaders Jos6 Ignacio 
Grau and Haria· Hercedes Barbudo, the first Puerto Rican woman-patriot. 
Barbudo was deported to Cuba on the recommendation of the Prosecutor 
Francisco Horales de Santaella. According to Loida Figueroa, 11 the latter 
destiny of D. Haria has been lost to history."S9 
The separatists rene\'led their efforts for independence the following 
year. In March, 1825, Venezuelan vessels raided the coastal town of 
Aguadilla and landed a token force of revolutionaries who promptly took 
the Spanish fortification of Punta Borinquen. The invaders, however, 
could not repel a counterattack made by the more numerous Spanish forces 
and had to retreat to their ships. Again, as in 1817, the lack of proper 
coordination, perhaps caused by the destruction of the Barbudos' revo-
lutionary cell, contributed to the victory of the peninsular forces.9° 
As in Cuba, the revolutionary activities resulted in increased 
government controls. In 1824, the Governor published the Dando 2! poli-
-
~ J: ~ &obierno (a law enforcement decree). Its sixty-six articles 
restrained civil liberties, regulated behavior, restricted the use of 
weapons, commerce, and travel, and severely punished dissidents. The 
decree also prohibited evening reunions of citizens in stores, warehouses, 
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and public places, establiShed a ten o'clock curfew, and eliminated 
freedom of the press. 91 The separatists, disregarding the dangers, con-
tinued a large-scale propaganda campaign in the interior, and even threat-
ened the life of the governor. The situation had become so critical du-
ring that time that Governor Miguel de la Torre decided to stay in Puerto 
Rico for hi.s swearing ceremony rather than go to Cuba as he had been 
directed to do. 92 
In spite of all their efforts, Cubans and Puerto Ricans could not 
achieve their political goals. The dictatorial measures of the govern-
ment and the, exile of many important leaders significantly affected the 
struggle for independence in both countries. The geographical position 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico prevented the spread of the national liberation 
movements from Spanish America. As a result, the Cuban and Puerto Rican 
separatists remained isolated from the mainstream of military activity. 
They could not purchase weapons or receive economic help from the main-
land. Racial peculiarities, regionalism, apathy, and ignorance would 
have made a local insurrection difficult without military help from the 
Spanish American republics. Clearly, the Caribbean possessions needed 
a military intervention from Colombia or Herico for a successful revo-
lution. 
The intervention of Colombia and Mexico in the political affairs of 
the Caribbean would add a new dimension to the independence movement of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. While the goals of the separatists paralleled the 
interests of the Spanish American republics, they were diametrically 
opposed to those of the United States and the European powers. When Colom-
bia and Hexico turned their attention to the liberation of Cuba and Puer-
to Rico, the United States, Great Britain, and France opposed their plans 
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because they would tl1reaten the status quo. As a result, not the mil-
itary power of Spain but the concerted effort of the United States and 
the European powers prevented the success of the Caribbean movement for 
independence during the first part of the nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER V 
FOREIGN INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
The struggle of the United States, Great Britain, and France for 
political supremacy in the Caribbean during the first three decades of 
the nineteenth century seriously affected the independence movements in 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. That conflict influenced the national develoP-
ment of these islands and prevented their independence from Spain when 
local conditions were most favorable for accomplishing that goal. It 
also helped shape United States relations with Spanish America and the 
attitude of Mexico, Colombia, and Cuba toward American foreign policy. 
United States and the European powers intervened in the Caribbean 
to protect their growing national interests and to maintain a balance 
of power in the lvest Indies. The uncertainties created by the Congress 
of Vienna, the fear of imperial restoration in Spain's former colonies, 
and the threat to American and European commercial interests compelled 
these nations to attempt the control of the Caribbean - an area vital 
to the growing Spanish American markets. Other factors that influenced 
American determination were the fear that the Spanish American conflict 
would eventually s~ead to the United States own borders, the threat of 
a slave revolt, the concern for national security, and the desire of 
some Southern political leaders for territorial expansion in the Carib-
bean. It was not in the best interests of the United States to allow 
Cuba and Puerto Rico gain their freedom from Spain because of the 
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possibility that either Great Britain or France would seize them after 
independence. This circumstance, it was believed, would seriously com-
promise United States 1 national security and damage its commercial and 
trade interests in the Caribbean. 1 
General considerations of strategic and commercial policy deter-
mined British and French interests in the West Indies. Since Great Brit-
ain hoped to secure the trade monopolies relinquished by Spain in South 
and Central America as a result of the war, it followed closely any pol-
itical change in the area which could affect that nation's intended pur-
poses.Great Britain also had friendly relations with Spain and was a 
colonial power with possessions of her own in the Caribbean. Like France, 
she did not desire to disturb the Antillean settlement reached in the 
Congress of Vienna. As a result, Great Britain opposed any political 
change in the Caribbean lvhich could have upset the satisfactory balanc~ 
of European interests in the area. 2 
France, like Great Britain, also had important interests in the 
Caribbean. lvith the loss of Haiti, Tobago, and St. Lucia, her only re-
maining possessions in the area were the islands of Guadeloupe and Mar-
tinique, which Great Britain had allowed her to keep after the Treaty 
of Paris. Since France wanted to reestablish part of her once glorious 
empire, she looked with great interest upon the fate of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. The acquisition of these islands would have given France a strong 
position in the Caribbean and perhaps control of the commerce between 
Europe and the emerging Spanish American republics. 
North American interest in the Caribbean began early in the seven-
teenth century, when New England merchantstraded regularly with the Pu-
ritan settlers of the ill-fated colonies of Providence and Henrietta 
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southwest of Jamaica and with the thousands of British immigrants who 
had settled in Barbados and St. Kitts in the Lesser Antilles. Shipping 
enterprises from Boston, Salem, and other New England ports also recog-
nized the excellent trading opportunities offered by illegal commerce in 
the Spanish colonies. Despite the barriers imposed by Spain's mercan-
tilistic policies, which confined commerce to Sevilla and C~iz, Amer-
ican merchants did a substantial amount of smuggling in the Caribbean. 3 
Since official commerce and navigation records of the United States 
are not available for the period prior to 1790, it is difficult to deter-
mine with accuracy the amount of North American trade during the period. 
Herbert c. Bell, using British trade records, estimates that 11one year. 
with another, the continental colonies exported to the islands goods to 
a value of 500,000 pounds sterling, 11 and the addition of heavy freight 
charges increased that amount to "725,000 pounds sterling. n4 In the 
eighteenth century, Pennsylavania, Haryland, New York, and South Caro-
lina joined the New Englanders and trade between the United States and 
the Caribbean increased substantially. These colonies sold dried fish, 
lumber, flour, biscuits, staves and hoops for barrels, and low quality 
pickled fish with which plantation owners fed their slaves. They pur-
chased sugar, coffee, tobacco, and other tropical products. Crude molas-
ses for the manufacture of rum became a significant New England import 
by the eighteenth century.5 
Prior to the American revolution, the British-American colonies 
considerably increased their trade in the Caribbean. Timnthy Pitkin 
wrote that in 1769 the export trade of the mainland colonies with the 
West Indies amounted to 747,910 pounds sterling and the importation to 
L 789,754. 6 With the termination of British control over the American 
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colonies, commercial contacts decreased, especially with the Spanish 
possessions, but by 1800 a well-organized and profitable carrying trade 
flourished between the United States, Europe, and the Caribbean. 7 
To preserve Cuba and Puerto Rico from economic ruin and starvation 
during the political turmoil in Europe, Spain allowed American ships 
to enter the colonial ports to sell manufactured goods, foodstuffs, lum..:. 
ber, and slaves, and permitted them to purchase sugar, coffee, tobacco, 
cocoa, and hides for both the American and European markets. American 
ships 11also took large amounts of specie from the Spanish colonial ports. 118 
The vessels, hcnvever, had to risk the intervention of the British navy 
and the danger of foreign privateers, especially if their final destina-
tion was Napoleonic France. 9 The Spanish colonies also augmented their 
trade with the United States as a result of their proximity to the Amer-
ican ports and the trading facilities offered to the Spanish by the 
American merchants. Thus, according to historian Arthur P. Whitaker, 
"it was only in the Caribbean and on the Atlantic coast of South America 
that the Spanish toleration of neutral trade with its colonies was direct-
ly beneficial to the United States.n10 
During the first decade of the nineteenth century, most American 
conunerce with the Spanish colonies was concentrated in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. 11 In 1798 United States exports to the Spanish Caribbean colonies 
rose to $5,0801 543. In 1799 the amount reached a total value of $8,993,401. 
In the next two years it fluctuated between $8,993,401 and $8,437,659, 
then decreased slightly to $7,690,888 by 1805. 12 During this period, 
Puerto Rico imported about 20 percent of its goods from the United States 
and exported to that nation between 15 and 50 percent of its tobacco, 
sugar, and coffee. 13 
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In 1803 Puerto Rico exported to the United States 263,000 pounds 
of sugar, at six cents a pound, for a total export value of $15,792. 
This trade increased to 3,796,900 pounds with a market value of $227,814 
in 1810; and to 19,788,600 pounds valued at $791,544 in 1828. The ex-
port of sugar during this last year represented 73 percent of the total 
Puerto Rican sugar production. This same year 1 Puerto Rico exported 
to the United States 2,245,044 pounds of raw molasses, valued at $44,900. 
Thus, in the short span of twenty-five years, sugar exports from Puerto 
Rico to the United States increased seventy-five times. 14 
The commerce beuveen the United States and Cuba increased in a 
similar proportion. The Cubans, allured by the American trade and. by 
the extraordinary prices of sugar and coffee in the world market as re-
sult of the Haitian disaster, multiplied their plantations wi~~ the 
help of some American capital. American commercial agents carried on 
much of the Cuban sugar business by helping the planters develop their 
crops and by purchasing their harvests. N:orth American business concerns, 
such as Messrs. Castillo, Black, & Co. and Latting, Adams & Steward in 
Havana; and Atkins & Allen and Simpson, Tryon & Co. in Hatanzas did con-
siderable business in the colony lvhile the United States Government sta.-
tioned 11agents for seamen and commerce 11 in the island to protect American 
economic interests.15 
The jeffersonian Embargo of December, 1807, considerably reduced 
American trade but did not prevent it. During a congressional debate 
on the results of the embargo in November, 1808, Timothy Pitkin of Connec-
ticut, James Lloyd of Hassachusetts, and other members of the Congress 
stated that the Jeffersonian commercial policies had ruined the American 
trade in Spanish America. Large supplies of American beef, flour, meal, 
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and cotton failed to reach the Spanish markets in the West Indies. These 
individuals, who represented New England trading interests, also believed 
that the continuation of such policy would permanently damage American 
trade in the Caribbean because the Spanish colonies, as result of the 
embargo, were seeking new markets in France and Great Britain. 16 During 
the embargo, American trade with the Spanish West Indies decreased from 
$12,341,225 between 1806 and 1807 to $6,685,617 in 1809; sugar imports 
declined from 82,663,008 pounds to 51,432,442 pounds. 17 
During the Hadison and Honroe administrations, trade with the 'vest 
Indies received special attention, since by that time the United States 
had begun to increase her efforts to control the Caribbean. Records 
maintained at the Philadel:rhia Custom House indicate that in 1809 ninety-
one commercial vessels arrived from Cuba, thirty-one from Puerto Rico, 
and thirty from Venezuela. During the same period, eighty vessels depart-
ed for Cuba, t\'lenty_.six for Puerto Rico, and fifteen for Venezuela. The 
following year, the United States to Cuba and Puerto Rico goods valued 
at $6,787,109 and imported from the Caribbean 40,555,498 pounds of sugar, 
21,425,007 pounds of coffee, and 4,394,139 gallons of molasses, the prin-
cipal tropical products desired by the nation. 18 By january, 1817, Niles' 
\veekly Register was reporting the yearly arrival of 1109 foreign vessels 
to Cuban ports, most of them from the United States. 19 
In 1818 a Philadelphia merchant reported to the Congress that Cuba _ · 
annually received 100,000 barrels of American flour and sold 45,759 hogs-
20 headsof molasses to Philadelphia merchants every year. Trade with 
Puerto Rico also augmented significantly after the War of 1812. In 1813 
American connnerce amounted to $269,008; it increased to $1,082,299 in 
1819 and to $2,103,498 in 1818. The expanded trade between the two 
I 
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countries was a result of the concessions granted by the C~dula de 
Gracias and the continuing political and economic in&tability in the 
peninsula. During· that time the State Department instructed its com-
mercial agents in Cuba and Puerto Rico "to promote trade and commercial 
contacts with the Spanish authorities. 1121 
While the connnerce of the United States with the lvest Indies in-
creased considerably at.the beginning of the nineteenth century, British 
and French trade suffered as result of the war in Europe. After July, 
1807, Napoleon attempted to subdue Great Britain by economic measures. 
His plan was to keep out of the continent all Dritish manufactured goods 
and those brought from the Dritish colonies, notably the 1vest Indies. 
He believed that these measures would result in economic depression and 
instability in Great Britain since the commercial warfare would inevi-
tably result in unemployment. Therefore, after the defeat of Prussia, 
Napoleon ordered the seizure of British goods and ti1e closing of European 
ports to British coiDL~erce. The British in return blockaded the continen~ 
talports in order to force Napoleon's allies to import British goods. 
Neutral Ships, among those of the United States, were forbidden to trade 
with ports that did not admit British vessels. 
These measures affected British and French trade in the West Indies 
and accelerated American commerce to a large extent. The war motivated 
hundreds of privateers to seize foreign vessels under the prete~t that 
they were complying with the instructions of France or Great Britain. So 
great was the interference to European commerce by privateers that Great 
• Britain, France, and the United States had to augment their naval forces 
in the area. Host importantly, the war in Europe upset the commercial 
contacts of enterprising Englishmen.with South America which had been 
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increasing since the Bourbon reforms. Prior to the conflict, Great Brit-
ain command of the sea had forced Spain to suspend her already weakened 
system of trade monopoly. 
Great Britain and France enlarged their trade in the Caribbean dur-
ing the eighteenth century as result of mercantilism and the economic 
nationalism which prevailed at that time. As the British and French col-
onial populations increased in the Lesser Antilles, they created markets 
that absorbed the surplus commodities and m.anufacturered goods of t'..b.e 
homelands. This was the era of the "sugar and slaves" economy; the con-
sumption of coffee, sugar, tobacco, and other tropical products increased 
in Europe. European drinking habits were further altered in the eighteenth 
century and rum purchases increased for the benefit of the West Indian 
1 . 22 co omes. 
Daspite French and SpaniSh navigation laws forbidding colonial trade 
with foreigners, British manufactured products were sold in great quan-
ties, since France and Spain were largely unable to furnish needed SUP-
plies to their colonies even in time of peace. Because commerce with 
Great Britain was so vital to the Caribbe&"l, laws prohibiting that trade 
were ineffective. The outbreak of hostilities between France and Great 
Britain in 1793 practically gave the United States a monopoly over the 
Caribbean trade. Great Britain attempted to curtail American commercial 
influence in the Caribbean, but after the ratification of the jay Treaty, 
the United States received tacit permission to continue, with certain res-
trictions, i:ts profitable trade in the British West Indies. 23 
Before the Napoleonic conflict, Great Britain had a successful trade 
with her Caribbean possessions and annually imported a total of $39,062, 
500 in tropical products. It exported manufactured goods and foodstuffs 
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with a value of $42,659,237.50 every year. 24 The statistics for British 
trade with the Span ish colonies are too unreliable to be of any help in 
determining the volume of commerce with Cuba and Puerto Rico, but it 
must have been significant since Spain had to o:pen the Caribbean port 
to foreign commerce as a result of the European war. 25 
After the defe t of Napoleon and the end of the War of 1812, Great 
Britain attempted to recapture its lost trade in the Caribbean and gain 
an ascending position in the emerging Spani$1 American commerce. The 
nation Underwent a period of uncertainty after the end of the conflict 
and high unemployment, heavy taxation, agricultural failures, financial 
distress, and higher prices undermined her economy. The European disaster 
closed British markets for manufactured products and the resultant clo-
sing of factories caused riots and criticism. These conditions s~urred 
the necessity for expanded trade. Competition with the United States 
was keen, but Great Britain counted on the good will and friendship of 
the Spanish American revolutionaries to accomplish her goals. 
British postwar trade, however, began slowly. On November 4, 1815, 
the London !:l£rning Chronicle reported that exports to Venezuela and Cu-
manit amounted only to $4,500,000 and those of the Spanish West Indies 
to $5,000,000. At the same time Panama was receiving imports valued at 
26 
$8,500,000. Great Britain's economic problems merited special atten-
tion because business concerns, especially those in the import and 
export trade, were declaring bankrupcy as result of the unstable economic 
nd . . . h 27 co 1t1ons 1n t e country. 
Toaccomplishher economic objectives, Great Britain required polit-
ical stability in the Caribbean since that nation could not support an 
international emergency in the area. At the Congress of Vienna, Great 
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Britain could have demanded the transfer of all the remaining French 
West Indian colonies and even the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. 
An action of that nature, hO\v-ever, would have created distrust among 
the Spanish American revolutionaries, probably a conflict of interests 
with the United States, or perhaps a political upheaval at home, since 
many individuals desired to halt the importation of colonial grains and 
goods to protect British landmvners. The moderate demands of Great Brit-
ain at the Congress of Vienna, therefore, resulted in political sta-
bility in the nation and in the Caribbean. 
· In spite of British intentions, France resented the loss of Haiti, 
Tobago, and St. Lucia, since they reduced · her dependencies to the is-
lands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. As a result, she looked lrith great 
anxiety upon the fate of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The acquisition of these 
territories would have given France an important base for the reconquest 
of Santo Domingo and perhaps for additional territorial expansion. 
As previously indicated, Haiti and Santo Domingo had been the most 
important colonial possessions of France in the Caribbean. In 1789 
that colony exported to Frence 138,663,100 pounds of sugar, 78,494,500 
pounds of coffee, and 6,705,600 pounds of cotton. The slave insurrection, 
however, curtailed local exports, and in 1799 France could obtain only 
16,813,900 pounds of sugar, 27,744,100 pounds of coffee, and 2,341,900 
pounds of cotton. 
After 1818 political and strategic considerations, in addition to 
connnercial and trade interests, also be.came part of the concern of the 
United States and the European powers in the Caribbean. The United States 
feared that Great Britain or France would seize the Spanish colonies in 
the ivest Indies as a result of the unstable political conditions existing 
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in Spain, and the marked inability of that country to protect its over-
seas possessions. The British government did not want to see the Spanish 
colonies transferred to France or the United States any more than the 
United States cared to have them transferred to Great Britain or France. 30 
Great Britain believed that American possession of Cuba would jeopar-
dize the Jamaica trade and ruin Britain's position and interests in the-
whole Caribbean. 31 George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, was 
very specific about the policy of his government on this matter. On 
November 15, 1822, he \\Tote: 
It may be questioned wnether any blow that could be struck by 
any foreign PoWer in any part of the world would have a more 
sensible effect on the interests of this country and on the 
reputation of its government. 32 
American fears were not completely unfounded. In the summer of 
1819, it was rumored in Europe_ .that Great Britain might seize Cuba to 
balance United States hegemony in the Gulf of Hexico, \vhich had been one 
of the results of the American acquisition of the Floridas. British news-
papers reported that the Duke of San Carlos, the Spanish representative, 
had indicated ~panish desires for the British occupation of Cuba. 33 The 
London Times described Havana as the best commercial port in the \¥orld 
and "a station. from which the British navy would have complete command 
over the whole line of the southern and eastearn coasts of the United 
States. n34 
During that time the British press, which had condemned the Florida 
treaty, demanded that Great Britain seize Cuba because of the dangers to 
which "British trade in the Gulf of Hexico would be exposed in case of 
a future war with the United States. n35 Great Britain had provided sub-
stantial military assistance to Spain, who owed L 15,000,00 for military 
supplies and maintenance of the British army.36she also owed money to 
125 
many British merchants who had suffered com1nercial . injuries during 
the war and for the purchase of merchandize and foodstuffs that could 
not be produced. As Spain was unable to satisfy her financial obligations 
because of a large national debt, it \v-as believed that she '\'fould trans-
fer Cuba and Puerto Rico, her last remaining loyal colonies in the Western 
Hemisphere, to Great Britian in payment for her debts. There also was 
some speculation that Spain mig..~t cede the islands to France, Hhich had 
provided substantial military assistance to Ferninand VII to help him 
regain his Spanish throne. 37 
In the spring of 1823, rumors circulated in bU.rope and Washington 
concerning the possible transfer of Cuba and Puerto Rico to Great Brit-
ain or France. Charles s. Todd, the Confidential Agent of the United 
States to Colombia, informed John Quincy Adams about, the Colombian govern-
ment's concern with "the necessity and propriety of their CGreat Brit~ 
having Cuba as an offset to our JU't'chase of Florida. n38 
For Adams, the possibility of transferring Cuba or Puerto Rico to 
a European cotu1try seemed dangerous. ~1e anxiety of the United States 
concerning the possible disposition of the Spanish colonies in the Carib-
bean to Great Britain was expressed by the Secretary of State to John 
Forsyth, the United States Minister to Spain. On December 7, 1822, Adams 
wrote: 
It is asserted that for more than two years there have been 
secret negot·~ations ••• for the cession of the Island 
/J5uba J. Spain, though disinclined to such an arrangement, 
might resist it lvith more firmess, if for a limited tirue 
she could obtain the join guarantee of the United States and 
France in securing the Island to herself. 39 
Adams' statement indicates that as early as 1822 the United States was 
considering the support of Spanish colonialism in the Caribbean. 
In a letter to Hugh Nelson, the new minister to Spain, Adams 
discussed the reasons for the attitude of the United States: 
These islands ["Cuba and Puerto RicoJ from their local 
position are natural appendages to the North American con-
tinent, and one of them nlmost in sight of our shores, 
from a multitude of considerations, has become an object 
of transcendent importance to the conunercial and politic-
al interest of our Union. Its commanding position, lvith 
reference to the Gulf of Hexico and the \vest Indian Seas; 
the character of its population; its situation midway 
benveen our coast and the island of St~ Domingo • • • give 
it an importance in the sum of our national interests. 40 
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Adams also believed that the French invasion of Spain to reestablish ab .... 
solutism under Ferdinand VII might cause the Spanish constitutionalists 
to cede Cuba and perhaps Puerto Rico to Great Britian as the price of 
a new Anglo-Spanish alliance in another peninsular \var. 
Believing that both France and Great Britain had agents 11observing 
the course of events, 11 Secretary Adams stated that the President \'fanted 
the United States minister to obtain information concerning any nego- · 
tiation between Spain and Great Britain about the Caribbean and 11if so, 
to communicate to the Spanish Government • • • the sentiments of this 
Government in relation to this subject. ,A-l Thereafter, the Secretary 
of State sent special agents to Cuba and Europe. These emissaries were 
really government spies to observe and report activities detrimental to 
the interests of the United States.42 
Hany other American political leaders and statesmen, including 
Thomas jefferson, James Honroe, james Hadison, Henry Clay, and John c .. 
Calhoun, also believed that the control of the Spanish colonies in the 
Caribbean was, as Adams had indicated, "an object of transcendent import-
ance to the political and commercial interests of our U:r.ion.. n43 During 
his administration, President Hadison had indicated that 11 the position 
of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the destiny of 
that island" that the United States could not permit its falling to any 
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European government ''which might make a fulcrum of that position against 
the commerce and security of the United States. rM In 1820 Thomas Jef-
ferson had told Calhoun that the United States ought to take Cuba "at 
the first opportunity" even 11at the cost of a war with England .. n45 This 
was not inconsistent with United States policy at that time. In the 
opinion of John Quincy Adams, there were two reasons which could involve 
the United States in a war with Europe: a maritime war resulting in the 
impressment of American seamen, or a war threatening the transfer of 
. 46 
neighboring Spanish territory, like Cuba or Puerto Rico. 
In Februar.r, 1823, Henry Clay, expressing a similar concern, told 
Stratford Canning, the British Hillister to the United States, that the 
United States "would fight for it ["CubaJ should they /J.he BritishJ 
.attempt its possession.n47 The possibility of British seizure of Cuba 
led Secretary of State Adams to apply the No-Transfer Principle of 1811 
to the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean in the summer of 1823.48 The 
decision took into consideration the position of Spain and her colonies 
in the Caribbean and the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis. 
As in 1811, ldlen the No-Transfer resolution had been passed by the Con-
gress to protect American interests in Florida, its application to the 
Spanish colonies in the Caribbean became a matter of necessity for the 
United States. The resolution emphasized the fact that the United States 
could not accept that "any part of Spanish territory pass into the hand 
of any foreign power_ 11 The policy continued to be applied in the Carib-
bean as long as it was important to the security of the United States and 
to the transit across the Isthmus of Panama. 49 
The reaeons for United States concern in the Caribbean were many. 
The war of 1812 had shown the military weaknesses of the nation and her 
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inability to protect the southern flank and the recently acquired Louis-
iana territory. Florida, purchased from Spain in 1819 and acquired 
several years later, could not be properly defended from aggression by 
a foreign power which controlled the Caribbean. Many thousands of pion-
ners had crossed the Alleghenies to the rich valley of the Louisiana 
territory, but transportation between the East coast and the new settle-
ments \vas so difficult and expensive that they had to float their cargoes 
dolm the Hississippi to New Orleans for transfer to the eastern markets. 
In spite of some improvements in transportation, the renewed migration 
to the lY"est and the extension of agriculture to the Hississippi made 
Ne'v Orleans the principal commercial link between the rapid developing 
western region and the Atlantic coast. Since British or French domina-
tion of Cuba could cut off conmmnications between New Orleans and the 
Atlantic ports in the event of a conflict, the possession of that island 
became essential to the interests of the United States. 
just as the security of New Orleans, Florida, and the southern flank 
of the United States became a strategic necessity, United States commerce 
in the West Indies required that Cuba and Puerto Rico remain free of 
foreign interference. American trade, according to John A. Logan, 11re-
quired that neither Great Britain nor Frnnce should establish herself 
in Havana harbor, virtually impregnable if properly fortified, and so 
situated that from it a first class sea power could command the commerce 
of the entire Caribbean region."5l "I consider Cape Florida and Cuba, 11 
wrote President James Honroe to Thomas jefferson, 11as forming the mouth 
of the Mississippi and other rivers emptying into the Gulf itself, and 
in consequence, its acquisition is of the highest importance.n52 
As Cuba had a. large black population, any change in her colonial 
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political status \vhich could have interfered \vith the Spanish institu-
of slavery would have also affected the control of the slaves in the 
southern states. Since Great Britain had indicated in the Congress of 
Vienna her determination to abolish the slave traffic in the Spanish col-
onies, it was to be expected that she \vould have abolished slavery in 
Cuba and Puerto Rico if these colonies had been ceded to her. 53 Or, if 
these colonies had become independent during this critical time, they 
would have freed their slaves, as their sister republics in Spanish Amer-
ica had already done. The prospect of either situation arising so close 
to the United States was vie\ved by the Southern members of Congress as 
a threat to the institution of slavery in the United States and as a 
danger to the peace and security of the South. 
These individuals believed that the large black population in the 
\vest Indies \vould create conditions similar to those that had existed in 
Haiti in 1794 \vhen the black population in that country rebelled and mas-
sacred the vhite French settlers. If, on the other hand, new republics 
were created in the Caribbean, they would be entitled to send black or 
mulatto ambassadors and consuls to the United States to "parade through 
our country and establish themselves in our cities.n54 Either of these 
situations \vould have given the black slaves in the United States an 
example of what they could gain if they revolted against their \vhite mas-
ters. This circumstance was intolerable to the citizens of the South.· 
An independent Cuba also \vould have terminated the profitable illegal 
African slave trade of Texas and Louisiana and gravely reduced the man-
power necessary for the southern economy.55 
The policy of e:Arpansionism of United States southern leaders inten-
sified American determination to prevent the independence of the Spanish 
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colonies in the Caribbean or their transfer to Great Britain or France. 
}1any American statesmen had expressed the desirability of taking Cuba be-
cause they believed that the island \vas indispensable to the security, 
trade, and cmmncrce of the United States. Since Puerto Rico played an 
important role in the defense of the Caribbean, the island probably would 
have follmved in the \vake of Cuba if that QOlony had been seized by the 
United States. 
As early as 1786, Thomas jefferson had expressed his desire to ex-
pand the American borders tm·.rard the South. "Our Confederacy must be 
viewed," he said, 11 as the nest from which all America, North and South, 
is to be peopled." He also had expressed the fear that Spain could not 
keep Spanish America lltill our population is sufficiently advanced to 
gain it piece by piece. 1156 In a letter to his successor, Jefferson com-
mented that he believed Napoleon \vould not object to the conquest of 
Cuba by the United States.57 Although jefferson continued to discuss 
the possibility of acquiring Cuba and even suggested the idea of a war 
with Spain, since Cuba could be seized without much difficulty, the United 
States took no steps to acquire Cuba or Puerto Hico before 1808.58 In 
the spring of that year, hmvever, jefferson sent General james Hilkinson 
to Cuba to convince the captain-general to transfer his allegiance to 
the United States since the French invasion of the peninsula would prob-
ably change the Spanish tutelage of the island. According to Valentin 
de Foroooa, the Spanish charg6 d'affairs in the United States, Hilkinson 
was instructed to negotiate "a reunion of the Kingdom of Hexico, and the 
islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico under the United States. 1159 Wilkinson's 
mission failed because the Spanish authorities in Cuba rejected the Amer-
. . 60 1can suggest1on. 
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President James Hadison continued Jefferson's policy toward the 
Spanish Caribbean. As early as 1810, he indicated that the United 
States "could not be a satisfied spectator" to the transfer of Cuba to 
any European power because of the danger to 11 the commerce and security 
of the United States. 1161 In 1947 a National Congress of Cuban historians 
held in La Habana declared that Hadison 1 s policy tmvard the Caribbean be-
came the official position of the United States government thereafter; 
11From then on1 and continually, Yankee policy in respect to Cuba was 
support for the continuation of Spanish sovereignty wlule it could not 
be convenient for the island to be part of the North American Union. 1162 
In 1810 Hadison appointed William Shaler as consul to Cuba to advance 
the government's policy of annexation through the organization of a cons-
piracy among the liberal creole planters. 63 Shaler, one of the earliest 
American advocates of expansionism, informed the Cubans that the United 
States \·muld favor the annexation of the Spanish colony if they revolted 
against Spain. i'lhile some plantation mmers sympathized with this plan, 
the conspiracy did not take place. As a result of his activities in 
Cuba, the Spanish authorities arrested Shaler in November, 1811, and order-
ed him. to leave the country. Before departing, Shaler notified the 
government that the United States \vould not consent to the transfer of 
Cuba to another European pmver and that the local authorities could de-
pend on help from the United States to protect the island. 64 
During james Honroe' s administration, Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams, as has already been indicated, pursued the same course of action 
tmvard the Spanish possessions that Jefferson and Hadison had taken. 
Concerning Cuba, Adams wTote: 11\'lere the population of the island of one 
blood and one color there could be no doubt or hesitation 'vith regard to 
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the course the United States \vould pursue, as directed by their interests 
and.their rights. 1165 "There is nothing I so much desire, 11 Governor William 
c. Clairborne of Louisiana had also \-.rritten, "as to see the flag of my 
Country reared on the Herro Castle. 11 Cuba, according to Clairborne, \vas 
the "real mouth of the Hississippi, and the nation possessing it, can 
at any time command the trade of the 'vestern States. Give us Cuba and 
the American Union is placed beyond the reach of change.n66 
In 1823 Honroe, Jefferson, and Adams discussed the annexation of 
the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. On June 30, 1823, Honroe inform-
ed Jefferson that he had always concurred \·lith his views concerning the 
armexation of Cuba and that 11\ve ought to incorporate it into our Union11 
at the most favorable moment, hoping that it might be done 11without a 
rupture ivith Spain or any other pov1er. n67 Jefferson replied to the Pres-
ident that 111 candidly confess that I have al1vays looked ori Cuba as the 
most interesting addition \ihich could ever be made to our system of 
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States. 11 Since Jefferson suggested at that time an alliance \·lith Great 
Britain concerning·Cuba, Honroe replied that he believed the suggestion 
may have been difficult to implement because the Caribbean problem had 
not been resolved. He further wrote to Jefferson that it ,.,as necessary 
to insure that the island did not follow the exa..11ple of Spanish America 
concerning independence. 69 
Adams, expressing a more positive vie,., about the future of Cuba, 
,,rrote: 
Such, indeed, are the interests of that island and of this 
country ~ • . that is scarcely possible to resist the con-
viction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic 
1t:ill be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of 
the Union itself. It is obvious, hmvever, that for that 
event \te are not yet prepared •••• There are lmvs of po-
litical, as well as of physical gravitation, and if an 
apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot 
choose but to fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjointed 
from its o\'m unnatural connection \vith Spain, and incapable 
of self -support, can gravitate only tm·mrd the North Amer-
ican Union, 1vhich, by the same law of nature, cannot cast 
off its bosom. 69 
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The interests of Honroe in the acquisition of Cuba could be related 
to the Hissouri Compromise of 1819 and the desires of the southern states 
to expand slavery beyond the Nississippi. Honroe did not want Texas be-
cause he feared that the acquisition of that territory \vould rea\vaken 
sectionalism and the controversy over slavery in the territories. The 
members of the administration, therefore, would offer Cuba to the south-
ern leaders until the slavery problem \vas settled in the United States. 
The atmexation of Cuba \vould have served to satisfy what Hadison had once 
referred to as the "manifest course of events, 11 \•Thile at the same time 
it would have fulfilled \vhat John Quincy Adams called 11the law of pol-
itical gravitation," that is, Cuba's ultimate annexation to the United 
States. 70 
While the United States had desired Cuba, she was not yet ·ready to 
pay the high price of mmership - most proba?ly a war lvith Great Britain 
or France. On September 27, 1822, after a cabinet meeting during which 
Secretary of i\Tar John c. Calhoun had expressed 11 an ardent desire that 
the island of Cuba should become a part of the United States, 11 Secretary 
Adams wrote in his diary that the United States \vas not prepared for 
\va.r at that time. As a result, the "nation's object must be to gain time. 11 
Adams also commented that 11 as to taking Cuba at the cost of a war 'ld th 
Great Britain, it \vould be \vell to enquire, before undertaking such as 
war, hmv it \vould be likely to terminate, 11 since 11in the present relative 
situation of our maritime forces, we could not maintain a \var against 
Great Britain for Cuba. n71 
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Adam's concern for the Spanish Caribbean may have been the conse-
quence of an early belief in "Hanifest Destiny." On November 16, 1819, 
he had told the members of the cabinet that the rumors about American 
expansionism \vhich had been circulating in Europe \vere true. He contin-
ued that: 
• ~ • nothing that we can say or do \vould remove this im-
pression until the world shall be familiarized with the 
idea of considering our proper dominion to be the conti-
nent of North America. Spain has possessions upon our 
southern aP.d Great Britain upon our northern borders. It 
is impossible that centuries shall elapse vithout finding 
them annexed to the United States; not that any spirit 
of encroachment or ambition on our part renders it neces-
sary. 72 
With the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico in mind, Adams went 
on to say that: 
••• it is a physical, moral, and political absurdity 
that such fragments of territory,, \vith sovereigns at 
fifteen hundred miles beyond the sea, \vorthless and 
burdensome to their mmers, should exist permanently con-
tiguous to a great powerful and rapidly groving nation. 
Host of the Spanish territory \vhich had been in our 
neighborhood had already become our own • • • • This 
renders it still more unavoidable that the remainder of 
the continent should ultimately be ours. United States 
an North America are identical, and any effort on our 
part to reason the '"orld out of the belief that 1ve are 
ambitious \V'ill have no other effect than to convince 
them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy. 73 
As Adams indicated, this was an explicit policy of expansionism di-
rected toward the annexation of the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. 
The only things that prevented this nascent imperialism from extending to 
the 1vest Indies were the military \vealmess of the United States and the 
threat of war \vith either Great Britain or France for the possession' of 
the islru1ds and control of the Caribbean. 
United, States intentions tmvard the Caribbean had been a matter of 
great concern to Spain, France, and Great Britain. In 1789, the Spanish 
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statesman, Pedro Abarca y Bolea, conde de Aranda, informed Charles III 
that he believed the United States would someday become a g:i,_ant on the 
North American continent. Forgetting the help which the European nations 
had provided during the American Revolution, the United States \Vould 
seize Florida, the Caribbean, and even attempt to control the rest of 
the Spanish American empire. Spain could not have been able to prevent_ 
this because of her internal \veaknesses and the proximity of the United 
States to the Caribbean. 74 Concer~ing American intentions in Spanish 
America, Pedro Quevedo, Bishop of Orense, declared in 18o6 that 11 the 
United States '~ould create serious problems for Spain. u75 
The Hexican government had a similar concern and asked Great Britain 
to restraint American expansionism in the Caribbean. Pablo Obreg6n, 
the Mexican Minister to the United States, \vrote to Hariano de Hichelena 
in London concerning the possibility of an American attempt against Cuba. 
Under the pretext of curtailing the piratical depredations in the Carib-
bean the United States, according to Obreg6n, was ready to invade the 
island.76 11 I have strong reasons to believe," replied Michelena, "that 
England \vill oppose any attempt by the United States to seize Cuba. tt Ten 
days later, the Mexican representative in London discussed \vith the Brit-
ish Foreign Sub-Secretary Planta the situation in Cuba. He later \-.Tote 
to the Secretary of State and Foreign Relations that Great Britain would 
prevent the expansion of the United States into the Caribbean.77 
Since Anglo-French conflicts in Europe were invariably connected 
with rivalry in the \Vest Indies, Great Britain had vie\ved the conquest 
of the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean as necessary to her nation-
al interests. On October 14, 1762, the British government intended to 
ask Spain to relinquish its corrtrol of Florida and Puerto Rico in exchange 
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for Havana, but a Parliamentary crisis limited the demands to the acqui-
sition of Florida. 78 Twenty-three years earlier, the Earl of Hamilton, 
a member of the Parliament, had proposed the annexation of Cuba: 
If the Cro\fn of England could become possessed of the is-
land of Cuba, that I\ey to all America, no man of knowledge 
can denye [Sic_7 butthat Britain, in that case must become 
possessed of the ~vhol.e trade of the Spanish empire; and 
the simple privilege of trading \vith these people, upon 
very high terms,is now become one of the greatest prizes 
contended for by all the pmvers in Europe; sure England 
\vill not neglect any opportunity \vhich is offered of ac-
quiring such a possession as must infallibly secure that 
\vhole invaluable trade to her subjects alone. 79 
In 1785 a. stirring pamphlet \vas published in Great Britain concerning 
the disposition of the \'lest Indies by the European pm,'ers. The theme 
of !:!: Crise de 1 1 Europe \'las the emancipation of all the European colonies 
in America by the conc7rted effort of Great Britain, France, Prussia, 
and Russia. These nations would be rewarded by a partition of the Carib-
bean islands as follmvs: Cuba to Russia, Hartinique to Denmark, Guade-
loupe to S1veden, Puerto Rico to Prussia, Santo Domingo to France, and 
the remaining islands to Great Britain. john Adams, United States Hinis-
ter to Great Britain, epitomized the pamphlet in ~ letter to John Jay 
on Hay 28, 1786, and warned him of the intentions of the European pmvers. 
Thirteen years later a joint Anglo-American attack on the Spanish colonies 
\vas averted only by the caution and shre\vdness of President John Adams. 80 
The United States and the European powers, therefore, were suspect-
ed of expansionism in the Caribbean even before the second decade of the 
nineteenth century. By that time, hmvever, it \vas clear that none of them 
could take the Spanish ''!est Indies \vithout inflincting serious damage 
upon the other 1 s interests. The seizure of Cuba or Puerto Rico \vould 
have given a definite advantage in the Caribbean to the controlling power. 
The concern for these islands was of such importance to the contending 
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pmvers that 11their subordinates were constantly reporting to each of 
them the supposed designs of the others.n81 During that time, the London 
Courier declared that 11Cuba is the Turkey of transatlantic politics, to-
tering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggle of those 
who contend for the.rights of catching her in her descent.1182 
Since the United States, France, and England had conflicting object-
ives in the Caribbean and desired to maintain spheres of influence there, 
they resolved to maintain the status quo in the '\<lest Indies until they 
could find a satisfactory solution to the existing problem. To achieve 
that purpose, the United States, France, and Great Britain opposed not 
only non-Spanish foreign control of Cuba and Puerto Rico, but also any 
political change that could affect their interests. As a result of this 
policy, the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean could not proclaim their 
independence in the second decade of the nineteenth century. At that 
time, local conditions, created by the instability of the peninsular govern-
ment and the chaos which resulted from the \vars of independence in Span-
ish America, \vere most favorable for accomplishing that goal. 
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CHA.PTER VI 
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN POWERS, A }I'D THE 
STATUS QUO IN' THE CARIBBEAN 
At the beginning of 1.822 a serious international problem arose in the 
Caribbean. The United States could not seize the Spanish possessions or 
exercise a commercial monopoly in the West Indies without the danger of 
a war with the European pmvers; Great Britain and France were similarly 
restrained because any unilateral action on their part would have proba-
bly lead to a conflict \vith the United States or to a war bet\veen them-
selves. According to Samuel F. Bemis, after the United States acquired 
Florida, the focus of American attention shifted from the Great Lakes and 
the Northwest to the Caribbean. The Spanish possessions had become as 
essential to the protection of the Florida territory as that territory 
previously had been to the .safety of Louisiana. 1 The United States de-
fense system in the Southeast, the integrity of both Florida and Louis-
iana and the security of Ne\v Orleans depended in great part on the con-
trol of the Spanish Caribbean. 2 
During this period, British trade interests in the Caribbean also 
became a matter of concern. On April 23, 1822, British merchants, shiP-
owners, manufacturers, and traders met in London to consider ways for 
increasing commerce \vith the Spanish American republics. It was agreed 
to ask the government to permit ships of 11 the ne\vly established countries 
to enter llritish ports. Since Great llritain had not recognized the nmv 
republics and treated them as belligerants, opening official trade with 
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South and Central America 'vould constitute a de facto recognition. To 
satisfy the demands of the British merchants, Great Britain established 
trading posts and commercial 'varehouses on the Br:itish possessions in th~ 
Caribbean, thereby increasing the importance of the area to Great Drit~ 
ain 1 s overseas trade. TI1e new measures greatly stimulated British com-
merce in Central America and northern South America, and England \vas un-
\V'illing to allovl' American intervention in the Caribbean to endanger that 
trade. 3 
Of all the continental pm-iers, France was perhaps the nation most 
interested in the Spanish American colonies. Corrrlict of interests, 
hmvever, affected French foreign policy. Merchants wanted to emulate 
Great Britain and open trade with South America, v1hile the ultraroyalists 
demanded territorial acquisitions and the suppression of republicanism 
in the vlestern Hemisphere. The government, hmvever, preferred to estab-
lish independent Bourbon monarchies in America as a means of 11recon-
ciling legitimacy \'lith French commercial interests." Since the islands 
of Guadeloupe and Hartinique in the Caribbean \V'ere the only possessions 
from \'lhich France could attempt to exercise political control, they be-
came important to France's plans in the ''!estern Hemisphere - the con-
quest of Cuba and Puerto Rico.4 
In Harch, 1822, President Honroe recomended to Congress the recog-
nition of the Spanish American republics that had successfully gained 
their independence. On Hay 4, 1822, the Congress accepted the President's 
recommendations and voted to establish diplomatic relations \·lith Colom-
bia, Hexico, and Argentina. Since both Hexico and Colombia bordered the 
Caribbean, British and French interest considerably increased during the 
summer.S British manufacturers and merchants urged the government to 
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foll01v the ex?-mple of the United States, but Parliament refused to take 
any action on this matter without the approval of its European allies. 6 
France also refused to recognize the Spanish American republics ~~d 
criticized the American decision. 7 
In 1822 the three pow·ers increased their naval forces in the Carib-
benn. The United States sent to the Hest Indies the frigate Congres~, 
the corvette John Adam~ the sloop of war Peacock, the brigantine Spark, 
and five other ships; the Navy also prepared the sloop Hornet and the 
brigantine Enterprise to join the other vessels in the Caribbean. 8 These 
vessels represented 64 percent of all American w·arships in service at 
that time. In spite of the increased defense, the United Statas observed 
\vith considerable anxiety the arrival of a British naval squadron in the 
area. The Niles t 1:!.,~eirJ.r Register spread alarming reports about a Spanish 
cession of Cuba and those n~vs served to increase tension in the nation's 
.als caplt • 
At the end of 1822, according to Charles s. Todd, the coPJidential 
agent of the United States to Colombia, the American government ordered 
the construction of fortifications in Key 1dest, Florida. Todd wrote 
about "plans for extensive preparations on the part of the United States 
to fortify Key ~vest" even \vhen "it may be found, on examination, that 
the area is unfit as a naval depot or fortification. 1110 The abortive 
expedition against Puerto Rico, organized and directed by Ducoudray Hols-
tein, also became a major concern of both the United States and Great 
Britain. According to Ad<UUs, the British Hinister in the United States 
\vas very inquisitive about the attempt to liberate Puerto Rico because 
"he suspected the expedition had been secretly santioned or connived at 
by the American government, and that \ve intended to make ourselves master 
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of Puerto Rico. 1111 
In September, 1822, Cuban creoles \'f'ho desired the annexation of Cuba 
to the American Union asked the United States to seize the island. Du-
ring a cabinet discussion concerning the Cuban proposal, it \vas agreed 
to refuse the offer because such action \.,rould have resulted in a dis-
astrous \var \vi th Great Britain. Calhoun coveted possession of the is-
land to insure it against a slave insurrection as well as to prevent its 
falling into the hands of Great Britain, but knew that Cuba could not be 
gained easily. As a result, the Cubans were told the President had· no 
authority to promise to admit Cuba as a territory. 12 
The possible acquisition of Cuba by the United States and the fu-
ture of the Spanish West Indian colonies because a serious :problem for 
the British governrnent at the end of the year. British merchants de-
manded the acquisition of the island and criticized the Parliament for 
not taking a positive view toward the protection of British trade in 
the Caribbean. Afraid of American encroachment in an area \vhich they 
considered vital to their economic interests, the merchants and the press 
hardened .their demands for action since they expected the United States 
to invade Cuba in October, 1822. 13 
Since the British government concern also extended to France, "a 
strange king of triangular suspicion arose :·ll'rance suspecting England 
and the United States, the United States suspecting England and France, 
England suspecting France and the United.States.n14 British suspicions 
tmvard France may have been \veil-founded since the French foreign minis-
ter considered acquiring the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean by an 
agreement with Spain. 14 In respect to the United States, British precau-
tion 11had a modicum of truth," since Secretary of State Adams did not 
intend to use military force b1 Cuba, but expected her annexation by 
16 peaceful means. 
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On November 15, 1822, George Canning wrote a memorru1dum to the Brit-
ish Cabinet concerning American intervention in the Caribbean. 
The possession by the United States of the channel tl1rough 
\'lhich our Jamaican trade must pass \vould, in time of ,.,ar 
1<Tith the United States, or indeed in a \var in ,.,hich the 
United States might be neutral, but in which \ve claim the 
right of search, amount to a supervision of that trade, 
and to a consequent total ruin of a great portion of the 
lJest Indian interests. 17 
In spite of that danger, Canning made no apparent overtures to Spain 
about the transfer of Cuba to Great Britain. The British Hinister in 
Madrid, hm'lever, warned Spain about the American intentions in the w·est 
Indies and told the Spanish government that Great Britain would not tel-
erate the transfer of Cuba to another power. Spain herself seemed to think 
that her control of Cuba and Puerto Rico \'las seriously threatened by the 
United States. As a result the government sent troops to protect the 
islands against a possible North ~erican invasion. 18 
The risk of an actual confrontation became more pronounced at the 
end of 1822. In December of that year, British sailors temporarily 
occupied a small section of eastern Cuba. This action considerably dis-
turbed the Utlited States government. Its concern did not ease until Can-
ning informed several governments, including the United States, that the 
landing had been made to suppress piracy and that Great Britain had no 
aggressive intentions tow·ard Cuba. Canning suggested during that time, 
ho\'lever, that if the United States meant to annex Cuba, Great Britain 
might "have to annex Puerto Hico to preserve the balance of power in the 
Caribbean. tt 19 
In March and April, 1823, when the threat of war in the Caribbean 
153 
appeared strnnger, the American Cabinet discussed the West Indian pro-
blem and the future of Cuba. John C. Calhoun, the Secretary of Har, ad-
vocated immediate intervention and a "war with England if she means to 
take Cuba,n while Smith Thompson, the Secretary of the Navy, believed 
that the problem could be resolved if the creoles declared their inde-
pendence. Secretary of State Adams, however, disagreed lvith both proposals 
because he believed that the Cubans could not maintain their li1dependence 
and thwt the United States could not prevent Great Britain from obtaining 
possession of the Spanish islands if she attempted it. Adams' opposition .to 
an aggressive attack. by the United States prevented the Cabinet from 
deciding a correct course of action. 11\ve must remain cool on the sub-
...,0 
ject, t1 wrote the Secretary of State aftenvards. tt""' 
In April, 1823, France invaded Spain to reestablish Ferdinand VII 
as the legitimate ruler. The intervention of France in the internal af-
fairs of Spain had been decided the preceding year by the Euro9ean powers 
at the Congress of Verona, the last of the congresses held by the Quadruple 
Alliance. The success of the ultraroyalist forces in Spain resulted in 
substantial apprehension in the 1~estern Hemisphere. Rumors spread. in the 
United States that Cuba and Puerto Rico had been transferred to France 
as result of the invasion. The possibility of such an event seemed dan-
gerous to Adams, vlho still \vaS concerned \vith British intentions in the 
area. The multiple threat to American interests convinced the Secreta~y 
of State the time for caution lvas over and that a positive step had to 
be taken to establish a defite American policy concerning the Caribbean. 
On April 28, 1823, Adams wrote to Hugh Nelson, the United States 
foreign minister to Spain, that the nation had great interest in the rna-
ritime \vars of Europe because 11 they are waged upon an element which is 
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the common property of all." As "Great Britain L-couldJ scarcely fail 
of becoming a party11 to those wars, "a collision bet\veen her and these 
21 Statesn could scarcely have been prevented. "But in the war betveen 
France and Spain noir commencing, 11 continued Adams, "other interests, pe-
culiarly ours, \vill in all probability be deeply involved. 11 Realizing 
that Cuba and Puerto Rico could be transferred to France as result of 
the conflict, Adams indicated that "this action must be prevented since 
the islands had become an object of transcendent importance" to the Unit-
ed States. Concerning the commercial importance of Cuba, the Secretary 
of State said: 
The nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing 
the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immen-
sely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an import-
ance in the sum of our national interests with which that 
of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little 
inferior to that \vhich binds the different members of the 
Union together. 22 
About the future acquisition of Cuba, Adams \vrote that "it is scar-
cely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba • 
will be indispensable to the Union." Adams realized that an attempt to 
conquer Cuba by force would be opposed by Great Britain. He equally 
feared that the invasion of Spain would result in Cuban emancipation. 
For Adams, Cuba was not ready for that independence,and as soon as the 
island declared self-government he feared that Great Britain or France 
would seize the country. According to the Secretary of State, that vould 
have been "an eventunpropitious to the interests" of the United States, 
therefore, the prevention of the transfer of Cuba to Great Britain "if 
necessary by force" became one of_the principal concerns of the nation. 23 
It was at this juncture that the status quo in the Caribbean became 
the official policy of the United States' government. "The wishes of 
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your government, 11 Adams 'rrote to Nelson, "are that Cuba and Puerto Rico 
may continue in connection with independent and constitutional Spain." 
Opposing independence for the islands,he further instructed the American 
minister to say that nno countenance has been given by us to any project-
ed plan of separation from Spain which may have been formed in the islands. 11 
He cautioned: 
This assurance becomes proper, as, by a late dispatch receiv-
ed from Hr. Forsyth, he intimates that the Spanish government 
have been informed that a revolution in Cuba was secretly pre-
paring, fomented by communications beti·reen a society of Free 
Hasons there and another of the same fraternity in Philadel-
phia. 
While disclaiming any intentions of obtaining Puerto Rico, Adams de-
clared "that the American government had no knowledgen of the expedition 
organized by Ducoudray Holstein to liberate that island. "You ivill not 
conceal from the Spanish government, 11 ended Adams, "the repugnance of 
the United States to the transff'r of the island of Cuba by Spain to any 
other power. 1124 \vhile Adams stressed Cuba in his declaration of official 
policy, the same vimvs extended to Puerto Rico. Historian Graham Stuart 
has summarized the Caribbean foreign policy of the United States as fol-
lows: 
In the foreign relations of the United States previous to the 
war with Spain, Puerto Rico had generally been regarded as a 
sort of natural appendage to Cuba. In the public statements 
made by American statesmen regarding Cuba, mention was some-
time made of Puerto Rico; but, even when nothing \'las said, it 
was generally understood that Puerto Rico \-rould follow in the 
wake of Cuba if that island should ever transfer its alle-
giance from Spain. Perhaps.that is one of the reasons why, 
in the foreign relations of the United States, Cuba plays 
such a predominant part, ivhile Puerto Rico is virtually un-
mentioned. 25 
The day follo\ving his message to Nelson, Adams instructed the Unit-
cd States agent in Cuba to observe the course of events in that island 
and to inform him of "any apparent popular agitation; particularly of 
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such nature as may have reference either to a transfer of the island from 
Spain to any other power. 1126 joel Roberts Poinsett had visited Puerto 
Rico six months earlier apparently with the same purpose. 27 All naval 
commanders in the Caribbean \vere instructed to be on the alert for any 
activities of the British or French naval squadrons in the area. Charles 
J. Ingersoll, the United States District Attorney for Pennsylvania, 
stated that Henry Clay had told the British minister in Hashington that 
the United States was ready to fight if Great Britain decided to seize 
. 28 
Cuba. 
While the.presence of British naval forces in the Caribbean con-
tributed to the unrest of Secretary Adams, the belief that Spain plan-
ned to transfer the Spanish possessions to other European pmvers became 
the principal worry of the United States. British program for the sus-
pension of the slave trade, the mutual rivalry for commercial and pol-
itical influence in the emerging Spanish American republics, and the de-
sires of the United States to participate in the British 'vest Indian 
carrying trade lvere also important concerns. Hany Americans believed that 
British policy dictated the·seizure of all points controlling channels 
of commerce. Since the United States had intentions of establishing an 
interoceanic waterway across Central America, British maritime policy 
was in a direct conflict \vith American interests in the Caribbean. 
The conflict of interests in the 1{est Indies also affected the viei.;s 
of the Spanish American countries. Hexico believed that the Americans 
were an aggressive expanding people with designs on the whole '\Vestern 
Hemisphere, \vhile the belief that the European powers \vere attempting 
to reimpose imperialism in South America was the major concern of Colombia. 
Colombian foreign policy viewed the United States as a nation capable of 
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leading the Western Hemisphere against the European powers. It appears, 
therefore, that Colombia had intentions of inviting the United States to 
take connnand of the affairs of the ne"\v republics. 29 
At that time it was intimated in Spanish America that Spain had of-
fered Puerto Rico to France as part of the indemnities paid after the 
French occupation of the country. The government of Colombia also be-
lieved that the British Cabinet may have had a similar concern in view 
~n1en Great Britain sent its naval forces to the Caribbean. Colombia 
did not doubt that possession of Cuba or Puerto Rico by any European 
pmver besides Spain ,.,ould have given that nation a valuable foothold in 
the most vulnerable part of the 1\'estern Hemisphere. 30 Hexico 1 s preocupa-
tion with United States expansionism predominated in her foreign polic~r. 
In Hexico, the local ne\vspaper g Amigo de ~ leyes connnented bitterly 
that ttAmerican ambition is better concealed that the English objectives, 
but it is more dangerous. Since they acquired Louisiru1a, it seems that 
they do not knmv the extent of their mm ambitior1s. n3l 
The invasion of Spain in 1823 revealed to the United States for the 
first time the great differences that existed betw·een Great Britain and 
the members of the Quadruple Alliance. British refusal of the goals of 
the Quadruple Alliance in the Spanish peninsula divided the Congress of 
Verona. During the formal discussion concerning French intervention in 
Spain, Arthur Wellesley, Dulce of Wellington and Great Britain1 s represen-
tative at the Congress, further contributed to schism by disassociating 
Great Britain from the Quadruple Alliance. \,rhen hostilities broke out 
beuveen France and Spain, Canning informed the French govcrP~ent that 
Great Britain would declare -vmr if France decided to occupy permanently 
the Spanish peninsula, or extend her operations to the Western Hemisphere. 
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The British attitude toward the occupation of France and Great Britaints 
withdrmval of the Quadruple Alliance marked the effective end of the post-
N 1 . f . . 1 32 apo eol1lc system o 1nternat1ona congresses. 
Great Britain's attitude toward France, the Quadruple Alliance, and 
Spanish America made a very favorable impression on the United States in 
spite of persistent rumors that she was planning to take Cuba as a set-
off to the French attack on Spain. 33 Canning insistance that England 
would not take advantage of the Spanish distress to "trespass" on Cuban 
soil for the purpose of appropiating the island,served to convince the 
United States that a mutual self-denial not to tru(e Cuba could be satis-
factorily arranged. The United States, therefore, decided to set.tle 
its principal differences with Great Britain on the slave trade, commer-
cial monopolies, and the balance of pmver in the Caribbean. In t1vo 
interviews \vith Stratford Canning, the British Hinister in the United 
States, Adams discus.sed the Anglo-American problem, the political situa-
tion in Spanish America, and the settlement of differences bet\veen the 
t\vo countries. 
Stratford Canning interpreted Adam.' s remarks as a suggestion for an 
alliance \lith Great Britain, but the Secretary of State promptly explain-
ed that the intention '"las "to compare their ideas and purposes together, 
with a view to the accomodation of great int.erests upon \·lhich they had 
heretofore differed. 11 Concerning the Spanish ''lest Indies, Adams told 
Stratford Canning that 11it appeared,_ from the published diplomatic papers 
and from Mr. George Canning's speeches in Parliament, that France, at 
least \vas to make no conquests in this hemisphere. n34 At that time, the 
need to protect~Cuba and Puerto Rico from foreign agression was also dis-
cussed. Since the views expressed by the British government corresponded 
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\'lith those expressed by Adams to the United States Minister in Spain, 
the Secretary of State suggested theestablishment of-the status quo in the 
Caribbean. 35 
These conversations satisfied the British government, since they 
appeared to indicate that the United States had no intentions of occupy-
ing the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. Robert Banks Jenkinson, 
Earl of Liverpool and British Prime Minister, told Richard Rush, the 
United States l1inister in Great Britain, that his country \·lould not 
attempt an invasion of Cuba but would not tolerate changes in the island's 
sovereignty. 36 nrn this vmy," \VTites Samuel Flagg Bemis, "a sort of 
gentlemen's agreement sprang up bet\'leen Monroe and Canning in 1823 that 
it vlOuld be best to let Cuba rest in the quiet possession of Spain. 1137 
Since a logical result of a status quo was the continuation of Span-
ish colonialism in the West Indies, the United States and Great Britain 
accepted as a collateral doctrine Spanish imperialism in the Caribbean · 
and in Cuba and Puerto Rico. This policy remained in effect until the 
end of the nineteenth century, affected the national development of the 
SpanishWest Inqies1 and preventedtheir independenc~ from Spain. According 
to historian Trelles y Gobin, United States policy toward Cuba "solidified 
38 the chains of political control for another three-fourths of a century." 
W'ith peace and stability in the Caribbean, Honroe directed his Se-
cretary of State to revie\v the policy of the United States to\vard Span.:.. 
ish America. France, hm-.rever, could not be convinced to accept the status 
quo in the Caribbean. Since one ·of the political goals of the Ultra-
royalists was the establishment of Bourbon monarchies in the lvestern 
Hemisphere and possibly the seizure of Cuba and Puerto Rico, they did 
not accept the agreement between Adams and Canning. Agents continued 
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to arrive in the Caribbean borderlands to pursue the plans of the French 
goverrunent. On January 8, 1823, Todd wrote from Bogota, Colombia, that 
11the United States would be invited to join in an American confederacy!! 
to forestall French intentions in Spanish America. A day later, Todd in-
formed the Secretary of State that more French agents were arriving in 
Cartagena on their way to Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. Todd further 
indicated that 11 these agents w·ere dispatched for the purpose of examin-
ining into the actual state of affairs and it was possible that they soon 
will be fomenting intrigues to gain political and commercial advantages 
for their country.n39 
Commencing in August, 1823, Canning approached the government of the 
United States concerning French activities in Spanish America, the reaf-
firmation of the status quo and the future of the new independent nations. 
Canning consulted Rush about the feasibility of a joint declaration against 
French designs in the Western Hemisphere .4° At that time.the Foreign 
Secretary reemphasized that Great Britain did not intend to appropriate 
Cuba or other portions of Spanish America. Canning also expressed his 
opposition to France'sintentions, but since he could not be certain of 
that country's plans for Spanish America he suggested a joint declaration 
by the United States and Great Britain concerning European interests in 
America. He expected that the combined maritime pmv-er of the United Stat-
es and Great Britain \vould be sufficient to deter French aggression in 
the Western Hemisphere. 41 
On August 20, 1823, the United States Minister to Great Britain re-
ceived a formal proposal from the British government concerning a bi-
lateral agreement. Rush, without committing his country to a particular 
course of action, informed James Monroe of Great Britain's proposition. 
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Receiving the dispatch on October 9, the President consulted \dth Jef-
ferson and Madison as to their opinions on the subject. Secretary Adams 
recommended that instead of a multilateral declaration, the nation-
should independently \varn Europe that any attempt to regain the Spanish 
colonies \votlld be opposed by the United States. The result of Adam's 
recommendations \vas the proclamation of the Honroe Doctrine in December,-
1823. Noncolonization and noninterference in Spanish American affaixs 
became the t\vo major objectives of American foreign policy in the lvest-
ern Hemisphere. 42 
Since the Monroe Doctrine was not a formal la\'f" and Congress took 
no action to make it an official policy, the message fell into disuse.for 
several years. The Spanish American governments received Honroe 1 s decla-
ration with great enthusiasm. TI1e correspondence of Carlos de Alvear, 
the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata Minister to the United States, 
indicates that the presidential declaration attracted Spanish American 
sympathies in spite of the realization that 11 the geography of the N.e\v 
'vorld suggested Monroe was indulging in fantasy. n43 In addition, the 
the European pmvers never accepted the Honroe Doctrine and did not bind 
them under international law or by treaty commitments. 
Cuba's political future played an important role in the Cabinet dis-
cussions that led to the Honroe Doctrine. On November 7, 1823, the Pre-
sident1s-advisors met to discuss the British proposal of a joint de-
claration against foreign intervention in Spanish America. Calhoun re-
commended that Rush be authorized to negotiate a joint declaration· ivith 
the British government and to pledge American non-interference in Cuba. 
Adams, \'lho was suspicious of Great Britain's motives, believed that a 
joint declaration would compromise the United States, especially in the 
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Caribbean. 11i>Jithout entering now into the inquiry of the expediency 
of our annexing Texas or Cuba to our Union," wrote the Secretary of State, 
11we should at least keep ourselves free to act as emergencies may arise, 
and not to tie ourselves dmm to any principle >vhich might immediately 
afterward be brought to bear against ourselves. 11 
Directly connecting the Monroe Doctrine to the status quo, Adams 
explained to the President that "the answer to be given to Baron Tuyl, 
the instructions to Hr. Rush relative to the proposals of Hr. Canning, 
those tc l1r. Middleton at St. Petersburg, and those to the minister who 
must be sent to France must all be parts of a combined system of policy 
and adapted to each other. n44 Adams ended by saying that all the pre-
sidential advisors agreed that a minister shall immediately be sent to 
France. 
In October, 1823, Great Britain accomplished the principal purpose 
for \vhich Canning sought an Anglo-American declaration. Since he was 
primarily concerned \vith French designs in Spanish America, Canning 
exerted pressure upon Prince jules de Polignac, the French Minister in 
Great Britain, to compromise French policy toward Spanish America. 'vhen 
Great Britain informed the French government that she intended to mantain 
the status quo in the Caribbean, Polignac signed a memorandum on October 
9, 1823, pledging to remain neutral in the \~estern Hemisphere. France 
also disclaimed any desire to appropriate any portion of the Spanish 
possessions and to support the status quo.45 
nvo months after signing the compromise with France, Canning inquired 
about the official position of the United States concerning Cuba. The 
British Foreign Secretary requested from H. u. Addington, the British 
charg~ d'affaires in the United States, to determine the position of the 
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United States on Cuba. Addington, shmving little tact, discussed the 
request with the Secretary of State in the mist of the negotiations 
for an Anglo....American declaration. On December 1, 1823, he told Canning: 
It appeared: to me that a good opportunity \vas here offer-
ed for endeavouring to ascertain ••• something positive 
as to the plans and intentions of this Government l'lith 
regard to Cuba •••• I accordingly observed that the 
insular possessions, in consequence of the turn \vhich af-
fairs had taken in Spain, \vere to make an effort to free 
themselves from the dominion of the Hother Country •••• 
would the United States in this case be disposed to re-
cognize their independence also? 
Hr. Adams replied \dthout hesitation that this, if 
it happened, \vould furnish matter for future considera-
tion. rhe United States desired not the possession of 
Cuba or Puerto Rico themselves, but neither could they 
see them \dth indiference in the hands of any other Pmver.46 
The follmving day President James Honroe made his now-famous declaration. 
The Honroe Doctrine \vas a direct result of the struggle for su-
premacy in the West Indies and reflects a fear of European intervention 
in the Caribbean. "Speaking in practical terms, 11 \vrote Dexter Perkins, 
"the Honroe Doctrine \·las for the most part a Caribbean doctrine, 11 It 
also was an attempt to formalize the status quo and the interests of the 
Americnn traders \vho wanted a large share of the economic advantages made 
possible by the independence of Spanish America. The Monroe Doctrine 
was primarily directed against British and French intentions in the Carib-
bean in spite of the concern for the Holy Alliance and Russian expansion 
in the Pacific Northwest. As Perkins has ·written: 
No legend is more persistent than the legend that the 
countries of the New Uorld were in grave danger from Eu-
rope and that the l!onroe Doctrine protected them from 
being overrun by the \vicked nations of the Old \'lorld. A 
corollary to this legend is that, though the United Stat-
es \'las unable effectively to prevent such action, any 
hostile move \vas prevented by the British domination of 
the seas. Neither of these things happens to be true. 
The pronouncements that had been made by the Holy Alliance were little 
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more than declarations of principles. "I no more believe that the 
Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent," 
wrote Adams, "that the Chimborazo \vill sink beneath the oceans. 1147 
Neither could Russia have offered a serious challenge in the Paci.,.. 
fie North~v-est. Its naval forces 1vere obsolete and extremely limited, 
even for the defense of the homeland. That nation was unable to provide-
adequate forces to protect her interests in North America. A single >var 
vessel protected the North American settlements most of the time. Count 
Nesselrode, the Russian Secretary of State, hoped 11 that the English navy 
\vould soon put· an end to all piratical raids 11 in North America since 11 the 
Russian flag seldom appeared in Latin American seas. 11 By July 22, 1823, 
the two nations had already compromised themselves to resolve the north-
western territorial problem.48 
The concern of the United States with the Caribbean was an entirely 
different problem. Canning had agreed with the United States that it ;vas 
necessary to contain French expansion in the Hest Indies if the status 
quo \vas to be satisfactorily maintained. Adams \vould have preferred a 
partnership between the United States and Great Britain which would have 
left intact their commercial relations in Spanish America, but his belief 
that Canning's offer of an agreement was directed "against the acquisi-
tion to the United States themselves of any part of the Spru1ish American 
possessions" prevented the issuance of a joint declaration. The United 
States also did not >·Tant to compromise the possibility that a free and 
independent Cuba may ask someday to join the American Union.49 
The United States also may have considered the threat of a South 
American confederation that had begun to materialize under the leadership 
of Colombia. The year preceding the promulgation of the Honroe Doctrine, 
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Spanish American leaders planned the establishment of a continental 
system to coordinate common defense, commercial and trade relations, and 
resolve disputes among the new republics. Since these nations had ideo-
logical and cultural sj~ilarities and common national interests, their 
leaders agreed in principle to the formation of an Americru~ confedera-
tion under the leadership of S~6n Bolivar. 
The Anglo-American rivalry in the Caribbean provided the Spanish 
American republics with minimum interference from the United States or 
Europe, a necessary condition for the grmv-th of a political entente 
because it permitted them to adjust relationships ivithout foreign inter-
vention. Under the leadership of Colombia, Spanish American politicians 
periodically discussed mutual defense agreements, unified military com-
mands, commercial regulations, and other national interests. Hhile 
these nations did not have adequate naval forces to protect their terri-
tories, undoubtedly they had the largest organized armies in the West-
ern Hemisphere. An aLliance bet\veen Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Chile and 
Hexico, therefore, \'lould have created a pmverful block in the Hestern 
Hemisphere. 
American co~nercial agents in Spanish America routinely informed the 
Secretary of State of these plans. On january 3, 1823, Todd \vrote to 
Adams that there \vere important negotiations in progress among the na-
tions of the continent. He stated that since they spoke a common lan-
guage and had common customs and traditions 11 they might be considered 
allies. tt The follm·ling month, Todd wrote that Colombia had signed trea-
ties with Peru and Chile and \vould soon conclude one with Buenos Aires 
(Argentina). 11 The United States may be compelled, 11 \\Tote Todd, 11 to unite 
with them in a Continental Confederacy • • • to place its commerce on 
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the footing of a most favorable nation. 11 On Hay 8, 1823, Todd informed 
Adams that the Colombian treaties with Peru and Chile were political in 
nature and constituted the bases of an Amphyctionic Council at Panama.5° 
Adams' apprehension about the danger of a pov1er block in the i·lest-
ern Hemisphere which could challenge American supremacy in the continent 
increased vith Todd's messages. On Hay 17, 1823, he instructed Caesar 
A. Rodney, the United States Minister to Buenos Aires, to inquire about 
the continental system: 
••• a more extensive Confederation has been projected under 
the auspices of the ne\¥ Government of the Republic of Colom-
bia. In.the last despatch received from Hr. Forbes he mentions 
the arrival at Buenos Aires of Nr. joaquin Hosquera, senator 
from Colombia, in a mission • • • to engage the other Indepen-
dent Governments of Spanish America to unite with Colombia in 
a Congress to be held at such point as might be agreed on, to 
settle a general system of American Policy • • • • For this 
purpose they had already signed a treaty with Peru. By let-
t.ers of a previous date • • • it appears that the project is 
yet more extensive than Hr. Mosquera had made knmm to Hr. 
Forbes. It embraces North as well as South America. 51 
The danger that Gran Colombia may become a world pOiver capable of 
limiting A.merican influence in the Caribbean disturbed the Secretary of 
State. Adams believed that Colombia was "undoubtedly destined to be-
come one of the mightiest nations on earth." On the proposed Colombian 
confederacy, Adams intended that the United States "remain a neutral and 
tranquil but deeply attentive spectator. 11 The MonroeDoctrine, therefore, 
provided the ideal diplomatic tool for accomplishing .that purpose. It 
also served to restraint Spanish American political and territorial 
.ambitions in the Caribbean. 5Z 
The Caribbean problem between the United States and the European 
powers had been resolved by the completion of the French invasion of 
Spain. The status quo becrune a satisfactory political solution to the 
growing West Indian problem because it prevented collisions of interests 
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among the three maritime powers. The peace and stability that follmved 
the international agreement resulted in increased trade for Great Brit-
ain. Since that nation did not have to be concerned \vith American and 
French threats in the West Indies, it dedicated her resources to inter-
national trade. As a result, its commerce with northern South America, 
Central America, and Mexico grew considerably. 
English companies began to operate Colombian, Venezuelan, and Hex-
ican mines and to establish cowmercial transportation facilities in cities 
and rural areas. British financial operations extended to government 
agencies, private investments, and manufacturing. Since restrictions on 
foreign commerce were abolished in most Spanish American republics, Brit-
ish manufactured goods flooded the local markets. Great Britain extend-
ed credits to Colombia, Hexico, and other Caribbean borderlands for pur-
chasing her products. These nations also negotiated loans in London 
to rebuild their milltary and commercial fleets and to pay their war 
debts. As the United States Minister to Colombia vrrote at that time: 
English enterprises and intelligence has diffused itself 
into every quarter of the republic. Every day shows a 
new face belonging to some British house of trade, inun-
dating themselves into the favors of the government. Pro-
positions are now before this Congress by English com-
panies for opening a canal across the Isthmus. 53 
Since the United States did not have sufficient investment capital to ex-
panel. her commercial operations to the emerging Spanish American republica, 
Great Britain seized upon the new trading oportunities. Hhile the United 
States exported mostly agricultural products, Great Britain sold manufac-
tured goods. Robert A. Humphreys writes that during the 1820s "British 
trade, British capital, and the British fleet \vere of more importance to 
Spanish America than \vere those of the United States. rr54 
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The British iVest Indies became useful intermediary trading posts, 
supplies 1varehouses, and naval repair facilities for Great Britain's 
trade in the '·!estern Hemisphere. These islands served as storage areas 
for the manufactu:oed goods brought from England1 and as distribution points 
for the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Panamanian traders. On September 25, 
1825, Daniel Webster \ITote to Henry Clay that the southern Caribbean 
had lost its commercial importance to the United States. "Connected 
"'ith this in the policy of England, 11 "rrote \',1ebster. 
• • • is the extension of the warehouse system. We have no 
right tp complain about it • • •• I consider the 'vhole sys-
tem as a master stroke of commercial policy on the part of 
England, and as one that should m.,raken all our vigilance 
and exercise our \dsdom •••• Our 1vhole trade 1vith the 
British \\1est Indies is not so important ••• \'lhen compared 
lvith that of Cuba and Hispaniola. 55 
Webster concluded that the loss of the Spanish American markets to Great 
Britain had been the fau.l t of the American government. 
In the cor:1.petition for prestige and political advantage in the Carib-
bean and Spanish America, hmvever, the United States had gained some 
importance by her recognition of the independence of Hexico and Colom-
bia. On the other hand. France 1 s internal problems reduced French in-
fluence in the Caribbean borderlands. The ascension of Charles X to the 
throne resulted in political turmoil, radicalism, censorship of the press, 
and internal disturbances that prevented the grmf'th of manufacturing and 
conrrnercial vitality. Lat-TS establishing noble primogeniture, medieval 
ceremonies, and royalist preferences curtailed individual initiative. 
Scaling dmm interest on government bonds reduced capital expenditures 
and France's role in international co~nerce. As a result, that nation 
could not participate in the expanding commercial trade of Spanish Amer-
ica. 
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TI1e status quo in the Caribbean did not remain unchallenged for 
long. The sudden intervention of Hexico and Colombia-in the political 
affairs of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1825 and 1826 threatened to disrupt 
the stability of the area and disturb the interests of the United States 
and the European po\vers. Since 1824, Cuban and Puerto Rican revolution-
aries had asked the Spanish American republics to intervene in the is-
lands to secure their independence. Separatists believed that the only 
i<~ay to accomplish their goals \V"as through an invasion of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico by the combined forces of Hexi.co and Colombia, assisted by the re-
volutionary forces on the islands. Clearly, a military operation of 
this magnitude l;·lOuld have ended Spanish rule in the Caribbean. The Unit-
ed States and the European pm.,rers, hoivever, could not tolerate this at-
tempt by the Spanish A.merican countries because it \·Jas contrary· to their 
objectives in the West Indies and a direct threat to the status quo. 
As Mexico ru1d Colombia turned their attention to the liberation of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States took the initiative in seeking 
diplomatic intervention by the European po\vers to prevent such action. 
Secretary of State Henry Clay sent letters to the foreign ministers of 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, asking them to exercise their influence 
to convince the Spanish government to terminate the Spanish American con-
flict by recognizing the independence of the mainland colonies. By se-
curing peace in the \'!estern Hemisphere, the United States vrould then pre-
vent Herico and Colombia from attacking the \·:'est Indies. Clay, recog-
nizing the need for peace during this critical time,wrote 
. in respect to Cuba and Puerto Rico, there can be lit-
tle doubt, if the war w·ere once ended, that they would be 
safe in the possession of Spain. They would, at least, be 
secured from foreign attacks and all ideas of independence 
v1hich the inhabitants may entertain, would cease \vith the 
cessation of the state of 1var 1·;hich had excited them. 56 
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The United States also attempted to convince Spain that, unless 
she ended. the Spanish_ American conflict and recognized the independence 
of the new republics, she was in danger of losing her possessions in 
the Caribbean. United States foreign policy, therefore, employed the 
strategy of attempting to convince Spain that only by mal-cing peace \vith 
her revolted colonies and recognizing their independence could she keep 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. 57 At the same time, the United States reemphasized 
to Great Britain and France the need to maintain the status quo in the 
Caribbean. Clay believed that if Hexico and Colombia intervened milita-
rily in the Caribbean, Great Britain and France would feel compelled to 
join the conflict to protect their interests. According to Bemis, this 
would have meant "that in the maintenance of the Honroe Doctrine it would. 
have been necessary to defend Spain's possessions ~'ld therefore to incur 
the enmity of the Latin American republics and possibly France or Great 
Britain.n58 
On April 27, 1825, Alexander Everett, the United States Hillister to 
Spain, 1-ras instructed to approach the Spanish government concerning the 
hostilities bet1veen Spain and the Spanish American republics and the se-
curity of the Caribbean. 11 The war upon the continent is, in fact, at an 
end, 11 \Yrote Secretary Clay to Everett, 11 and the armies of the new states 
• • • have no longer employment on the continent. To v1hat object, then, 
will the ne\'1 republics direct their powerful and victorious armies?" 
Expressing the vimv that the United. States desired peace to secure the 
status quo, the Secretary of State added: 
It is not for the ne\'1 republics that the President wishes 
you to urge upon Spain the expediency of concluding the 
\var • • . • And, as the vie\vS of the United States in re-
gard to those Islands may possibly have some influence, 
you are authorized frankly and fully to disclose them: 
the United States are satisfied with the present condition 
of those islands Ccuba and Puerto 1\ico J in the hands 
of Spain, and \vith the ports open to our commerce, as 
they are nmv open. This government desires ~ politi-
~ change of ~ condition. 59 
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Since 11 political change" must have included self-determination, it 
may be said that opposition to the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
was part of the policy of the United States. TI1e evidence to support 
this assertion appears in the many statemer.ts of official policy made 
at that time. To Everett, the Secretary of State also wrote on April 
27, 1825: 11 'fhis government desires no political changes ["in Cuba and 
Puerto RicoJ •. The population itself of the islands is incompetent at 
present, from its composition and its amount, to maintain self-govern-
60 ment. 11 To Henry Middleton, United States Hinister to Russia, Clay 
stated on Hay 10, 1825, that the United States 11desired for themselves 
no politic.al change in them, n61 adding subsequently, 11if Cuba vlere to 
declare itself independent, the runount and the character of its popula-
tion render it improbable that it could maintain its independence. 1162 
Hiddleton, expressing a. similar concern, informed the Russian govern-
ment on july 2, 1825, that lvhile the "United States have seen \vith satis-
faction the efforts of the nations of the American continent \·rithdrmv 
themselves from the yoke of Spanish domination, it \vas not so with re-
gard to the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 11 Considering the possibility 
of slave insurrection on the islands, he also vrrote: 11 The character of 
the population of these islands render extremely problematical their 
capacity to maintain independence. A premature declaration would pro-
bably result in the afflicting rep£tition of the disastrous scenes of 
St. Domingo. 1163 
At that time, ne\vspapermen, naval officers, private citizens, and 
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even the President of the United States held similar views about the 
political independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Cuban historians have 
long contended that United States opposition frustrated the independence 
of their country and that American interference in the political affairs 
of the Caribbean \vas the principal reason \vhy Cuba remained a colony of 
Spain until 1898. American, British, and French interference in the 
West Indies, in reality, prevented the independence of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico dur.ing the nineteenth century. 64 
A continuation of Spanish rule in the Caribbean, supported by the 
United States and the European powers, fit perfectly the policy of the 
American and British governments tmvard the status quo. The constant 
apprehension concerning the transfer of Cuba and Puerto Rico to a govern-
ment less powerful than Spain was lessened by the status quo. Spain, 
however, did not believe that the United States or Great Britain intend-
ed to protect Spanish interests in the Caribbean; she believed that they 
planned to annex Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
As a result, the Spanish government refused to accept the recommend-
ations of the United States concerning peace in the Western Hemisphere. 
The reply of Francisco de Zea Bermudez, the Spanish First Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, was categorical:. 
His Haj esty at no time thought of ceding to any pmver the 
islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and, so far from such a 
purpose, is firmly determined to keep them under the do-
minion and authority of his legitimate sovereignty. 65 
Zea Bermudez also told the United States Hillister that if the United Stat-
es was truly concerned over Cuba remaining under Spanish control, it should 
guarantee her O\vnership by a defense agreement that protected both Amer-
ican and Spanish interests in the West Indies. 
On September 25, and again on October 20, 1825, Spain reemphasized 
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that view. Everett informed the Secretary of State that Zea Bermudez 
had explicitly told him that Spain intended to remain in the West Indies 
and had no intentions of acknowledging the independence of the new states.66 
Spanish refusal signified the continuation of the struggle on the conti-
nent and the probability that it \vould extend to the Caribbean. To con-
vince Spain of the necessity of terminating the conflict in America, the 
United States, therefore, appealed to Russia, France, and Great Britain. 
11 True \visdom, 11 Clay had \Yritten to his foreign emissaries, "dictates that 
Spain, without indulging in unavailing regrets on account of what she 
had irretrievably lost, should employ the means of retaining what she 
may yet preserve from the wreck of her former possessions. 1167 
At that time Clay asked the European powers to convince the Spanish 
government of the futility of the Spanish American conflict. Clay's 
communications emphasized that Spain would benefit by a recognition of 
her defeat, since continued attempts to regain her empire would only re-
result in the additional losses of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Since France 
\'las an ally of Spain, Clay informed the United States Hinister in Paris 
11 to open the matter to the French government, in the hope that they 
['"wouldJ cooperate in the great object.n68 
Even Prince Klemens lvensel Nepomuk Hetternich, the Austrian Chan-
cellor and post-Napoleonic leader of Europe, became \vorried about the 
international problem in the Caribbean. Hhile the distribution of lands 
that had been taken from Napoleon, the restoration of "legitimate" rulers 
in Europe, and the encirclement of France had been the principal object-
ives of the Congress of Vienna, peace amC:n.g the great European pm.,rers 
had been a special g.oal of Prince Hetternich. Having suppressed the re-
volts against the Quadruple Alliance and the monarchical regimes of Europe, 
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he now directed his attention to the Caribbean. He supported the Span-
i.sh rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico because it represent legitimate govern-
ment. As a result, he expressed his opposition to political changes in 
the area but indicated at the same time "that each of the Allied PO\vers 
should feel free to act according to its own interests. 1169 
Hetternich disapproved a proposal for inviting the United States 
to send delegates to a congress convoked to consider the impact of the 
Spanish American revolutions and made it knO\vm "that the government of 
Austria did not aclmO\vledge the rebellious Spanish American colonies as 
independent so long as the motherland had not taken that momentous step. 11 70 
As a result, on Harch 17, 1825, Hetternich declared his opposition to 
revolutions against Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico and stated that 
11 such events lvould have an unhappy influence upon the fate of civiliza-
tion. n71 He urged Spain to .reinforce her military forces in the Carib-
bean to demonstrate that she still ,.,.as able to reconquer the Spanish 
American colonies. 72 To the Spanish Foreign Minister, however, here-
commended that Ferdinand VII endeavor 11by the adoption of a mild and con-
ciliatory policy, and even if necessary, by concessions and sacrifices," 
to forestall the expansion of the Caribbean problem.72 
'vhile Prince Hetternich urged Spain to reinforce her military pos-
itions in the Caribbean, Great Britain, wanting to preserve the status 
quo and the balance of pO\'I'er in that region, supported the United States 
recommendations tovard peace and stabili~y in Spanish America. Great 
Britain needed the cooperation of the United States and France to pre-
serve the status quo, since she feared that the Spanish American repu-
blics might extend their operations to the British possessions in the 
\vest Indies. 73 Canning, supporting Clay's position, informed Viscount 
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Levenson-Gmver Granville, the British Hinister to France, that Great 
Britain had no interest in acquiring Cuba and Puerto Rico; only on pre-
serving the status quo. To demonstrate to France that Great Britain de-
sired peace in the Caribbean, Canning even indicated that his country 
\vould not support the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico 11by receiving 
any overture \vhich might be made from any party in those islands desirous 
of thrm·Ting off the dominion of Spain. n74 The British Foreign Secretary 
also stated to Granville that he supported the continuing attachment of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico to Spain for the sruce of that country and the gen-
eral peace of the \vorld. 
At the end of 1825, France also accepted the vieivs of the United 
States and Great Britain concerning the status quo in the Caribbean. On 
january 10, 1826, james Brown, the United States Hillister to France, in-
formed the Secretary of State. that the French govern..11ent "appeared to 
concur entirely in the vie\v \thich I took of the subject. u75 France, 
however, was more concerned with the British reaction than with the po-
sition of the United States concerning the tvest Indies. During 1825, 
a large French fleet had vi·sited the Caribbean and prompted much specu-
lation about the French government's intentions. The United States pro-
tested immediately to France and insisted that there were already an 
American squadron for the suppression of piracy and other beneficial ser-
vice for all nations in the Caribbean; another fleet was not needed. 76 
On October 25, 1825, the United States also informed the French govern-
ment that "we could not consent to the occupation of those islands by 
any other European pmver than Spain under any contingency "'hat ever. 1177 
The threat of Hexico and Colombia and the visit of the French fleet 
disturbed the peaceful coexistence that had existed in the Hest Indies 
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after the Adams-Canning 11 gentlemen 1 s agreements 11 • During that time 
Great Britain distrusted France more than she distrusted the United Stat-
es or the Spanish American republics. The presence of the French squa-
dron in the 'vest Indies disturbed the British government and drew pro-
tests from Canning. He became very angry \vhen notified of France's 
presence in the Caribbean. Ange-Hyacinthe-Haxence, Baron de Damas and 
French Foreign Hinister, replied to the British government that the Gover-
nor of Harinique had overstepped his authority and ordered French \far-
ships to convoy Spanish troops transports to the ''Jest Indies. 7S 
The Governor of Hartiiliqne had been authorized, should the occasion 
arise, to intervene \vith French military forces in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
in the event of ari insurrection or if the separatists.threatened the interests 
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-of Spain. Great Britain believed that this· action \vere a direct viola-
tion of the Polignac Hemorandum and Chateaubricjl.d 1 s pledge in November, 
1823, that France \vould not interfere \vith the revolutions in Spanish 
America or \vith the status quo in the Caribbean. 
lvhile the United States' major problem \vas the activities of Hexico 
and Colombia in the Caribbean, she \vas not less interested \vith those of 
France or Great Britain. According to Harold \1. V. Temper ley, Adams 
11\vas not the man \vho patiently \vould suffer this, and he prepared vigor-
ously to resist, in case of a French attack on Cuba. n80 As a result, the 
United States and Great Britain began neiv negotiations concerning the 
threat of Hexico, Colombia, and France in the Caribbean. The result of 
these discussions \'las a British recom.rnendation for a tripartite a.§sreement. 
The United States also invoked the aid of Russia, assuming the Tzilr, as 
leader of the Holy Alliance, \vould exercise a strong influence in the 
affair. 
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In spite of the fact that the United States and Great Britain pre-
viously had reached a mutual understanding concerning the balance of 
pm'ler :Ln the Caribbean and both nations had disclaimed any aggresive 
designs against the Spanish colonies, the United States refused to 
accept the tripartite agreement because it would have reduced the chan-
ces of incorporating Cuba into the America Union. France declined the 
offer because of her comrilitment .to support the objectives of the Holy 
Alliance. 
Russia accepted the American determination to maintain the status 
quo in the Caribbean. The Tzar 1 s concern v1as not the danger involved 
in an attack from Hexico and Colombia but rather the use of force by the 
United States to impose a military solution to a political problem. 81 
This belief prompted Count 1\arl Robert Nesselrode, the nussian Secretary 
of State, to inform the Russian Hinister in the United States that 11Hr. 
Adams had declared that if the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico were en-
dangered to the extreme of affecting American power, the United States 
would be forced to establish her authority there."82 
By involving Russia in the political affairs of the Caribbean, hm¥...,. 
ever, the United States had committed a serious blunder. Canning had 
called this action "a desperate move. 1183 Russia, according to Canning, 
\vas inalterable in her vimvs concerning republicanism; as a result, she 
could not have given serious consideration to the plight of the United 
States for recognition of the Spanish American republics. 11 'l'he United 
States, \¥rote Canning, , are grievously m.ista.ken if they imagine that 
the Emperor of Russia is upon this, so far as to be induced to use the 
influence 1vhich he possesses. "84 
Russia could not have taken any steps to bring peace in Spanish 
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America Hithout a previous understanding with her European allies. For 
that reason she did not approach Spain \vith the vigor that the United 
States expected. 11All that the Emperor desires, as a friend of the King 
of Spain, 11 wrote Count Nesselrode to Ferdinand VII, "is that this issue 
should be discussed in his councils with the care and the impartiality 
that it deserves. 1185 'l11at \vas the extent of the Russian participation in 
the affairs of Spanish America. 
The involvement -of Russia to protect the status quo in the Caribbean, 
hm't'ever, hardened Spain' s determination to coP.tinue the "struggle in 
Spanish America and maintain her control in the Hest Indies. This action 
was contrary to the original purposes of the United States. The Span-
ish government, which \vas seeking a respite to relieve the pressure of 
Great Britain, France, and the United States, smv in the Russian attitude 
a vtay to avoid making a decision. Frederick Lamb, the British Hinister 
in Spain, informed Canning on February 25, 1826, that the Spanish F'oreign 
Hinister had constantly stated that 
• • • the Government of the United States, being better ac-
quainted \vith American affairs than any other, and having 
apPlied to Russia for her intervention rather than to any 
other pmver, must lmovl it is impossible for Spain to act 
\vithout consulting her CRussiaJ in the question. 
This viei·l permitted the Spanish government to pospone making a decision 
indefinitely. 
During that time, the Hexican governnent attempted to convince Great 
Britain that the real danger was the intentions of the United States in 
regard to Cuba. The United States, according to Jose Hariano de Hiche-
lena, the Hexican representative in Great Britain, was making prepara-
tions to invade the Spanish West Indies and suppress piracy. Since 
the action of the United States iv-as contrary to Hex:ican .plans, that nation 
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hoped that Great Britain \'lould restrain ~the United States in the Carib-
bean. Canning told Hichelena that Great Britain had been trying for 
many mcmths to convince Spain that she should stop her belligerant acti-
vities in Spanish America and recognize the independence of the revolt-
ed colonies, but he had been unsuccessful. Since he did not consider the 
United States to be a threat to Cuba, HeY.ico 'l.ias at liberty to act as 
she deemed it to be necessary for her national interests. 11 The British 
Foreign Secretary also commented to 1•1ichelena that lvhile he opposed the 
transfer of Cuba either to the United States or to France, he had no 
objections to a transfer to Nexico. 87 Canning did not 11ish to oppose 
openly the Spanish American plans in the Caribbean and thereby offend 
the new republics. When he finally reconunended to Hexico and Colombia 
the abandonment of their project, he did it on the ground that the Unit-
ed States had already announced that she would interfere, and that her 
action would be bound to result in a military conflict. 
Defore taking any action in the Caribbean, Colombia \vanted to lrnmv 
\vhat. the response of Great Britain and Fran.ce vould be to an extension 
of the Spanish American war. to the Caribbean. Colombia was quite famil-
iar lvith the interests of the European pmvers in that area, especially 
1-lith those of Great Britain. "The Spaniards are no longer a danger to 
us, 11 1vrote Sim6n Bolivar on Hay 20, 1825, "but the English are very much 
so, as they, being omnipotent, are therefore to be feared, n88 Colombia 
had previously begun conversations 1vith France to determine that nation's 
response to an attack on the Caribbean. Josl! H. Lanz, the Colombian re-
presentative in Paris, approached the French government "to obtain expla-
nations" concerning the proposed expedition to the Caribbean. "If Colom-
bia and her !unerican allies," indicated Lanz, "should undertake to liberate 
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Cuba and Puerto Rico from the Spanish rule, \Vould France take and active 
part against them?89 
In spite of the assurances given to Colombia and Hexico, neither 
the United States nor Great Britain or France \Velcomed the plans of Co-
lombia and Hexico for an expedition to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
The European pmvers, however, by not opposing the Spanish American plans 
directly, \vere able to convince Colombia and Hexico that the United Stat-
es, not they, \vas responsible for the Caribbean crisi.s. As it \vill be 
seen later, Great Britain continued to emphasize this scheme at the 
Panama Cor~ress and during the subsequent deliberations of the Spanish 
American republics concerning the Caribbean. The belief of Colombia 
and Hexico that the United States was responsible for opposing their 
plans \'las intensified on December 20, 1825, when Clay requested that 
these countries 11in the interest of peacen suspend the proposed military 
expedition to Cuba and Puerto Rico.9° 
Four months earlier, on August 20, 1825, Count Nesselrode had sub-
mitted a note to the United States expressing the appreciation of the 
Russian goverrunent for the interests of the United Statts in protect-
ing the Spanish Caribbean. In that note, Nesselrode also co~nentcd that 
Russia \vanted the United States 11 to use their influence to disconcert 
every enterprise against the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. n9l The 
United States hastened to comply with the ,.,ished of the Russian govern-
ment. \Yrongly assuming that Russia intended to urge Spain to seek a 
compromise in the Hestern Hemisphere, the Secretary of State reconunended 
to Colombia .and Mexico a suspension ·of every hostile action against Cuba 
and Puerto Rico. 
It is interesting to note that the United States Goverrunent, "which 
had rejected the idea of European interference in Ne\v Horld affairs in 
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Honroel s famous utterance, 11 92 had appealed to Great Britain, France, and 
Russia - Old World Powers -- to employ their moral and diplomatic ef-
forts to maintain the status quo in the Caribbean. 93 By inviting the 
interference of European powers in the political affairs of the Carib-
bean, the United States had violated her mm "noninterference principle" 
enunciated barely "h'lo years before in the Honroe Doctrine. Despite 
Honroe' s procla1nation, the United States asked the European pm'lers 11 to 
become involved in a movement to prevent the independence of an American 
area. 'l'he Adams-Clay policy vms nothing less than a call for European 
aid to keep Mexico and Colombia from helping Cuba and Puerto Rico achieve 
independence. 1194 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE SPANISH AHERICAN NATIONS A:t-.TJ) 'IHE 
STATUS QUO IN THE CARIBBEAN 
In December, 1824, the revolutionary forces of Harshall Antonio 
Jose de Sucre decisively defeated the royalists at the battle of Aya-
cucho, ending for all practical purposes over three hundred years of 
S . h . 'al' . A . 1 , parus 1mper1 1sm 1n mer1ca. In 1822 the United States had official-
ly recognized the independence of Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and 
Hexico. 2 In 1825 Great Britain also recognized the ne\v nations. The 
independence of Spanish America became an accomplished fact; only Cuba 
and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish control. 
As we have seen, revolutionary forces had also been active in the 
Caribbean since the beginning of the Spanish American \·rars for indepen-
dence. Because of their ge~graphical isolation, the repressive measures 
t~cen by the Spanish colonial officials, the exile of the rebel leaders, 
and the conflicts between liberals, conservatives, and separatists, Cuba 
and Puerto Rico had not been able to achieve their independence. A vi-
olent revolutionary uprising in the Spanish Hest Indies had far less 
chance of success than on the mainland because Cuba and Puerto Rico were 
more strongly governed than the rest of the colonies as a result of their 
role in the military de:Zense system of Spain. 3 
During the Spanish American wars for independence, other problems 
emerged in the Caribbean colonies. Some revolutionary ideas did not 
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appeal to the w·ealthy Cuban creoles and plantation mmers who depended 
on slavery as their source of labor. In addition, many Cubans believed 
that the black slaves \vould revolt after an independence as they had 
done in Haiti. Puerto Ricans, on the other hand, did not concern them-
selves with a slave insurrection since the white population vastly out-
numbered the blacks, and slavery \vas a limited institution. The Puerto -
Rican agrarian economy did not support large number of slaves, and free 
labor predominated during the Spanish regime. 
In spite of the opposition of the slaveo\mers and the wealthy cre-
oles, the great changes that occurred on the mainland stirred in the is-
lands a spirit of revolution and desire for political and economic 
change. No doubt the underlying antagonism against Spain and the use 
of the islands as military strongholds served to harden separatism and 
the motivation for self-government. In spite of the fact that the se-
paratists received help and encouragement from Venezuela and Mexico, 
they could not succeed, and many Cuban and Puerto Rican revolutionaries 
emigrated to South America to join Bolivar 1 s revolutionary armies. 
Sim6n Bolivar, under whose leadership most South America became 
independent, had been unable to devote much attention to the struggle 
for liberty in the Caribbean; the wars of independence on the mainland 
consumed all of his available resources. Even after the battle of Aya-
cucho, Hexico and Colombia \vere not yet able to provide the necessary 
military assistance for the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico. w·hen 
a group of Cuban separatists arrived in Colombia in 1823 to seek help 
f.er the liberation of their cotmtry, Colombian leaders expressed great 
sympathy for the Cuban cause but made clear to them that the liberation 
of Peru took precedence over the Caribbean. Bolivar pr.orilised, hmvever, 
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"to look into the matter'' as soon as the royalists were defeated. 4 
The interest of Bolivar in Caribbean independence had begun eight 
years before while the South American leader was still in Jamaica orga-
nizing the revolutionary struggle. On September 15, 1815, in his fa-
mous letter, ~ Ans\ver 2!_ i: Southern American !£_ i: Gentleman of J ama.i.ca, 
he had expressed his interest in the political future of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico: 
The islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, \ath a combined popu-
lation of perhaps 700,000 to Soo,ooo souls, are the most 
tranquil possessions of the Spaniards, because they are 
not \\>ithin range of contact \'lith the Independents. But 
are not the people of these islands Americans? Are they 
not maltreated? Do they not desire a better life? 5 
This declaration had served to raise the morale and expectations of the 
separatists. After that date, Bolivar emerged, in their view, as the 
principal supporter of Cuban and Puerto Rican independence. 
Although the Spanish American republics had been unable to assist 
the Caribbean revolutionaries with sufficient military aid, their agents 
periodically visited Cuba and Puerto Rico, and corsairs and privateers, 
operating from South and Central American ports, raided Spanish instal-
lations and coastal settlements. Venezuela increased these naval acti-
vities after the fall of Cartagena and continued them throughout the con-
flict.6 
The Spanish retaliated in the spring of 1822, after the United Stat-
es recognized the nC\v republics. General Francisco Morales, the conunan-
der-in-chief of the royalist forces, established a blockade of the Vene-
zuelan coast \'lith the help of Spanish privateers from Puerto Rico. The 
Spanish vessels raided neutral ships going to Venezuela and Colombia. 
Their activities became .so harmful to the ivest Indian trade that both 
the United States and Great Britain sent naval forces to protect 
their commerce and suppress the privateers. The American press urged 
the government to use force against the Spaniards and tcl{e Cuba and 
Puerto Rico; President Honroe contemplated a naval blockade of Puerto 
Rican coastal ,.;aters. 7 
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In spite of General Morales' measures, Colombia continued to send 
privateers to raid the '·lest Indies. Under the conunand of Admiral Luis. 
Bri6n, government vessels and licensed privateers operated throughout 
the Florida Keys and the Gulf of Hexico. To increase their efficiency 
Colombia negotiated loans in Great Britain and France for the purchase 
of \varships, the recruitment of seamen, and the training of cre,vs. By 
June, 1823, Colombia had sufficiently increased her naval forces to 
defeat the Spanish bloch:ade and consider an attack on the ivest Indies. 
"The arrival of Harships from England Hould help us carry out the acti-
vities against Cuba and Puerto Rico, 11 lvrote Francisco de Paula Santan-
der, the Vice President of Colombia, on june 21, 1823. In September he 
told Bolivar that he \vas negotiating another loan in Great Britain in 
order to purchase more vessels in the United States. 8 
In Mexico, thirteen ye·ars of \var, confusion, and devastation had 
left the country exhausted and in economic chaos. The extraction of . 
most of the nation's cash reserves and the dilapidation of the silver 
mines crippled the He:xican economy and reduced foreign trade. To\ms, 
villages, and rural plantations destroyed during the 'var could not be 
rehabilitated. Internal political divisions curtailed government effi-
ciency and fostered mismanagement in public affairs. In spite of these 
chaotic conditions, on january 27, 1824, the Hexican Congress met to 
consider, among other things, sending a military expedition to liberate 
Cuba. 1he Congress approved the negotiation of a large loan in Great 
Britain to rebuilt Hexican ·naval forces, a necessary part of any plan 
for an attack on the island. 9 
For the Hexican and Colombian political leaders, the principal 
obstacle to peace and security in the 'vestern Hemisphere had been the 
belligerant actions of the royalist forces that controlled the Carib-
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bean. The liberation of the Spanish Antilles \vas considered to be not . 
only a moral responsibility but also a strategic necessity. Cuba and 
Puerto Rico served as military strongholds of Spanish power in America 
and as staging areas for operations against the mainland. If \var con-
tinued, they \vould remain launching points for the Spanish armies or for 
those of any European nation that desired to help Spain. 
The safeguard and protection of the republican victories in Spanish 
America depended, to a large extent, on the removal of the Spanish me-
nace from the Caribbean. The Spanish West Indies had also become a 
haven and refuge of loyal creoles and peninsulares \·lho had escaped from 
the rebel areas. These people posed a threat to the stability of the 
Spanish American countries; their potential for subversion increased 
lvith the arrival of ne\v Spanish troops in the Caribbean. 10 
In Hexico, Secretary of State Lucas Ala.'!lm considered the Spanish 
presence in Cuba a burden to the Hexican government because it had to 
maintain a large standing army as a security against a hostile attack 
from the llest Indies. Since the flow of reinforcements from Cuba had 
prevented the capture of the last Spanish stronghold in Hexico, the 
fortress of San juan de Ulua, Alaman also considered the Spanish occupa-
tion of Cuba a national dishonor. 11 
'Ihese considerations, therefore, demanded the intervention of the 
Spanish American republics in the political affairs of the Caribbean. 
A\vare of the separatist .movements for independence in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, the ne\·l nations promised to help the revolutionary cause in the 
\vest Indies. In addition to their strategic and military interests, 
moral considerations also influenced their decision. Colombia rea-
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lized that the independence of Spanish America would not be completed 
\vhile Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish colonialism. The 
concept of freedom had been for Bolivar an i~eal encompassing all mat-
ters and all people of the Western Hemisppere. He had expressed those 
views as early as 1816. 12 
To liberate the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, both Hexico and 
Colombia rely principally on creole Cuban and Puerto Rican officers who 
\'lere serving in the revolutionary armies. These officers, lvho had fought 
for the independence of Hexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, longed for the 
opportunity to do the same in the Caribbean. Hany of them were already 
serving as liaison agents between the separatists and the republican 
governments of the mainland. One of them, the Puerto Rican Antonio 
Valero de Bernab~, a commander in the Colombian army and one of the prin-
cipal spokesmen for the separatists, planned one of the earliest attempts 
for a Spanish American invasion of Puerto Rico. 13 
Valero's project called for an expedition from Caracas and La Gua)Ta 
under the command of General Carlos Soublette, one of the best tacticians 
in the Republican army. The military force planned by Valero \'lOuld be 
composed of t\vO infantry battalions totalling 1,500 men, one cavalry unit 
of 500 men, and sufficient \var material to arm additional 4,000 men from 
the separatist forces operating inside Puerto Rico. The invading army 
\'lould be escorted by \·;arships '"'hich, after reaching the island, \'rould 
blockade the landing site. 
The plan envisioned an initial attack upon the northern coast of 
Puerto Rico, follmved by an assault on San Juan by 2,000 men. Valero 
did not expect the Spanish to surrender \vithout a prolonged struggle 
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since the Spanish garrison in San Juan \vas an elite military unit. To 
prevent the reinforcement of the city, therefore, he planned to obs-
truct all roads bet\veen the capital and the rural areas. Another force 
would be sent to the interior to complete the conquest. These plm1s 
could not be implemented because the invasion of Peru took precedence 
in Colombian military strategy. When the Spanish forces \vere finally 
defeated in Ayacucho, Colombian leaders decided to launch a much larger 
invasion than the independent operation planned by VaJ.ero. As a re-
sult, his plans for the invasion of Puerto Rico \·Tere rejected by the 
military leaders of Colombia. 14 
By the middle of 1824, the independence of Colombia .and Hexico had 
been successfully completed. As a rest-tit Hexican and Colombian leaders 
turned their attention to the Caribbean, where the separatists in Cuba 
and Puerto Rico had ren.e,;red their efforts for independence after the 
return of Ferdinand VII~ Confident of a victory over the remaining royal-
ist forces in Peru, Bolivar and Santander planned independent military 
operations in the Caribbean. 
On Hay 10, 1824, Santander informed Bolivar that the 11Cubans and 
Puerto Ricans \vere imploring our protection but that jna.dequate resour-
ces precluded giving them assistance. 1115 Five days later, the Colombian 
Congress approved a resolution grru1ting the ~xecutive authority to orga-
nize an invasion of the Spanish 1i'est Indies "and any other area which 
\vas still in Spanish hands." Since July 10, 1823, the Colombian Senate 
had been secretly considering a request from the Vice President for an 
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invasion of Puerto Hico. The proposal reappeared for discussion du-
ring the legislative sessions of July 19, 21, and 23, 1823, but the 
11 importance of the subject prevented a general agreement at that time.n 
The Senate reconsidered Santander 1 s r·equest on April 17, 1823, and a 
committee in the Chamber of Deputies discussed it confidentially on 
Hay 7 and Hay 14, 1824. On Hay 15 the project \'laS finally approved 
\vith the provision that "all other provinces still controlled by Spain11 
be included in the plan. Using that congressional authority, Santander 
began to prepare a military expedition to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico. 16 
The inclusion of Cuba created a problem for Santander, since the 
original plan had only considered Puerto Rican independence. 1vhile 
Puerto Rico played a predominant part in Santander's plans, Cuba, until 
the beginning of 1825, appeared to be less important for Colombian 
Caribbean designs. Bolivar,_ Santander, and a great number of other 
South American creoles had the same racial prejudices about the Cuban 
people that the Southern senators of the United States Congress had 
sho'm during their discussion of Cuban independence. Colombian concern 
for a slave insurrection in Cuba paralleled the racial beliefs of Adams, 
Clay, Jefferson, ru1d other North American statesmen and politicians. 17 
To achieve the purposes of the congressional resolution and the 
plans concerning the liberation of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, 
Santander ordered a reorganization of the Colombian naval forces. Car-
los Soublette, the Secretary for Harine Affairs, presented a detailed 
project to the Congress concerning the creation of a 1nodern, more effi-
cient navy. As part of the reorganization, Santander ordered nineteen 
of the ti't'enty-three vessels that comprised the national navy into the 
Caribberu1. Cartagena became the center for the proposed operation, and 
202 
soon a naval squadron of one shiP-of-the-line of 74 guns, a frigate of 
44, three corvettes, two brigantines, and tivo sloops of war assembled 
there for provisioning and refitting. The rest of the available forces 
\"lere placed under the command of Lino de Clemente and Antonio Beluche, 
the two most experienced naval officers in Colombia. As part of the 
naval preparations, Santander petitioned the Congress for authority to 
purchase ne\v and better \varships, since many of the vessels available 
18 \vere obsolete or poorly armed. 
Using funds from a British loan, Colombia purchased the ship--of-
the line Libertador, the brigantine IndeEendencia, the frigates Col om-
lli and Cundinamarca, the corvette Bolivar, and t\velve gunboats. The 
government bought additional warships in SiYeden and Great Britain and 
ordered the construction of modern frigates in the United States. Carta-
gena received authority for the construction of repair facilities and 
the creation of a naval school. Colombian agents recruited officers and 
cre\vmen in foreign countries, since the nation did not have adequate 
personnel to operate the vessels that had been prtrchased in Europe and 
the United States. The preparation of the Caribbean expedition ivas of 
such magnitude that t\vo years later it caused a financial crisis and a 
full investigation into Santander's political activities. At that time, 
he \'las accused of expending needed financial resources in the expedition 
instead of using the funds for national social improvements. 19 
On June 6, 1825, Sant~1der told Bolivar about the military prepa-
rations: 
I have in my hands a secret project to blockade Havana. It 
has three principal purposes: (1) to assault, in coopera-
tion with the Hexican forces, San juan de Ulua, (2) to res-
trict the Spaniards in such a \·my that they stop their hos-
tile operations against our ports, and (3) to contribute to 
the glory and reputation of Colombia. 
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Santander also explained to Bolivar that 11he could not mount a full 
scale expedition at that time because for that project the navy needed 
the additional \varships that had been purchased and paid for in Europe. 11 
"\vith those- vessels," he continued, "Colombia 'lvill have the strongest 
fleet in the Caribbean. At that· time ive \·rill consider an invasion of 
Puerto Rico. have been authorized by Congress to do everything.n20 
The military campaign in Peru prevented Bolivar 1 s involvement in 
the'military plans of Santander. After the battle of Ayacucho, hmvever, 
Bolivar recognized the necessity of removing the royalist forces from 
the Caribbean. On December 24, 1824, he threatened to invade the islands 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico \vithout 'lvaiting for the reorganization of the 
navy. On that day he wrote Santander, 11I think it is advisable that the 
Colombian government make Spain understand t~1at if she does not make 
peace soon, the same troops \vill go straight to Havana and Puerto Ri.co. n21 
By 1825 other Colombian leaders '\vere also planning the liberation 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico. On April 9, 1825, Harshall jos~ Antonio Sucre, 
the victor at Ayacucho, informed Soublette that he had 7,000 men, 11\vith-
out those of Valero, 11 that ·could be used for an invasion of Cuba, if pro-
tected by adequate naval forces. 111 understand, 11 wrote Sucre, 11 that the 
patriotic fervor in Cuba is very high and they are ready to join us, so 
victory will not be difficult. 11 Four months later, Sucre repeated the 
offer to Bolivar. 11'\ve have nmv received the Pichincha Battalion, and I 
believe that these men placed inside Cuba \'lill give America and Colombia 
b ill . . l . h" . ,,22 a r 1ru1t page 111 t1e1r 1stor1es. 
By the end of 1825, Smtander observed that .11 too many unemployed 
troops in Venezuela could be dangerous to the stability of Grm Colombia. 11 
Three years earlier, General Santiago Hontilla had informed Santander 
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about the nnecessity of entertaining the thousands of unemployed sol.':" 
diers v1ho roved across the northern provinces." Hont-illa had suggest-
ed using them in an expedition against Puerto Rico, ttsince it is ne-
cessary for our government to remove that Spanish bastion from the 
Caribbean." nr will be quite happy to lead such an expedition," he 
added, ttbut I believe that General P~ez could do a better job if you 
provide the necessary assistance. 11 Since General jos6 Antonio P~ez 
Has the principal Venezuelan caudillo vlho could lead a separatist move-
ment against Gran Colombia, Santander reconsidered Hontilla' s earlier 
suggestion. As a result on August 30, 1825, Bolivar offered P~ez the 
command of an expedition to liberate the Spanish lvest Indies. Bolivar 
also told Santander to utilize the troops that \vere stationed in Vene-
zuela for the maritime expedition. 23 
As part of the plans for extending the \var to the Caribbean, Boli-
var ordered General Francisco Rodriguez del Taro to transfer 1,600 men 
from the junin anC. the Ayacucho battalions to Panama. 24 On October, 
1825, he also ordered General Salam in Peru to send 1,400 men to Panam~, 
imcluding the Callao Battalion under the command of Harshall Valero. 
These ,particular units had been selected because they were accustomed to 
the tropical conditions of the Caribbean \vhich 1vere entirely different 
from the Andean battlegrounds. These units \vere later transferred to 
Cartagena, Turbaco, Valencia, and Caracas near the Caribbean in order 
to accustom them to the \varm climate of the region. 25 
Undoubtedly, the Venezuelan and Ne\v Granadan armies \vere the most 
experienced fighting units in America at that time; they could have 
easily defeated the Spanish forces in the w·est Indies. As it has been 
already indicated,-before trueing ·any action in the Caribbean Bolivar 
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and the Colombian leaders wanted to lmmv the reaction of Great Britain 
and France. In 1825 a French squadron visited the Caribbean to convoy 
Spanish reinforcements to Cuba and Puerto Rico. Bolivar believed that 
those vessels might oppose Colombian efforts in the Caribbean. On Octo-
ber 13, 1825, he wrote that 11this incident reveals that the French gov-
ernment is in Buonaparte \vith the Spaniards in their usual treacherous · 
fashion. 1127 Fearing an attack on Cartagena by either the French or the 
Spaniards, Bolivar ordered more troops to the north. ,,,1hen the attack 
failed to materialize, he decided to leave these reinforcements in Ve-
nezuela and Colombia to replace the .forces that had been selected for 
service in the Caribbean. The French military designs further convinced 
Bolivar that the Spaniards had to be expelled from Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
Santander smv the French intervention in the Caribbean as an opportunity 
to use his forces in the lvest Indies \vithout fear or suspecion, or as a 
28 mean 11 of providing a meaningful occupation to our army and navy. 11 
In France, Colonel Jose M. Lanz asked the French government if it 
intended to provide soldiers for the defense of the Spanish colonies, 
and if it considered opposing the Colombian invasion of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. Since the Polignac Memorandum of October, 1823, restricted French 
interference in the Caribbean, France replied that it had no intentions 
of joining the struggle. 11Lanz received assurances from Villele CJean 
Baptiste Guillaume, Count de Villele, President of the Council of Hinis-
tersJ that France \vill not participate in the conflict, 11 Santander wrote 
to General Mariano Hontilla. 29 
Concerning Colombian privateers, hO\vever, France informed the Colom-
bian representative that 11 she \vould seize any vessel that carried artil-
lery, if the size of its crew should be unduly ~arge in proportion to 
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its tonnage, or if three fourth of the crew· should not be composed of 
mariners belonging to the country where the ship had been fitted out. 11 
Thus France indirectly threatened to stop Colombia's invasion of the 
Caribbean by treating her national vessels as privateers. It cannot 
be doubted that the interests of France would be greatly promoted by 
imitating the policy of the United States and Great Britain in relation 
to the status quo. The expenses of the war in Spain and the additional 
increase to the public debt by the law of compensation to the emmigrants 
of the Napoleonic conflict had place the French financial system in 
jeopardy. The government, therefore, also wanted to increase its trade 
to resolve its serious financial difficulties. To accomplish that pur-
pose, it \vas necessary that France remained at peace, especially in the 
lvestern Hemisphere, \vhere she planned to increase her trade. 30 
Hexico had also promised to assist the Cuban revolutionary exiles 
in achieving their illdependence. In October 21, 1823, Josll A. Torrens, 
the Hexican representative in the United States, informed his government 
that Colombia was planning to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico. According 
to Torrens, the Colombians 11had an adequate navy and 30,000 men that 
they could use for that purpose." He also expressed the belief that if 
Hexico joined Colombia, they could undertake together an enterprise that 
\vould S!lccessfully liberate Cuba. 31 On these recommendations, Hexican 
General Guadalupe Victoria recommended to the Senate the dispatching of 
General Anastasio Bustamante to Colombia \vith a proposal for an unified 
invasion of Cuba. 32 
At the beginning of 1824, the Hexican Congress met to consider, 
among other things, a request from General Victoria for an expedition to 
Cuba. 33 The absence of an adequate navy and the shortage of funds to 
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finance the proposed expedtion precluded a congressional decision 
on Cuba. British Connnissioner Patrick Hackie, on the other hand, told 
Victoria that "England also \vanted complete freedom of Cuba, but it 
ld . · b ~ · 1134 \vou not accept 1ts occupat1on y a rore1gn pmver. Lucas Alaman, 
the Secretary of State, was skeptical about British and Colombipn 
intentions concerning Cuba. "As soon as the war in Peru is over, 11 he 
wrote, "Bolivar \YOuld dedicate all his energies to the liberation of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. n35 The Secretary of State, ho,vever, believed 
that Colombia desired the annexation of the Spanish islands. "Under 
these circtunstances, 11 \vTote Alamful to Hichelena, 11it will be necessary 
that Mexico proceed ahead of Colombia to make Cuba an independent state 
and prevent its annexation by another pmver. n36 
In March, 1825, Hichelena approached the British government to 
obtain its vie1vs concerning an expedition to liberate Cuba. He stated 
that Spain \vas unable to control the island and that it could be expect-
ed that 11 the spirit of liberalism there \vould soon proclaim its indepen-
dence.1137 The following month, Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna, the mili-
tary governor of Yucatan, organized an expedition to invade Cuba \vi thout 
the authority of the central goverrunent. His complicity in the scheme 
caused his removal from office and the discovery of the Mexi.can intent-
ions tmvard the Caribbean. u38 
In Jtme, 1825, The Nexican government received .from Colombia the 
first official proposals for a joint invasion of. Cuba. The Mexican Con-
gress discussed the recommendation in a secret session, but it resolved 
that the enterprise could not be accomplished at that time. It appears 
that Mexico would have preferred to undertake the expedition \vithout 
the aid of Colombia. The invasion of Cuba was subsequently discussed 
in the secret sessions of the Chamber of Deputies, but the government 
realized that it had to rebuild its naval forces before any attack on 
the \vest Indies. 39 
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In July the Hexican government negotiated loans lvith Barckay, Her-
ring and Company, a British firm, to buy ships and armaments. 'IWo months 
later, Hichelena began to send modern weapons to Hexico; on September 
20, 1825, he returned,to his country in a forty-four gun frigate that 
had been purchased in Denmark and equipped in Great Dri tain. 40 'I'ivo 
other '"'arships, the Guerrero and the Bravo, arrived afterwards; the gov-
erment increased its naval force to eleven ships. During this time, the 
Aguila Hexicana applauded the decision to increase the navy. "Soon ,.,e 
'"ill have one of the strongest naval contingents in the Caribbean, 11 pro-
claimed the newspaper, "and ,.,ith the union of Cuba to our Federation w-e 
will have the most important defense force in the hemisphere. 1141 
The plans for the invasion of Cuba began to materialize in the fall 
of 1825. President Victoria authorized the formation of the Junta ~-
motora de la Libertad de Cuba, composed of Cuban exiles and Hexican vol-
unteers. Shorty after its formation, this group expanded to include the 
principal officers of the Mexican army and navy and the most distinguish-
ed members of both houses of Congress. Similar groups were organized in 
4'' Colombia and Venezuela by Cuban and Puerto Rican separatists. ~ The 
Junta organized in Hexico proposed sending agents to Great Britain and 
the United States. Among the plans sponsored by the Cuban exiles was 
the landing of a revolutionary army of 2,000 men in Oriente Province. 
At that time Poinsett 'vrote to Clayto explain that the Mexican Congress 
had to consent first to any such proposal. 11 It appears to me, 11 ,.,rrote 
Poinsett, 
••• that the attempt vvill fail and produce only the most 
disastrous consequences. i'ihat I most dread is that the 
blacks may be armed and used as au.'Ci.liaries by· one or both 
parties. I .;:un somm;rhat afraid too that an ineffectual 
attempt on the i.sland of Cuba may induce Spain to cede it 
to France. This government does not lmo\v that I am acqui-
ented \·lith their designs and I cannot therefore speak 
openly on the subject but I shall endeavor to mru\e them 
sensible to the vastness of the attempt they meditate. 43 
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After the Spanish surrender of the Castle of San Juan de Ulua, the 
Hexican Cabinet proposed an expedition against Cuba before the erid of the 
year. The Chamber of Deputies debated the proposal for tvlO days in se-
cret sessions, and on December 1, 1825, the proposition was approved 
t\venty-four votes to t\venty•t\vo. Poinsett described these proceedings 
as follmvs: 
The minority \·las not opposed to the spirit of the report 
of the Committee but proposed to strike out the \vords 
1 at present. 1 Of the two secretaries \vho took part on 
the debate to sustain the proposition, the Secretary of 
Har urged the necessity of getting rid of at least six 
thousand men ancl a number of officers \vhose presence he 
considered dangerous to the liberties and peace of the 
republic. Fortunately, the House was aware of the still 
greater danger of collecting at one spot so large a 
force of the character described by the secretary and of 
the imminent risk that 1vould attend either their success 
or defeat. 44 
Thus it appears that both Hexico and Colombia desired to conduct a mil-
itary operation li1 the Caribbean not only to· emancipate Cuba and Puerto 
Rico but also as a precautionary measure for the peace and stability of 
the republics. 
Contrary to the belief held in the United States about a joint oper-
ation, it seems that Mexico and Colombia \vere organizing separate expe-
ditions. In spite of that problem, both nations informed the other of 
their own preparations. From the United States, Obreg6n \vrote to the 
Hexican Foreign Hinister that agents of Colombia had informed him that 
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the government intended to use all the nation's vessels and nine thou-
sand men that \vcre being assembled at Cartagena. "I have confirmed those 
reports, n \vrote Obreg6n, 11 and they begin to alarm this country Cthe 
United StatesJ. ,AS 
To smnmarize, by the end of 1825 seven nations \·Jere involved in 
the affairs of the Caribbean. The United States, Great Britain, and 
France each feared the plans of Colombia and Hexico for the liberation 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico because they would have disrupted the status 
quo. Russia was drawn in by the United States because, in spite of their 
differences, relations betw·een the t\vO countries had always been on cor-
dial terms, and the Tzar \vas a friend of Spain. Hcxico and Colombia 
\vere interested in the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico for a mul-
ti tude of reasons. Spain 1 s policy in the Caribbean \vas a matter of pride 
and stubborness, since she \vantcd to retain a foothold in the Ne\'l \vorld. 
While the diplomacy of the period reflected a clash of forces and in-
terests, the nations involved concealed their intentions and objectives. 
As a result, the tlu·cat of \var lingered over the Caribbec..n for many years, 
threatening the status quo and the stability of the area. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE STATUS QUO AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA 
AND PUERTO RICO 
'Ihe projected intervention of Hexico and Colombia in the political 
affairs of the Caribbean had serious implications for the status quo~ 
'Ihe United States government did not welcome the rumors or the official 
reports of the proposed invasion. The expedition threatened the com-
I 
pratti..s;} that had been arranged with Great· Britain and France in 1823. 
While the United States had been aware of the intentions of the Spanish 
American republics as early as 18241 and had conducted extensive diplomat-
ic efforts to prevent the fulfillment of the Spanish American plans, it 
was clear that by the middle of 1825, the problem was reaching a criti-
cal leYel. The combined revolutionary forces of Hexico and Colombia, 
assisted by the separatists, threatened to end Spanish rule in the Carib-
bean. The intervention of these powers on the lvest Indies, according to 
Harold W. Temperley, "meant not only war but an invitation to slaves to 
rise against their masters, and the flame of a successful Black revolt 
might easily spread from Cuba to Georgia and Virginia. 111 The government 
of Colombia had alre-ady prepared a_ proclamation emancipating the black 
slaves in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 2 
TI1e ti1reat of political turmoil in the Caribbean became a serious 
matter for many United States statesmen. Later, during the debates for 
the nomination of American representatives to the Congress of Panama, 
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Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri justified American intervention 
in the Caribbean in 1825 by saying that the South could not "allow the 
principle of uni.versal emancipation to be called into activity in a sit-
uation where its contagion would be dangerous to our quiet and safety. n3 
john Randolph, a senator from Virginia, supported the same position, 
fearing that the emancipation proclamations coming from the new re-
publics would arouse and inflame the passions of the Southern slaves and 
eventually J,ead to revolts. in the United States. Randolph described 
Hexico and Colombia as being instigators of domestic slave rebellions. 
He declared that an invasion of the West Indies would invariably lead 
to destruction and mass bloodshed among blacks and whites.4 
Other congressional representatives had opposed the Spanish American 
plans for the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico because of the dan-
ger involved in the emancipation of the slaves. As Senator Benton in-
dicated: 
When we look to the situation of those islands, to the com-
mand position they occupy with reference to the commerce of 
the lvest Indies, we cannot be indiferent to a change in their 
justaposition to a portion of the Union where slavery exists; 
that the proposed change is to be effected by a people whose 
fundamental maxim it is that he who would tolerate slavery 
is unworthy to be free; that the principle of universal eman-
cipation must march in the van of the invading forces; • • • 
they are swallowed up in magnitude of the dangers 'vith which 
we are menaced ••• with a due regard to the safety of the 
Southern states, can you suffer these islands to pass into 
the hands of buccaneers drunk with their new-born freedom? 
Cuba and Puerto Rico must remain as they are. 5 
The Southern members of Congress had viewed the independence of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico as a threat to the peace and security of the South. 
TI1ese individuals believed that after independence, the large black 
population of Cuba would create a black republic similar to Haiti. The 
new republic, ti1erefore, would be entitled to send black or mulatto 
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ambassadors and consuls to the United States to 11 parade. through our 
country and establish themselves in our cities. 116 Thi.s situation \vould 
have given slaves in the United States an example of the rights \~1ich 
awaited them if they did lilcewise and revolted against their masters. 
According to Senator Benton, this danger had to be prevented by the 
United States. 
The Hexican and Colombian plans for a military expedition to block-
ade Havana, destroy the Spanish fleet, emancipate the slaves, and pro-
claim Cuban and Puerto Rican independence, could not be kept secret. 
The recruitment of seamen, the arrival of ~~arships to Cartagena and Vera-
cruz, the construction of repair facilities in Cartagena, and the con-
gresional debates, both in the United States and in the Spanish American 
republics, could not be concealed from the press. In Hexico, the abor-
tive plans of General Santa Anna for an expedition to Cuba and the acti-
vities of the Cuban exiles soon became the subject of political de 
debates in the national capital. On January 2, 1825, the Gaceta Diaria 
de Hexico commented editorially: 
Could the Antilles be kept European v1hen they are located 
at the entrance of the \'!estern Hemisphere? In September, 
\~e \fill have a shiP-of-the line of 80 guns, tHo frigates 
of 40, and two brigantines. Then, Havana, \·Till be free 
in a year. Hhen ten ;flags are ready to cover the Carib-
bean, \~hat force could prevent it:? 7 
In Philadelphia, the NationalGazette published a letter from a mem-
ber of the Colombian navy who asserted that 11 ten thousand men and a 
8 strong squadron '"ere ready to liberate Cuba." Niles' \veekly Register 
predicted that the "expedition ~~ill be easily accomplished since the 
people of the islands are prepared to give a favorable reception to the 
invasion. 11 Strongly opposing the operation, the nm~spaper commented: 
There is every reason to believe that Hexico and Colom-
bia are preparing a very formidable expedition to divest 
Spai.n of Cuba, which '"'e suppose, 1vill be easily accom-:-
plished. nut if the expedition shall be resisted, ~1d 
the island become a theatre for military operations • • • 
the excess of the colored population will take advantage, 
and the scenes that \vere acted in Haiti will be reacted 
in Cuba. The present contemplated expedition may only 
hasten events that must happen. 9 
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In subsequent editorial commentaries, both the National Gazette and 
Niles' Feekly Eegister demanded American intervention in the Caribbean. 
Prior to these demands, the Government of the United States had already 
taken the necessary steps to discourage Hexico and Colombia from attempt-
ing an invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico. On Harch 26, 1825, Clay instruct-
ed Joel Roberts Poinsett, the United States Hinister to Hexico, to in-
form the Hexican government that 11\v'hile the United States have no de-
sire to aggrandize themselves by the acquisition of Cuba, n Hexico should 
lm01v 11 that if that island is to be made a dependency of any one of the 
American states, it is impossible not to allmv that the la\v of its po-
sition proclaims that it should be attached to the United States. rr 10 
In his message to Poinsett, Clay also stated: 
If the Har be indefinitely protacted, to 1vhat object will 
the arms of the ne\v Governments be directed? It is not 
unlikely that they may be turned upon the conquest of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, and \vith that vie,.,., a combined ope-
ration will be concerted between those of Colombia and 
Hexico. The United States cannot remain indifferent to 
such a movement ••• 1ne United States could not see 
the dominion Cof Cuba and Puerto RicoJ passing either 
to Hexico or Colombia \vithout some apprehension of the 
future •••. What the President, ho\·rever, directs you 
to do is to keep a vigilant attention upon every move-
ment tmvards Cuba, to ascertain the designs of J.!exico 
in. regard to it, and to put him, early, in full posses-
sion of every pt.rrpose of the Hexican government relative 
to it. And you nre authorized, if, in the progress of 
events it should become necessary, to disclose frankly 
the feelings and the interests as here develop, \·Thich 
the people of the United States cherish in respect to 
that island. 11 
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THo days later, Poinsett \l'arned Hexico that the United States \vould not 
pennit any attempt to seize the island of Cuba. At that time the United 
States believed that neither Colombia nor HE>..xico had the naval strenght 
to protect Cuba and Puerto Rico after independence. The military \veal\:-
nesses of these nations, therefore, would had made possible the seizure 
of the islands by Great Britian or Fr-ance. 
In a detailed analysis justifying the American position in the 
Caribbean and the necessity of preserving the status quo, Clay used the 
Honroe Doctrine for the first time by directing Poinsett to inform the 
Hexican government that the United States haino intentions of disturbing 
tP.e colonial possesions of Spain. But he also indicated 11that any attempt 
to establish new ones in an area open to the enterprise and commerce of 
all Americans" without the consent of the United States would not be 
tolerated. 12 
Perhaps the most important reason \vhy the United States desired to 
control the Caribbean at that time was to provide security to a water-
\'lay being plrumed across Central America. On April 18, 1825, Clay wrote 
to Antonio Jos~ Cafiaz, the Envoy from the United Provinces of Central 
America, empressing his approval for such a plan. 11The Unites States, 11 
\vrote Clay, 11will cooperate in promoting the or:ening of a Canal through 
the Province of Nicaragua • • • • The idea has long been conceived and 
the evidence tends to shOiv the superiority and advantages of the area 
\vhich traverse the Province of Nicaragua. {"The United StatesJ have 
settled the question in favor of that route. 1113 
Colombia \vas similarly \varned to keep hands _off the Spanish posses-
sions in the Caribbea.11. The United States also endeavored to bring in-
direct pressure on Spain through the influence of Great Britain, France, 
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and Russia, to terminate the Spanish American conflict. By making 
peace in the Western Hemisphere, the UILited States \vou.ld have prevented 
the invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Secretary of State began 1·1ith 
Russia, the pmoJer whose influence had for more than a decade been do-
minant in the councils of the reactionary states. 14 The United States 
appealed to the Tzar 1 s sense of justice and humanitarianism to convince 
Spain to end the Spanish American \var. He attempted to persuade Russia 
that Spain Has in imminent danger of losing Cuba and Puerto Rico unless 
she sacrificed her pride and make peace. In spite of the efforts of 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia, Spain did not 
recognize the Spanish American republics at that time. 15 
On October 3, 1825, Clay \\Tote to President Adams concerning Cuba. 
He told the President that "matters are fast hastening to a crisis in 
Cuba and that shortly there will be an explosion. 1116 It appeared that 
the Cuban plantation 0\mers feared Colombia's black troops and that they 
preferred Hexican intervention. Clay mentioned that he had been inform-
ed that 11 as soon as the Hexican squadron appear, a revolution will begin 
in the island to throv1 off the Spanish regime. 11 He suggested that the 
United States send immediately a confidential agent to Cuba to determine 
the extent of the planned insurrection. President Adams, after some con-
sideration, approved Clay's request. 17 
On December 7, 1825, Clay directed 'Ihomas B. Robertson to go to 
Havana as a confidential agent of the United States. By that time, the 
confusing and chaotic conditions in the Caribbean had reached a danger-
ou:s level. Clay told Robertson to provide 11by · the most rapid means" 
information on the political conditions prevailing on the island, the 
views of the Cubans in regard to Spain, the extent of the independence 
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movement, the ability of Spain to resist an armed attack, and the 
creoles vie\vS concerning annexation to the United States. "You \vill 
keep yourself aloof, 11 directed Clay, 11 and under no circumstances you 
should give stimulus or countenance to insurrectionary movements, if 
such be contemplated. 1118 Concerning American direct involvement in the 
political affairs of Cuba, Clay stated: 
With reference to any commotions, either meditated or 
spontaneous, that may arise, and they should happ~n to 
be of a character, or take a turn, vhich \·rould require .. 
of the United States, from the relations in which they 
stand to that island, to interpose their pmver, it \vill 
then be time enough for the GoverTh~ent here to consider 
and decide the nature of their intervention that the 
exigency demands. 19 
Judge Thomas B. Robertson of Louisiana Has not the type of man for a 
mission of that nature. A quiet and unassuming individual \vho preferred 
the surrounding of a court room to international intrigue, he could not 
become the confidential agent that Clay expected. As a result, he de-
clined the mission, in spite of the fact that the captain-general of 
Cuba, General Dionisio Vives,,vas a personal friend of President Adams. 
On December 12, 1825, the Secretary of State received a distres-
sing report concerning Colombian preparations in Cartagena. According 
to information sent by Richard C. Anderson, the United States Minister 
to Colombia, 11 there is manifestly a naval expedition fitting out by this 
republic. n20 An invasion, according to Anderson, \vas being organized 
in Cartagena and there was no doubt about the destination of the expe-
dition. 11 There is now collected in this port almost all the naval forces 
of the republic, 11 \\TOte the American minister. 
Anderson sent to Clay a detailed information, "of some precision, 11 
concerning the number of vessels and their armament. According to him, 
·all the vessels were \veil armed and headed by English and North American 
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officers, but insufficently manned, since the government had great 
difficulty in acquiring adequate and experienced seamen. 21 TI1e report 
also made reference to the return of Colombian troops from Peru and the 
arrival of transports from Panam~. Evaluating Colombian ability to launch 
an expedition, Anderson \vrote: 
TI1e Ceres is a frigate mounting forty guns and is a remark-
able fine vessel. 'Ihere is also a SHcdish frigate \vith a 
foreign crew ready for action but I do not knmv the terms 
under \vhich the cre\v is to act. 'Ihe I3_2Yaca_, of twenty:...two 
guns is also a fine ship and the Venezuela is a frigate 
of forty guns that was formely an East Indiaman. 22 
Three day~ later, Clay received a report from Robert Tillotson, the 
Collector of the Port of Ne\v York, 11 about a ship pierced for 64 guns, 
called the America del ~ that sailed with complete armament on board11 
for Cartagena. 23 The confirmation of the Colombian preparations for the 
invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico induced the Secretary of State to re-
quest from Hexico and Colombia, in the 11interest of peace, 11 a suspension 
of the expedition. On December 20, 1825, Clay advised the foreign min-
isters of both countries that Russia had trucen the subject of peace in 
America under advisement. Under those circrunstances 
• • • the President believes that a suspension, for a limit-
ed time, of the sailing of the expedition against Cuba and 
Puerto Rico, which is understood to be fitting out at Carta-
gena, or of any ot!1er expedition \vhich may be contemplated 
against either if those islands, by Colombia or Hexico, 
lvould be salutatory influence on the great \vork of peace. 24 
lJhile the notes were conciliatory in nature and written in diplo-
matic language, their meaning \vas clear: the United States intended to 
stop the plans of Hexico and Colombia. Clay 1 s note also suggested that 
the suspension of the expedition \'I'Ould prevent both the intervention of 
Great Britain and France in the affairs of the Caribbean and the danger 
of a conflict of interests bet\veen the United States and the Spanish 
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American republics. "It would also pospone, if not forever render un-
necessary," Clay also \vrote, 11 all consideration \vhich· other po\vers may, 
by an irresistable sense of their essential interests, be called upon 
to entertain of their duties, in the event of the contemplated invasion 
of those islands, and of other contingencies which may accompany or 
follou it. 1125 
Eight months earlier, the Secretary of State had indicated in a 
diplomatic note to Alexander Everett, the United States Hinister to 
Spain, that the nation '"as ready to go to l'lar to prevent an invasion of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. "The United States," said Clay, "could not be an 
indifferent spectator11if ~·Iexico and Colombia extended their conflict 
lvith Spain to the Caribbean. 11 'Ihe possible contingency of such a pro-
tracted Har," added Clay, "might bring upon the government of the Unit-
ed States duties and obligations which, hm1rever painful it should E!' 
they might.n..£1: be ~ liberty !£ decline. 11 In other words, the United Stat-
es \'las ready to go to vrar against Hexico and Colombia to maintain the 
status quo in the Caribbean. 26 
On February 11, 1826, the American Hillister to Russia made it clear 
to the Russian government that the United States was considering inter-
vention in the Hest Indies.Henry Hiddleton informed Count Nesselrode that 
in case of the invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States \all 
be compelled to interfere in the Caribbean. He based his position on 
the fact that six days after the diplomatic exchange between Clay and 
the ministers of Nexico and Colombia, the Secretary of State had informed 
him that the Government of the United States might use its )}0\ver to pre-
vent a \var against the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. 
1he Secretary of State attempted to convince the Spru1ish American 
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countries that suspension of the attack \vould have afforded sufficient 
time for the United States to ascertain Spain's plans in regard to the 
conflict in Spanish America and would have provided the Emperor of Rus-
sia \vith the necessary support to convince Spain of the futility of the 
conflict. The Hexican and Colombian governments, exhausted by years 
of war, unmvare of the extent of Russia and the United States' involve-
ment in the peace negotiations, and afraid of an armed conflict with the 
United States, posponed their plans for the invasion. 27 
The United States government \vas certain that an attack to Cuba 
and Puerto Rico by the armies of the Spanish American republics, SUP-
ported by the separatists, would had been successful. In a letter to 
the United States Hinister in Russia, Clay had indicated the certainty 
of victory. 
The success of the enterprise is, by no means, improbable. 
Th.eir [1·1exico and Colombia' sJ proximity to the islands, 
and their armies being perfectly acclimated will give to 
the united efforts of the two republics great advantages. 
And, if with these be taken into the estimate, the import-
ant and \vell lmovm fact that a large portion of the in-
habitants of these Islands Lthe separatistsJ is predis-
posed to a separation from Spain, and would form a pmver-
ful auxiliary of the Republican armies, their success be-
comes almost certain. 28 --
The Spanish colonial government in Cuba ru1d Puerto Rico had also 
recognized that possibility and the inevitability of defeat. Two days 
before Clay's communication to the United States Hillister in Russia, the 
Hexican government received information that the Cuban slaveO\mers had 
urgently requested reinforcements from Spain to defend the island. Due 
to the fear of invasion, the Ayuntamiento de la Habana had even suggest-
ed to Spain the immediate recognition of the Spanish American republics 
as theonly possible way to prevent ru1 invasion of Cuba. 29 
227 
In 1825 the situation in Cuba and Puerto Rico had become extremely 
dangerous for Spain. American, Europeru1s, and creoles residing there, 
according to an American consular agent residing in Havana, "look for-
ward, some \vith joy, and others 1vith fear, to an invasion of the islands. n30 
In Puerto Rico, Governor De la Torre declared an emergency, intensified 
defense efforts, alerted all the military, forces on the islru1d, and even 
retained 1,300 men from a military contingent which was going to Cuba. 31 
An American businessman wrote to Clay from Santiago de Cuba that the 
principal competition for trade was bet,veen France and the United States, 
but that the United States should demand most favorable nation treatment. 
Concerning the threat of invasion, he suggested that the United States 
linmediately send military forces to Cuba to protect American citizens 
and property in Havana.32 
Before the Colombian and Hexican ministers received the official re-
quest from the Secretary of State for a cancellation of the expedition, 
the United States had considered military intervention in Cuba to prevent 
the Spanish American attack. Commodore David R. Porter, the commander of 
the Caribbean naval squadron, had been directed to increase his surveil-
lance of the Cuban and Puerto Rican coasts and to report any suspected 
movement of foreign vessels in the area. In spite of the fact that the 
South American navies had become better orgrulized and the distinction 
bet,veen legitimate privateering and piracy \vas now clearer, Commodore 
Porter was authorized to lru1d in unpopulated areas to pursue privateers 
when necessary. President Honroe even considered a naval blockade of the 
Spanish \Vest Indies to protect American interests. In 1825 he requested 
congressional authority to use force, "according to his ,discretion and 
as circumstance may imperiously require, 11 in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 33 
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On August 27, 1825, the Florida Intelligencer reported the establishment 
of a naval depot at Pensacola for the 'vest Indian squadron. "'Ihe dan-
ger," said the newspaper, "would probably awake the general government 
to the importance of fortifying the sea coast." 34 
The projected invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico also caused consider-
able alarm in Great Britain. Canning saH the extension of the Spanish 
American conflict to the Caribbean as a dangerous development that \¥ould 
serve as a pretext for United States intervention in Cuba. For Great 
Britain the real danger \vas not an invasion of Cuba by Hexico or Colom -
bia but the seizure of the island by the United States to prevent such 
an attempt. The proximity of the United States to Cuba and Puerto Rico 
created for Great Britain a difficult strategic problem since the nation 
could not prevent an American invasion of ~~e Spanish 1vest Indies. 35 
Since November, 1824, Great Britain had been mvare of the plans of 
the Spanish American republics for the emancipation of the Spanish col-
onies. In a conference 'rrith jos~ Hariano Hichelena on November 30, 1824, 
Canning inquired about the condition of the Hexican and Colombian na-
vies and the plans for the invasion of the Spanish islands. He asked 
.. 
Hichelena if there ,.;ere any defense pacts or agreements betHeen Hexico 
and the Spanish American republics, the extent of those agreements, and 
if they included exclusions or concessions to foreign powers. He remind-
ed Hichelena of the large number of blacks in Cuba and the danger of 
a racial confrontation on that island. 36 . 
On June 17, 1825, Canning told the Hexican representative that 
Hexico \·ms at liberty to act as she felt necessary. He also indicated 
that Great Britain had no objection to the transfer of Cuba to Hexico, 
but that she \vould not accept an American or French seizure of the 
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islands. 37 Four days later, Catming repeated the same vievs to Leve-
son-Gover Granville, the British Hinister to France: 11Ue sincerely \ash 
her ["cubaJ to remain 1'lith the Hother Country. Next to that I wish 
her independent, either singly or in connection with Hexico, but \vhat 
cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime Po\ver should get pos-
session of her. u38 Canning "certainly never had any notion of rumex-
ing Cuba for England, but he desired to maintain the status quo.H 39 
Great Britain did not oppose the projected invasion. Canning had 
no desire to associate Great Britain \vith the Arnerican objective because 
he did not vrant to alienate the Spanish American countries. He also 
considered the seizure of Cuba or Puerto Rico by the Spanish American 
countries as insignificant to British. interests in the Caribbean. For 
Canning, the independence of Cuba or Puerto Rico \vould not have affected 
the status quo because these nations were poor dependencies and sooner 
or later they too \lauld have become client-states of Great Britain, since 
that nation 1vas regarded as the European country most important to the 
security, commerce, and prosperity of the Spanish American republics.4° 
In spite of the apparent neutral rtttitude of Great Britain, the British 
Foreign Secretary hoped that the plans of the Spanish American republics 
\vould not succeed, and his diplomacy \vas subtly directed toward that 
end.4l 
To protect the status quo in the Caribbean, in 1824 Great Britain 
offered to guarantee Spain's continued possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
on the condition that the Sp?~sh government recognized the independence 
of the Spanish American repiblics. 42 At that time, Canning, according 
to Harold'"· v. Temperley, followed closely "his t\'lin pillars of policy 
- non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and preservation 
230 
so far as possible, of their existing territorial integrity against 
external attack. 11 But \vhen Spain refused t accept the suggestion, 
Great Britain decided that the status quo could only be guaranteed by 
the cessation of hostilities in Spanish America.43 
In 1825 Great Britain asked United States and France to sign.an 
agreement disclaiming any desires of annexation in the Spanish \vest 
Indies. Canning suggestion was unaccepted by the United States because 
it would have prevented the incorporation of Cuba into the American 
Union. 44 On October 17, 1825, Clay wrote that 11 a declaration on the 
part of the Government of the United States that they will abstain from 
taking advantage of the incidents which may grow out of the present \var 
to \·rrest Cuba from Spain, is unnecessary. 11 Great Britain also received 
a formal rejection from France because of her commitment to support the 
objectives of the Holy Alliance.45 The British Foreign Secretary re-
marked to the United States Hinister in Great Britain that he was great-
ly disappointed \vith the attitude of the United States and France. As 
for the American objection concerning the threat of Hexico and Colombia, 
Canning commented that they had the right as belligerents to attack 
Cuba and l>uerto Rico.46 
At the end of 1825 Charles R. Vaugham, the British Minister in the 
United States, discussed the problem in the Caribbean with Clay and sug-
gested then that the United States "dissuade the Hexican and Colombians 
from making any attack upon Cuba. Vaughrun later \·rrote to Canning: 
In the conversations \vhich I have had \vi th Hr. Clay upon 
the subject of the proposed attack upon the island of Cuba 
by the Governments of Colombia and Hexico, I ventured to 
suggest the advantage, lvhich might be derived from the 
Govern..-·nent exerting any influence which it might possess 
over those new States, to dissuade them from such and 
enterprise. Hr. Clay informed me that he was this day 
engaged in dra;dng instructions to the plenipotentiaries 
• • • to suspend at least their intended operations • • 
The United States \vould not see \dth indifference any 
proceedings ~vhich should tend to arm the black against 
the \vhite inhabitants, and the plenipotentiaries from 
those countries \vould, therefore, be instructed to re-
quired the abandonment of any part of their scheme of 
conquest in \vhich the aid of the blacks \vas to enter as 
an essential part. 47 
. . 
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Vaugham' s conversation \vith Clay reflects the preocupation \vith a 
slave insurrection in Cuba. ifuile Clay did not use this argument in 
his request to the Ministers of Hexico and Colombia it is certain that, 
among all the reasons "hich the United States utilized to justified her 
actions in Cuba, the threat of a slave insurrection was of decisive im-
portance • Puerto Rico played a secondary role in the foreign policy 
of the United States because she had a very small slave population and 
the concern for a slave insurrection there \vas not that important. Cuba, 
on the other hand, was the object of considerable attention because of 
the large nu:nber of blacks on the island. 
Canning \vas furious after receiving Vaugh am 1 s communication and 
he promptly disavmved the British Hillister's conversation with Clay. 
Canning's reply read in part: 
• • • you suggested an interference by the United States to 
dissuade the Hexicans and Colombians from maldng any attack 
upon Cuba. You will not find in your Instructions any autho-
rity to hold this language • • • • If the United States think 
that particular interests of their mm required that a cer-
tain operation of war should not be undertaken by one of the 
belligerents, it is a question, and a very nice one for 
them, hmv they \·.rill prevent the undertaldng of it; but it 
is manifest that \ve have not the lilce interest either to 
induce, or to justify us, in so unusual an interposition 
• • • • If there \vere anything in the attack upon the in-
sular possessions of Spai.n by a Po\·rer, openly and lawfully 
at \var \d th her, Hhich \vas beyond the rights of \'lar, or 
contrary to those of humanity, there might be some ground 
of interference on the part, not of the United States only, 
but of all neutral Pow·ers. But if it be merely the inter-
ests of the United States that are concerned, that ground 
of interference can only belong to them, nor is there 
any obligation upon us to share the odium of such an 
interposition. 48 
232 
Canning's message to Vaugham summarized British policy tO\vard the 
Caribbean. \·Jhile Great Britain wanted to preserve the status quo, she 
intended to remain neutral in the Caribbean. That attitude gave Canning 
11 an advantage \vhich he used with great skill to establish his position -
with Mexico and Colombia at the expense of France and the United States. u49 
At the Congress of Panama in the folloWing year, the British represen-
tative told the Spanish American delegates that the United States \vas 
responsible for the suspension of the operation against Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. He recommended, therefore, the abandonment of the project "on the 
ground that the United States had already announced that they would in-
terfere, and that their action would be bound to bring Britain also. 11 
Since the United States had no representatives at Panama, the British 
yiewpoint of American responsibility for tlnvarting the invasion plans 
of Mexico and Colombia gained immediate acceptance by the delegates.5°_ 
France played a minor role in convincing the Spanish American re-
publics of the dangerous effects of their proposed action. The fate of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, however, \vas a subject of considerable interest to 
the French government. Jean Batiste Vill~le, President of the Council 
of Ministers, told Granville that the French government had approved a 
ne,., policy toward Spanish America. Emphasizing the importance of Cuba · 
and Puerto Rico, he expected a continuation of the status quo in the 
Caribbean. As a result, Great Britain gave assurances to France that 
she had no desire to interfere in the affairs of Cuba and Puerto Hico 
but that she \vould not permit their occupation by the United States. 
Granville told Villele that he had been author.ized to express, the 
• • • readiness of His Hagesty 1 s Government to record 
conjointly with France, the determination, conunon to 
both Governments, not to aLm at the lJest Indies, nor 
to permit such occupation by the American government. 51 
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In spite of these assurances, in August, 1825, France increased her 
naval forces in the Caribbean. 'Ihe United States and Great Britain im-
mediately protested. On October 25, 1825, the United States informed 
the French government that 11\ve could not ccnsent to the occupation of 
those islands by any other European pm-1er than Spain under any contin-
52 gency \vhatever. 11 Great Britain also demanded an explanation from the 
French governm~nt concerning its intentions in the Caribbean. The French 
Foreign Hinister replied that the Governor of Hartinique had been the 
official responsible for ordering the French squadron into the Caribbean 
and that France had no territorial ambitions in the Vest Indies. 'Ihe 
explanation satisfied the British government, but Canning protested the 
lack of control over colonial officials. 11No plea \vhatever could jus-
tify in our eyes the introduction of a French military force into the 
Spanish islands, 11 Canning informed VillHe. 53 
During the emergency, Great Britain discovered that France had in-
tentions of sending armed forces to Puerto Rico to suppress local in-
surrections. Cruming, therefore, \varned the Spanish Foreign Hinister that 
Great Britain \vould not allo\v the use of French forces in Cuba or Puerto 
Rico to restrain independence. 54 He also refused to compromise with France 
~n a,joint declaration guaranteeing the Spaniru1 possession of Cuba ru1d 
Puerto Rico, in spite of the fact that he desired a formal \\Titten agree-
ment \vith that nation concerning the status quo in the Caribbean. 55 
The arrival of the French squadron in Cuba also caused considerable 
alarm in Hexico; her motives \vere not unfounded. Spain's plans for the 
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reconquest of her lost empire gave precedence to Hexico because of her 
rich silver mines, her larger peninsular population, and her proximity 
to Cuba.56 Since .the beginning of the year, Hexico had received reports 
that Spain and France \vere organizing a large expedition to protect the 
Caribbean and attack the Hexican coast. 5l 1·lhen the French squadron ar-
rived, the President of Hexico requested that Great Britain and the 
United States intervene to defend the Hexican territory by involr..ing the 
Honr.oe Doctrine. The United States, hmvever, rejected the request be-
cause the Hexican government implied "that the declaration of Honroe 
gave Hexico the right to demand that the United States interfere on be-
half of the ne\v state. n58 'lhis action would have clearly violated Amer-
ican neutra..li ty. 
President Guadalupe Victoria viewed the American refusal as a sign 
that the Honroe Doctrine served only the peculiar interests of the Unit-
ed States. By that time the relations betv1een the United States and 
Hexico had deteriorated rapidly. Ori September 1, 1815, the United Stat-
es had issued a proclamation prohibiting American citizens from help-
ing the Hexican insurgents.· The directive also prohibited the sale of 
weapons and military supplies to the revolutionaries and the departure 
of armed expeditions from American ports. ~vo years later, the United 
States prohibited still further American participation in the Hexican 
revolution. \·lith the official proclamations of neutrality, Hexico com-
pletely changed its attitude tmvard the United States. 
By the time that Hexico achieved her independence, the leaders of 
the revolution had developed a strong sense of distrust for the United 
States. President Victoria's dissatisfaction \vas so great that he cam-
paigned for the establishment of an organization of Spanish American 
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states to oppose what he considered to be the aggressive policies of 
the United States. 
As a result of the congressional debate concerning the confirmation 
of the American delegation to the Congress of Panama, President Adams 
removed the injunction of secrecy from all the messages and documents 
concerning United States policy in the Caribbean. 'Ihe President submit-
ted carefully selected extracts of this correspondence, but in spite of 
the editing, publication of these documents, especially the communica-
tions bet\veen Hexico and the United States concerning the Honroe Doctrine, 
irritated President Victoria. 111e Hexican chief executive.considered the 
intervention of the United States in the affairs of the Caribbean ill-
judged, unsolicited, and detrimantal to Hexico and Colombia. According 
to the Hexican government, the United States insistance on the status 
quo had guaranteed Spain 1 s continued control of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 59 
In spite of the· international effort to prevent the Colombian and 
Hexican attack on Cuba and Puerto Rico, by the end of 1825 war appeared to 
be innninent in the Caribbean. as a result on December 30, 1825, Secretary 
Clay instructed Richard C. Anderson to inform the Colombian government 
that the Unit~d States \vould oppose any military action in the Caribbean. 
Clay wrote: 
It is the wish of the President that you should lose no 
time in making lmmm to the Colombian Government the 
purpose of the letter to Hr. Salazar ••• and that you 
further the object of it as far as may be in your po\:er 
by direct and friendly explanations \dth the Goverrunent 
upon that subject. 60 · 
In spite of the fact that the United States had received 11nothing 
but polite generalities11 from Russia about the termination of hostilities,61 
Clay instructed Anderson 11to use the papers and facts" that had been 
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communicated to Count Nesselrode to justify the request for a suspension 
of 11 any military or naval expedition preparing against Cuba and Puerto 
Rico.n62 A similar directive, adapted for the Hexican government, was 
sent to Joel R. Poinsett, the United States Ninister to Hexico. 
On Harch 1, 1826, Anderson informed the Colombian government of 
his instructions. In his Diary, he later 'vrote: 
Went to se~ ["JamesJ Henderson, ["DritishJ Consul Gen.,. 
eral and f.. J os~ Hafael J Revenga. Had a long conversa-
tion 'dth them concerning the attempt of this Goverrunent 
and Hexico to make Cuba and Puerto Rico independent. I 
am instructed to dissuade [.~Anderson's emphasisJ this 
Government from the attempt on account of the fear that 
those islands cannot maintain their independence and a 
fear that the slaves 'rill get possession. I do not like 
much my business. I think that every belligerent has 
a right to annoy ru1d distress its enemy in every practi-
cable \vay. 63 
Both Nexico and Colombia coldly received the United States 1 request 
for a suspension of the planned attack upon Cuba and Puerto Rico. On 
january 4, 1826, Pablo Obreg6n, the Nexican Hinister in the United Stat-
es, informed Clay that the communication had been forwarded to the Hexican 
govern.111ent. 64 Upon the receipt of Obreg6n 1 s note, the Hexican Senate 
angrily decided to act against the wishes of the United States. On 
January 28, 1826, the Senate approved a proposal for a joint expedition 
against Cuba. According to Poinsett, it also requested that the Chamber of 
Deputies direct,the delegates to the Panama Congress ttto concert means 
with those of Colombia for a joint expedition.n65 
'Ihe Hexican Chamber of Deputies, ho\-.rever, reconsidered the Senate 
resolution and posponed any action rruntil the Executive could submit to 
the consideration of Congress the plans \vhich may be agreed upon at 
Panam~.n66 President Victoria agreed \dth the decision of the Chamber 
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of Deputies 11 to let the Plenipotentiaries at Panama decide the future 
of Cuba a:n.d Puerto Rico. 11 He also told Poinsett "that the government 
of Hexico had no intention to conquer or take possession of the island 
of Cuba, 11 and that the object of the intended expedition "was to assist 
the revolutionaries drive out the Spaniards, and, in case they succeeded, 
to leave the people to govern themselves. 1167 Colombia, apparently, had 
the same intentions tow·ard Cuba and Puerto Rico. 68 
The warnings of the United States and the uncertain conditions in 
the Caribbean, \vhich may have warranted the intervention of both France 
and Great Britain, resulted in the postponement of the plrumed expedi-
tion to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico. Hexico and Colombia did not 
\V'ant another armed conflict inunediately after years of savage fighting 
for independence. Their insistence on liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico 
had been primarily the result of strategic considerations. ~vhen Span-
ish power considerably diminished in the ~·/estern Hemisphere and the 
threat of royalist armed attacks from the Caribbean subsided, both 
Hexico and Colombia reccmsidered their actions. 
Since an invasion of the Spanish Caribbean \vould have upset the 
status quo maintained by Great Britain, France, and the United States, 
MeJdco and Colombia decided to let the representatives at the proposed 
Congress of Panama evaluate the political status of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
M1en the United States and the European pmvers objected to the invasion 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico at the Congress of Panama with the same vigor 
that they had sho'm so far, the Spanish American republics did not in-
elude the subject on their agenda. Hithout the support of the other 
Spanish American nations, Mexico and Colombia cancelled the plans for 
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the liberation of the Spanish Vlest Indies. That decision prevented the 
independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico during the first part of the nine-
teenth century. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCUJSIONS 
The status quo maintained by the United States and the European 
powers in the Caribbean during the first quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury prevented the expansion of the Spanish American movement for inde-
pendence to the Spanish West Indies. It also inhibited the politicaJ_ 
emancipation of Cuba and Puerto Rico when local conditions, created by 
the instability of. the peninsular government and the chaos \vhich result-
ed in Spanish America, were most favorable for accomplishing that goal. 
The struggle bet\veen the United States and the European powers for con-
trol of the Caribbean also shaped the relations of the United States 
\vith Spanish America and the attitude of Hexico and Colombia tmvard Amer-
ican foreign policy. 
Spanish colonialism retarded the national development and the pol-
itical, economic, and social gro\Vth of Cuba and Puerto RicoG During 
the entire colonial regime, these islands did not advance beyond the 
statusof poor colonies. Since agriculture played a significant role on 
the islands and the government limited land distribution to a few indi-
viduals, the latifundio, or landed estates with primitive agriculture 
and often servile labor, dominated the colonial economy. As a result, 
industrialization and manufacturing, aided by foreign capital, techni-
cians, and immigrant labor from Europe, did not develop during the se-
cond half of' the nineteenth century, a period when expanded industrial 




Repressive monopolies, high taxes, and a centralized and autocratic 
syst.em of government also restricted progress in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
Spain did not extend to the insular possessions the civil liberties and 
political concessions that had been granted to the citizens of the pe-
ninsula until the last decades of the nineteenth century. When the Cons-
titution of 1812 was restored in 1836, the li1sular governors protested 
to Spain that it was rnu,rise to introduce parliamentary reforms into the 
Spanish possessions. As a result, in 1837 the government decided to 
rule Cuba and Puerto Rico by Leyes Especiales (Special Laws}, instead 
of extending to the islands the constitutional guarantees and political 
reforms granted to the mainland. 
Despite the repressiveness of the government and the backwater con-
ditions of the colonies, the people remained loyal to Spain for more 
than three hundred years. In the nineteenth centlrry, however, the pol-
itical turmoil that besieged Spain and her colonies as a result of the 
Napoleonic invasion caused great anxiety and concern among the Cubru1s 
and Puerto Ricans. The French invasion of Spain and the indecisive actions 
of the Spanish government also affected the political expectations and 
loyalty of the colonies. A rising national conciousness begru1 to mani-
fest itself among the Cubans and Puerto Ricans, influenced both by the 
political events on the peninsula and by their belief in the inevitability .. 
of a prolonged struggle for independence in Spanish America. 
Social, economic, and political discrimination resulted. in creole 
dissatisfaction. Spanish Crown officials and the peninsular aristocracy 
in the islands distrusted and feared the creoles, considered them in-
feriors, and believed that they lacked the proper cultural and social 
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graces. Cubans and Puerto Ricans, except on a few occasions, did not 
attain positions of responsibility or authority in the local government 
because the peninsulares normally monopolized the lucrative bureaucratic 
posts. 'fhe Spaniards also controlled the business and commercial mono-
polies and the military forces that defended the islands. Furthermore, 
the creoles did not have representation in the political affairs of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico and could not change any law promulgated by Spain. 
The peninsulares believed the creoles were incapable of self-government 
and unable to direct the political affairs of the colonies. 
The brief period of free trade and economic concessions which Spain 
bestO\ved at. the end of the eighteenth century, however, diminished the 
creoles narrow provinciaJ.ism and their sense of inferiority and brought 
to their attention the importance of \vorld events. As a result of that 
awareness, the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, and the imprisonment of 
Ferdinand VII, Cubans and Puerto Ricans began to demand meaningful con-
cessions. During that time, the creoles identified themselves with col-
onial goals rather than \vith national objectives. A strong sense of 
individualism, personality, and identity became evident in their desires 
for increased social equality and decreased political control. Since 
the prosperity of many Cuban creoles depended on slavery and the plan-
tation system, they demanded the continuation of the slave trade, un-
restricted migration, and labor control and advocated free trade with 
all countries and popular education. On the other hand, the principal 
concerns of the Puerto Rican creoles were the reduction of trade barriers, 
the elimination of commercial restrictions, the promotion of agriculture, 
reduction of taxes, and equality of opporturiity for private economic 
interests. 
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The liberal outlook of some colonial rulers, the impro·vement of 
the economy, and the efforts made to resolve the colonial differences 
that existed between creoles and peninsulaEes, however, could not stifle 
the strong sense of nationality and pride in creole leadership \·;hich 
had arisen among the Cuba..."ls and Puerto Ricans. Spain's erractic adminis-
tration further increased creole nationalism. The insular planters and 
merchants of an emerging bourgeoise, having profited greatly by the 
few economic concessions of the preceeding century, realized that 
additional reforms were necessary if they were to maintain. a viable 
commercial system. Since the desired concessions appeared to be unattain-
able without substantial changes in the political system, Cuban creoles 
began to favor local autonomy, annexation by the United States, or out-
right independence. In Puerto Rico, many creoles demanded complete as--
similation into the political system or separation from Spain as the 
only solution · for resolving the colonial problem. 
The fe\v concessions granted by Spain \vere mostly economic in nature 
and primarily benefited the wealthy creoles and the middle class merchants. 
They did not, ho\vever, improve the political conditions of the colonies 
or the economic status of the poor peasants, free blacks, ru1d slaves 
who lived in poverty, had no education, and \vere unaware of the funda-
mental needs of social change. As a result,the political apathy of the 
masses, intensified by years of oppresion and military controls, began 
to change after 1810. Under the leadership of the separatists, secret 
societies, and Hasonic lodges, many Cubans and Puerto Ricans began to 
reconsider the extent of their loyalty to the Crown. 
The movement for political emancipation in Venezuela and Santo Domin-
go also strengtl1ened the nationalistic spirit of many Cubans and Puerto 
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Ricans. The revolutionary leaders that emerged to direct the indepen-
dence effort came mostly from the middle class. These, separatists 
began to furnish the directing force of the movement for Cuban and 
Puerto Rican independence, in spite of the opposition of the peninsu-
lares, the liberal and conservative creoles, and the passivity of the 
rural lmver classes. In Cuba, the Soles y Rayos de Bolivar became a 
true revolutionary organization \vith thousands of follo\vers from all 
sectors of society. 
In spite of their efforts, Cubans and Puerto Ricans could not 
achieve independence. The dictatorial measures of the government and 
the exile of many important leaders significantly affected the struggle 
for independence in both countries. The geographical position of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico prevented the spread of the national liberation move-
ments from Spanish America, and the factional disputes bet\veen conser-
vatives, liberals, and separatists also affected the struggle for in-
dependence. Racial peculiarities, regionalism, apathy, and ignorance 
would have made a local insurrection difficult \'l'ithout help from the 
Spanish American republics.· 
The rapacity of the insular governors, the suppression of indivi-
dual liberties, and the reestablishment of absolutism did not discourage 
independence. The military garrisons and the government '·s protective 
measures, however, made an internal revolt virtually impossible. Thus, 
after years of continuous defeats, improper preparation, and poor 
coordination, the separatists decided to take a different approach to 
accomplish their objectives. They resolved to place their hopes for 
success :in the victorious armies of the Spanish American republics. 
The intervention of Hexico and Colombia in the political affairs 
250 
of the Caribbean added a ne\v dimension to the independence movements 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Whi.le the goals of the separatists parallel-
ed the interests of the Spanish American republics, they were diamet-
rically opposed to those of the United States, Great Britain, and France. 
When Colombia and Mexico turned their attention to the liberation of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States and the European powers opposed -
their plans because they would have threatened the status quo in the Carib-
bean. 
The United States intervened in the Caribbean to protect its grow-
ing interests in the West Indies. The concern for the nation.' s secur-
ity, the need to protect her trade and commerce, and the fear that 
the Spanish American conflict would eventually spread to her own borders 
were compelling reasons for the intervention of the United States. The 
threat to the institution of slavery and the desire of some Southern 
political leaders for territorial expansion in the Caribbean were also 
factors of considerable importance. · 
National interests made necessary the prevention of non-Spanish 
foreign control of the Caribbean. Neither \vas it in the best interests 
of the United States to allow Cuba and Puerto Rico to gain se:J_f-government 
because of the possibility that Great Britain or France would seize them 
after independence. This circumstance, it \vas believed, would serious-
ly compromise United States national security and damage her commercial 
and trade interests in the area. 
As Mexico and Colombia began to organize an expedition to liberate 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States sought direct intervention by 
the European pmvers. The American government asked Great Britain, France 
and Russia to exercise their influence to convince Spain to terminate 
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the Spanish American conflict by recognizing the independence of the 
mainland colonies. By securing peace in the lvestern Hemisphere, the 
United States would PI-event the expansion. of the successful Spanish Amer-
ican movement for independence to the Spanish ':iest Indies and protect-
ed the status quo in the Caribbean. 
The United States also attempted to convince Spain that, unless 
she ended the Spanish American conflict and recognized the independence 
of the nmv republics, she was in danger of losing her possessions in 
the Caribbean. This move also \vas designed to influence Hexico and 
Colombia, who desired to end the hostilities in the mainland. At the 
same time, the United States reemphasized to Great Britain and France 
the need of maintaining the status quo. The United States believed 
that if Hexico or Colombia intervened militarily in the Caribbean, 
Great Britain or France would feel compelled to join the conflict to 
protect their mm interests. 
Great Britain supported the actions of the United States because 
she \vanted to prevent possible American intervention in the \vest Indies. 
She also feared that the Spanish American republics might extend their 
operations to her own colonies. The British governnumt, how·ever, did 
not wish to oppose openly the Spanish American plans and thereby alienate 
the new republics. Instead,she recommended the abandonment of their 
project because the United States had indicated that she would interfere 
to protect the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Great Britain, therefore, 
made the United States responsible for thwarting the invasion plans of 
Hexico and Colombia. 
France did not approve· the plans of Hexico and Colombia but re-
mained neutral as result of Great Britain's influence in the Caribbean. 
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The Russian government also accepted the recommendations of the United 
States. Russia's concern, hmvever, was not the danger involved in an 
attack from Hexico·and Colombia but rather the use of force by the 
United States to impose a military solution to a political problem. 
Colombia and Hexico decided, in view of the American opposition, 
to bring the subject of the colonial status of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
before the Congress of Panama during the summer of 1a26. When the 
representatives of the Spanish American repub~ics met in june, re-
ne\ved attempts by the United States and the European powers to maintain 
the status quo in the Caribbean further dissuaded the leaders of Hexico 
and Colombia from intervening in the islands. 
The actions of the United States created distrust of American in-
tentions in Spanish America and strained hemispheric relations. By 
the time the United States decided to commit its influence to preserve 
the status quo, .. relations with Hexico had deteriorated. President 
Victoria's dissatisfaction with the United States was so great that 
he campaigned for the establishment of an organization of Spanish Amer-
ican states to oppose the growing power of the United States. The 
intervention of the United States in the affairs of the Caribbean, an 
area which Hexico considered important for the defense of her eastern 
boundaries, increased Hexican concern. The suppression of a~sistance 
for the Hexican revolutionaries, the intervention in the Caribbean, 
and the refusal of the United States to help and acknowledge Pres~dent 
Honroe' s declaration whenHexico asked for assistance resulted in the 
ill-\vill of the Hexican government during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. 
When ne\vS arrived in the Venezuelan capital about the decision to . 
cancel the expedition the separatists immediately sought Bolivar's 
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opinion. He told them that the opposition of the United States had 
been the decisive factor in the suspension of the proposed invasion. 
The National Congress of Cuban Historians lvhich met in 1947 in Havana 
also declared that the opposition of the United States was the prin-
cipal reason which prevented the Spanish American republics from 
agreeing on the Caribbean problem in 1826. This belief still predo-
minates in many parts of Spanish America. 
The leaders of the Cuban and Puerto Rican movements for independence 
clearly understood t:1at to continue•. the struggle for political eman-
cipation would be futile \vithout direct assistance from the Spanish 
American republics~ Rebellion in Cuba and Puerto Rico during that 
time had less chance of success thru1 on the mainland because of the 
islands 1 geograp1ical isolation and the repressive measures of the 
Spanish government. Hany creoles, \vho feared that they would not be 
able to control the black slaves after independence, opposed insurrect-
ion. Their reticence greatly inhibited revolutionary activities in Cuba. 
The status quo supported by the United States and the European 
powers in the Caribbean prevented the liberation and independence of 
the last Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere during the first 
part of the nineteenth century. As a result of this political restraint 
which assured Spain control of her dependencies in the West Indies, 
Cuba and Puerto Rico were unable to gain their independence when local 
conditions \vere most favorable for accomplishing that goal. 
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